The case involved EMD Solutions, Inc. filing a collection action against Pediatrics by the Bay (PBB) in district court for $7,269.64 in unpaid services, after which PBB asserted counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud; the case was transferred to circuit court, where a bench trial resulted in a February 2011 judgment for EMD on its claim and the counterclaims, followed by a separate award of $13,703.76 in attorney fees. PBB appealed both the merits judgment and the fee award. The appellate court dismissed the portion of the appeal challenging the February 2011 judgment on the counterclaims as untimely, because that judgment fully resolved the claims and was final despite the unresolved attorney-fee amount, and the notice of appeal was filed more than 42 days later. The court affirmed the attorney-fee award, holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion given expert testimony that the fees were reasonable and necessary to the collection effort under the contract's broad "all cost of collection" provision, as the counterclaims were intertwined with the collection claim.
The case involved a mother appealing a juvenile court judgment that adjudicated J.S.F. as the biological father of her child, awarded him custody, and ordered the child's surname changed to his. The mother argued that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to change the child's surname, citing prior law that reserved such authority exclusively for probate courts. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that a 2009 amendment to the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act, specifically § 26-17-636(e), expressly grants juvenile courts the power to order a name change in paternity adjudication proceedings over which they have original jurisdiction. The decision rested on the statutory grant of authority and the fact that the juvenile court was properly exercising its paternity jurisdiction when issuing the order.
Pace Reid sought a permit from the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) to erect an outdoor advertising sign on his unzoned property adjacent to Interstate 65, but ALDOT denied the application on the ground that the proposed location was not within 600 feet of regularly used commercial activity as required by the Highway Beautification Act. An administrative law judge upheld the denial, but the trial court reversed after finding that portions of the property, including a concrete pad and south-entrance driveway used by the tenant moving company, qualified as commercial or processing areas. ALDOT appealed, arguing that the sign location did not meet the statutory distance requirement and that the concrete pad was not regularly used for commercial purposes. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment because ALDOT had failed to challenge one of the independent bases for reversal—that the driveway constituted a processing area—and therefore waived any argument on that ground.
In this case, the maternal grandmother filed a dependency petition in juvenile court after the mother's death, seeking temporary custody of the child and adjudication of the father's paternity, alleging the father's past abuse, mental instability, and inability to provide stability. The father petitioned for a writ of mandamus to dismiss the action, arguing lack of jurisdiction because it was a custody dispute and that the grandmother lacked standing to seek paternity adjudication since he was a presumed father under Alabama law. The Court of Civil Appeals held that the petition's allegations of dependency were sufficient to invoke the juvenile court's jurisdiction and rejected the father's jurisdictional challenge, but concluded the grandmother lacked standing to pursue paternity adjudication. Accordingly, the court granted the petition in part by directing dismissal of the paternity claim and vacating the genetic testing order, while denying relief on the dependency aspects. The decision rested on the statutory definition of a dependent child and rules regarding standing and presumed paternity.
This case concerns post-divorce contempt petitions filed by Rosemary Posey Brown and James Earl Brown, each accusing the other of failing to comply with obligations under their 2006 divorce judgment, including payment of a property settlement, mortgage on the former marital home, credit-card debts, and transfer of a timeshare. After a trial, the circuit court ordered the ex-wife to transfer the timeshare, held her responsible for $45,530.17 in credit-card debt and $34,703.63 in mortgage and housing costs paid by the ex-husband, and entered a money judgment in his favor. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversed the credit-card portion of the judgment because the ex-husband failed to prove that the ex-wife had incurred those debts after separation, affirmed the remainder of the judgment because certain sufficiency challenges were not preserved by a post-judgment motion, and remanded for further proceedings.
The case concerned a contract dispute between Mobile Attic, Inc. and its advertising agency TotalCom over whether Mobile Attic was obligated to pay annual talent-renewal fees for professional actors appearing in television commercials produced in 2005, after Mobile Attic had already paid the initial production costs of $196,000. The trial court found that the parties had agreed to the fees based on prior discussions, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed that ruling. The majority reasoned that evidence of conversations between the parties' representatives, combined with industry standards and the parties' conduct, demonstrated mutual assent to the ongoing fee obligation under an implied contract. The dissent argued that the record lacked sufficient proof of mutual assent to any such term.