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Old Carco Motors LLC v. Suthers (In Re Old Carco LLC)
District Court, S.D. New York · 2012-03-15 · cited 5×
This case involved plaintiffs from the Chrysler bankruptcy proceedings challenging Kentucky and Colorado state statutes that regulate relationships between vehicle manufacturers and dealership franchises. The plaintiffs argued these laws conflicted with federal Bankruptcy Code provisions and bankruptcy court orders allowing the rejection of certain dealer agreements, violating the Supremacy Clause, and also interfered with contractual expectations under the Contract Clause. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the preemption claim against Kentucky, finding that the state laws directly conflicted with the bankruptcy court's rejection orders by imposing additional requirements on manufacturers seeking to establish or relocate dealerships. It denied Kentucky's motion to dismiss but dismissed the claims against Colorado without prejudice and did not reach the Contract Clause issues. The reasoning centered on the Supremacy Clause resolving conflicts between federal bankruptcy authority and state dealer protection statutes in favor of federal law.
business & regulatoryfederal power
Wireless Ink Corp. v. Facebook, Inc.
District Court, S.D. New York · 2011-05-26 · cited 11×
This case involves Wireless Ink Corp. suing Facebook, Inc. and Google, Inc. for direct and indirect infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,599,983, which covers methods for users to create and manage personalized mobile websites with content channels suited to limited mobile displays, along with the defendants' counterclaims seeking declaratory judgments of non-infringement and patent invalidity. The parties cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), with the plaintiff also moving to strike the invalidity affirmative defense under Rule 12(f). The court denied the defendants' motion, finding the allegations sufficient to state an infringement claim, denied the motion to strike, and granted dismissal of the invalidity counterclaims because they failed to plausibly allege invalidity.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Gelber v. Stryker Corp.
District Court, S.D. New York · 2011-04-18 · cited 40×
In Gelber v. Stryker Corp., plaintiff Jeanette Gelber sued Stryker and related entities after a Trident hip replacement system implanted in 2004 caused pain, squeaking, and other issues, requiring revision surgery in 2009; her husband asserted derivative claims. The suit raised state-law claims for strict products liability based on manufacturing defects, negligence, breach of implied and express warranties, and loss of consortium, alleging violations of federal FDA regulations for the Class III medical device. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, allowing the manufacturing defect claims in negligence and strict liability plus certain express warranty claims to proceed while dismissing the rest. It reasoned that some claims were not preempted by the Medical Device Amendments because they paralleled federal requirements and were adequately pleaded, whereas others were preempted or failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The loss of consortium claim survived only to the extent it derived from the surviving claims.
torts & liabilityhealthcarefederal powerbusiness & regulatory
Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc.
District Court, S.D. New York · 2011-03-31 · cited 19×
The case involved a civilian contractor who was injured after falling in a toilet facility at Camp Shield, a forward operating base in Iraq, and sued Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., the private contractor responsible for operations and maintenance at the base under a LOGCAP contract with the U.S. military, alleging negligence in the facility's design, construction, repair, and maintenance. Kellogg moved to dismiss or for summary judgment on multiple grounds, including the political question doctrine, preemption under the combatant activities exception to the FTCA, derivative sovereign immunity, and the Defense Production Act. The court held that the political question doctrine did not bar the claim but concluded that the plaintiff's tort claims were preempted by unique federal interests arising from the combatant activities exception to the FTCA. It reasoned that Kellogg's services were integrated into military operations at the base, which was subject to ongoing combat threats and under military command authority, so that imposing state tort liability would conflict with federal policy. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant without reaching the other defenses.
torts & liabilityfederal power
Footbridge Limited Trust v. Countrywide Financial Corp.
District Court, S.D. New York · 2011-03-16 · cited 17×
The case involved two hedge funds that purchased mortgage-backed securities issued by Countrywide in 2006 through public offerings and later sued under sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, alleging material misstatements and omissions in the registration statements and prospectuses. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the claims were barred by the statute of repose. The court granted the motion, concluding that the three-year statute of repose under section 13 of the Act had expired and that the American Pipe class-action tolling doctrine does not apply to the '33 Act's statute of repose.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Institute for the Development of Earth Awareness v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
District Court, S.D. New York · 2011-03-10
The case involved a copyright infringement claim by the Institute for the Development of Earth Awareness against People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, alleging that PETA copied elements from the book "The Dreaded Comparison," which draws parallels between historical human oppressions like slavery and the treatment of animals, in PETA's Animal Liberation Project materials that made similar comparisons. The court granted PETA's motion for summary judgment. The decision was based on the finding that no reasonable jury could determine that PETA had copied protected original expression from the book or an original combination of unprotected elements, as the comparisons, side-by-side images, quotations, and subtopics were commonplace and unoriginal, and the overall concept and feel of the works differed.
propertyprocedure
GoSmile, Inc. v. Dr. Jonathan Levine, DMDPC
District Court, S.D. New York · 2011-03-07 · cited 247×
The case involved Go SMiLE, Inc., a company marketing tooth-whitening products, suing its former co-founder Dr. Jonathan Levine and his dental practice for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and New York law. Go SMiLE alleged that Levine's new "Glo" product line, developed after his departure from the company, infringed on its registered trademarks such as "Go Smile" and related marks. The court held an evidentiary hearing on Go SMiLE's motion for a preliminary injunction to stop the defendants from marketing the Glo products. The court denied the motion, concluding that Go SMiLE did not establish a likelihood of success on the merits because consumers were unlikely to confuse the marks.
business & regulatory
GMA Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC
District Court, S.D. New York · 2011-02-08 · cited 28×
This case involves a trademark infringement lawsuit brought by GMA Accessories, owner of the registered mark 'CHARLOTTE' for clothing and accessories, against Electric Wonderland, a fashion showroom service provider. GMA alleged that Electric Wonderland infringed the mark and engaged in counterfeiting by displaying and brokering sales of goods from designer Charlotte Solnicki, which were labeled 'Charlotte Solnicki' and sometimes identified with 'Charlotte' on sales documents. The court denied GMA's motion for summary judgment on liability, finding insufficient evidence that the mark was used in a manner likely to cause confusion or constitute infringement. It also denied the defendant's cross-motion on damages but granted summary judgment to the defendant on the counterfeiting claim, as there was no evidence of the standalone 'Charlotte' mark being placed on labels or displays.
business & regulatory
Mabry v. Neighborhood Defender Service
District Court, S.D. New York · 2011-01-31 · cited 67×
The case involves a pro se plaintiff, Reginald Antoine Mabry, who remains employed as Computer Services Director at the Neighborhood Defender Service, suing the organization and its executive director under the ADEA, Title VII, ADA, and related state and city human rights laws. He alleged age-based discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation tied to budget-driven limits on administrative raises, conflicts with a supervisor, and disability discrimination based on anxiety and related conditions for which he sought accommodations. The district court granted the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the entire complaint. The core reasoning was that the pleadings failed to state plausible claims, including that the plaintiff's medical condition did not substantially limit a major life activity under the pre-2009 ADA standards applicable to the 2008 events, and other deficiencies in alleging adverse actions or protected activity.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Jw Oilfield Equipment, LLC v. Commerzbank Ag
District Court, S.D. New York · 2011-01-14 · cited 19×
The case involved JW Oilfield Equipment, LLC attempting to enforce a money judgment obtained in federal court in Oklahoma against J.J.S. Oilfield Supply, GmbH by seeking a turnover order directing Commerzbank AG to pay over funds held in the judgment debtor's account. The court granted the petition for a writ of execution and turnover order under Rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.Y. CPLR § 5225(b). It rejected Commerzbank's objections based on due process, international comity, and forum non conveniens, reasoning that the judgment originated from a U.S. court, the debtor had chosen to litigate in the U.S., the separate entity rule did not apply post-Koehler to bar enforcement, and the relevant convenience and public interest factors did not favor dismissal.
procedure
Condal Distributors, Inc. v. 2300 Xtra Wholesalers, Inc. (In Re 2300 Xtra Wholesalers, Inc.)
District Court, S.D. New York · 2011-01-14 · cited 1×
This case involves appeals by landlord Condal Distributors from two bankruptcy court orders in the Chapter 11 case of tenant 2300 Xtra Wholesalers, Inc. regarding a commercial lease for a Bronx property. Condal sought to lift the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 to pursue eviction and challenged the approval of the lease's sale and assignment under §§ 363 and 365. The district court affirmed both orders, concluding that the lease had not terminated by expiration of its stated term so the § 362(b)(10) exemption did not apply, that Condal had waived any § 362(e) timing objection, and that the bankruptcy court's findings on cure of defaults and adequate assurance of future performance under § 365(b)(1) were not clearly erroneous after de novo review of legal issues and clear-error review of facts.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Zaccaro v. Shah
District Court, S.D. New York · 2010-09-29 · cited 10×
The case involved plaintiff John Zaccaro, a former limited partner in Affordable Hospitality Associates, L.P. (AHA), who sold his 16.5% interest in a Philadelphia hotel to Nish Capital, Inc. for $203,000; Nish then transferred it to a company controlled by defendant Hasu Shah. Shortly afterward, a REIT chaired by Shah acquired 80% of AHA at a price roughly seven times higher per share, and Zaccaro sued Shah, other partners, the REIT, and related entities for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and related claims, alleging concealment of the REIT's prior letter of intent. The court denied Zaccaro's motion for summary judgment against Shah on the fraud and fiduciary-duty claims, granted summary judgment to most defendants on the accounting demand, denied the remaining defense summary-judgment motions, and excluded Zaccaro's expert witness, primarily because material factual disputes existed on disclosure obligations and because Pennsylvania partnership law limited accounting claims to the general partner.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
In Re Bank of America Corp. Securities, Derivative, & Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) Litigation
District Court, S.D. New York · 2010-08-27 · cited 13×
This case was a putative class action under ERISA brought by participants in Bank of America 401(k) and pension plans, alleging that plan fiduciaries breached their duties of prudence, loyalty, monitoring, and disclosure by continuing to offer Bank of America stock as an investment option during the 2008-2009 class period despite the company's acquisitions of Countrywide and Merrill Lynch. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the complaint failed to plausibly allege that most defendants acted as fiduciaries, that maintaining the company stock fund as required by plan documents was imprudent, or that defendants breached duties to monitor or disclose material information. The court reasoned that following plan documents did not constitute a breach of prudence by the Benefits Committee, and without an underlying breach, claims for failure to monitor and co-fiduciary liability also failed.
labor & employment
In Re Bank of America Corp. Securities, Derivative, & Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) Litigation
District Court, S.D. New York · 2010-08-27 · cited 176×
This case involved consolidated securities class action and shareholder derivative claims against Bank of America and related defendants arising from BofA's 2008 acquisition of Merrill Lynch during the financial crisis. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated federal securities laws by concealing material information in proxy materials and other disclosures about Merrill's mounting fourth-quarter losses, large bonus payments, and federal officials' pressure to complete the deal. The court granted in part and denied in part the motions to dismiss the securities and derivative complaints under Rules 9(b), 12(b)(6), and the PSLRA, finding that some Section 14(a) claims adequately pleaded actionable misstatements or omissions while others failed to allege a disclosure duty, scienter, or loss causation; the financial advisors' motion was granted in full because their fairness opinions contained no continuing duty and no actionable misstatements. Core reasoning focused on whether the complaints met heightened pleading standards for each category of alleged nondisclosure without imputing allegations between the direct and derivative actions.
business & regulatoryprocedure
City of New York v. Lexington Insurance
District Court, S.D. New York · 2010-08-27 · cited 1×
This case is a declaratory judgment action in which the City of New York sought a ruling that its insurer, Lexington Insurance Company, was obligated to defend and indemnify a City police officer in a wrongful death lawsuit stemming from a 1996 incident at the West Indian Day Parade. The policy named the City as an additional insured and covered liability arising from the parade, but Lexington denied coverage for claims against the officer on the ground that it had not received separate and timely notice of those claims. The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and denied Lexington's cross-motion, holding that the notice provided to Lexington regarding the claims against the City was sufficient. Under New York law, the City and its employee were united in interest because the City was vicariously liable for the officer's acts under respondeat superior and statutory indemnification obligations, so notice for one defendant satisfied the policy's requirements for both.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
Boban v. Bank Julius Baer Postre-Tirement Health & Life Insurance Program
District Court, S.D. New York · 2010-07-09 · cited 1×
This case concerns a putative class action by three former Bank Julius Baer employees who alleged ERISA violations after the bank increased retiree contributions for health, dental, and life insurance benefits, contrary to promises in their separation agreements that allowed continued coverage at active-employee rates. The Moving Defendants sought dismissal for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing all claims against the Bank without prejudice for failure to serve process under Rule 4(m) and dismissing certain ERISA claims while allowing the promissory estoppel claim to proceed against the remaining defendants. The core reasoning was that the complaint sufficiently alleged inducement and extraordinary circumstances to support estoppel at the pleading stage, but other claims failed due to the plan documents' reservation of rights to amend benefits.
labor & employment
In Re Marketxt Holdings, Corp.
District Court, S.D. New York · 2010-04-15 · cited 8×
This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court order in the involuntary Chapter 11 proceeding of MarketXT Holdings Corp. The order retroactively annulled the automatic stay to validate an NASD arbitration award of about $545,000 issued in favor of the Claimants after the bankruptcy filing, and it reduced the Claimants' later $37 million proofs of claim on the same Most Favored Nation contract dispute due to the preclusive effect of the award. The district court affirmed, holding that the arbitration was an adjudication on the merits involving the same parties and claims that were or could have been raised there, satisfying the requirements for collateral estoppel. It further found that retroactive stay relief was warranted under Second Circuit precedent despite the lack of notice to the arbitration panel or Claimants. The decision rests on undisputed facts that the debtor knew of the petition but did not inform the panel.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Issac v. City of New York
District Court, S.D. New York · 2010-03-22 · cited 26×
The plaintiff, a 53-year-old African American man employed by the New York City Department of Correction, sued the City, the DOC, and a deputy commissioner under Title VII, the ADEA, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, alleging he was denied promotion to three positions because of his age and in retaliation for a prior discrimination complaint he had filed against another city agency. He also claimed retaliation through delayed appointment to a Staff Analyst title after passing a civil service exam and through an incorrect telephone listing on the city intranet. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and had failed to produce evidence that the defendants’ stated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the employment decisions were pretextual or that discrimination or retaliation was a substantial factor in those decisions.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Ed Ex Rel. Vd v. Tuffarelli
District Court, S.D. New York · 2010-03-02 · cited 30×
This case arose from a 2006 New York City child-neglect investigation by the Administration for Children’s Services that led to the emergency removal of two children, including a ten-year-old autistic boy, without a court order after a teacher reported injuries and lack of medical care. The children, their mother, and one father sued ACS employees under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming the removal lacked a reasonable basis and violated their constitutional rights, along with related state-law claims. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal claims, holding that no reasonable jury could find any constitutional violation on the facts presented, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. It also rejected the defendants’ Rooker-Feldman argument and the plaintiffs’ collateral-estoppel request. The core reasoning centered on the undisputed facts of the reports, the investigation, and the absence of evidence showing a lack of reasonable basis for the emergency action.
civil rightsfamily lawprocedure
RUSO v. Morrison
District Court, S.D. New York · 2010-02-04 · cited 14×
Plaintiff Yako Ruso sued attorney Edward A. Morrison and others under New York common law for fraud, breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of funds after transferring $2.5 million in 2003 for a promised high-return investment that failed to materialize. Morrison moved for summary judgment after discovery closed. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing the negligence, misappropriation, and certain breach of fiduciary duty claims as time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations because Ruso knew or should have known of the claims before April 2005, and dismissing portions of the breach of contract claims for lack of evidence that any provision was breached or that Morrison was a party to the relevant agreement. The court denied summary judgment on the fraud claim and the remaining breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims, finding genuine issues of material fact. The decision rested on application of New York limitations periods, contract interpretation, and the absence of evidence supporting some elements of the claims.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability