This case involved plaintiffs from the Chrysler bankruptcy proceedings challenging Kentucky and Colorado state statutes that regulate relationships between vehicle manufacturers and dealership franchises. The plaintiffs argued these laws conflicted with federal Bankruptcy Code provisions and bankruptcy court orders allowing the rejection of certain dealer agreements, violating the Supremacy Clause, and also interfered with contractual expectations under the Contract Clause. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the preemption claim against Kentucky, finding that the state laws directly conflicted with the bankruptcy court's rejection orders by imposing additional requirements on manufacturers seeking to establish or relocate dealerships. It denied Kentucky's motion to dismiss but dismissed the claims against Colorado without prejudice and did not reach the Contract Clause issues. The reasoning centered on the Supremacy Clause resolving conflicts between federal bankruptcy authority and state dealer protection statutes in favor of federal law.
This case involves Wireless Ink Corp. suing Facebook, Inc. and Google, Inc. for direct and indirect infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,599,983, which covers methods for users to create and manage personalized mobile websites with content channels suited to limited mobile displays, along with the defendants' counterclaims seeking declaratory judgments of non-infringement and patent invalidity. The parties cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), with the plaintiff also moving to strike the invalidity affirmative defense under Rule 12(f). The court denied the defendants' motion, finding the allegations sufficient to state an infringement claim, denied the motion to strike, and granted dismissal of the invalidity counterclaims because they failed to plausibly allege invalidity.
In Gelber v. Stryker Corp., plaintiff Jeanette Gelber sued Stryker and related entities after a Trident hip replacement system implanted in 2004 caused pain, squeaking, and other issues, requiring revision surgery in 2009; her husband asserted derivative claims. The suit raised state-law claims for strict products liability based on manufacturing defects, negligence, breach of implied and express warranties, and loss of consortium, alleging violations of federal FDA regulations for the Class III medical device. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, allowing the manufacturing defect claims in negligence and strict liability plus certain express warranty claims to proceed while dismissing the rest. It reasoned that some claims were not preempted by the Medical Device Amendments because they paralleled federal requirements and were adequately pleaded, whereas others were preempted or failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The loss of consortium claim survived only to the extent it derived from the surviving claims.
The case involved a civilian contractor who was injured after falling in a toilet facility at Camp Shield, a forward operating base in Iraq, and sued Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., the private contractor responsible for operations and maintenance at the base under a LOGCAP contract with the U.S. military, alleging negligence in the facility's design, construction, repair, and maintenance. Kellogg moved to dismiss or for summary judgment on multiple grounds, including the political question doctrine, preemption under the combatant activities exception to the FTCA, derivative sovereign immunity, and the Defense Production Act. The court held that the political question doctrine did not bar the claim but concluded that the plaintiff's tort claims were preempted by unique federal interests arising from the combatant activities exception to the FTCA. It reasoned that Kellogg's services were integrated into military operations at the base, which was subject to ongoing combat threats and under military command authority, so that imposing state tort liability would conflict with federal policy. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant without reaching the other defenses.
The case involved two hedge funds that purchased mortgage-backed securities issued by Countrywide in 2006 through public offerings and later sued under sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, alleging material misstatements and omissions in the registration statements and prospectuses. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the claims were barred by the statute of repose. The court granted the motion, concluding that the three-year statute of repose under section 13 of the Act had expired and that the American Pipe class-action tolling doctrine does not apply to the '33 Act's statute of repose.
The case involved a copyright infringement claim by the Institute for the Development of Earth Awareness against People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, alleging that PETA copied elements from the book "The Dreaded Comparison," which draws parallels between historical human oppressions like slavery and the treatment of animals, in PETA's Animal Liberation Project materials that made similar comparisons. The court granted PETA's motion for summary judgment. The decision was based on the finding that no reasonable jury could determine that PETA had copied protected original expression from the book or an original combination of unprotected elements, as the comparisons, side-by-side images, quotations, and subtopics were commonplace and unoriginal, and the overall concept and feel of the works differed.
