Donald W. Beatty

The case arose from a truck accident in which Ann McClurg and her late husband sued driver Harrell Wayne Deaton and his employer, New Prime, Inc., for negligence; after the defendants failed to answer, a default judgment was entered, prompting the defendants to seek relief under Rule 60(b), SCRCP, on grounds including fraud and misrepresentation by the plaintiffs' counsel. The circuit court denied the motions, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari. The majority affirmed the denial, holding that a meritorious defense is a prerequisite to Rule 60(b) relief but that the defendants had neither raised nor obtained a ruling on that issue in the circuit court, leaving it unpreserved for appellate review. The Court expressly declined to decide whether a defense limited to damages (rather than liability) would suffice or what the proper scope of any relief would be.

proceduretorts & liability

In this South Carolina Supreme Court case, a lender (Matrix) that refinanced its own existing mortgage on a property sought equitable subrogation to gain priority over an intervening judgment lien that had been enrolled after the original mortgage but before the refinance mortgage was recorded. The master-in-equity granted the subrogation, but the court reversed, holding that equitable subrogation is unavailable to a lender that refinances its own prior debt because the doctrine requires a third party to satisfy the original obligation. The decision relied on state precedent and the Restatement (Third) of Property, which distinguish subrogation from a lender merely replacing its own mortgage. The court also addressed but did not resolve related issues of attorney supervision in loan closings and unclean hands.

property

The case involved Amaurys C. Fonseca, who was convicted of committing a lewd act upon a minor based on a 2003 incident after the trial court admitted testimony from the victim about a separate 2001 incident under Rule 404(b) exceptions for motive, intent, and lack of accident. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the 2001 evidence was inadmissible because the defendant did not deny touching the victim and the act was not subject to varying interpretations, and that it also failed to qualify as evidence of a common scheme or plan due to dissimilarities and the time gap between incidents. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in full, adopting its reasoning as its own. A dissent argued that the incidents shared sufficient similarities to support admission under the common scheme or plan exception.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a petition for reinstatement filed by an attorney who was placed on interim suspension in October 2004 and indefinitely suspended from practicing law in South Carolina in January 2005. After the petition was referred to the Committee on Character and Fitness, that body held a hearing and issued a report recommending reinstatement with conditions; neither the petitioner nor the Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed exceptions. The court granted the petition, ordering that the attorney complete the South Carolina Bar’s Legal Ethics and Practice Program and Trust Account School within six months of reinstatement and submit quarterly financial reports to the Commission on Lawyer Conduct for two years thereafter, after which he may be sworn in at the next admission ceremony.

procedure

This case involved a petition for reinstatement filed by a lawyer who had been suspended from practice for nine months in 2009. The petition was referred to the Committee on Character and Fitness, which held a hearing and recommended reinstatement with specific conditions; neither the petitioner nor the Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed exceptions to the report. The court granted the petition for reinstatement, ordering the lawyer to enter a two-year monitoring contract with Lawyers Helping Lawyers that requires abstinence from alcohol and drugs, random testing, and submission of results to the Commission on Lawyer Conduct. The decision was based on the unopposed recommendation under Rule 33(d) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a personal injury lawsuit in which the plaintiff sought damages for injuries from a car accident. After the defendant used peremptory strikes to remove several African-American jurors, including one with dreadlocks, the plaintiff raised a Batson challenge alleging racial motivation. The trial court denied the motion after finding the strikes race-neutral based on the juror's appearance and the attorney's credibility, and the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the dreadlocks explanation was not facially race-neutral under the second step of the Batson analysis and remanded for a new trial.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned landowners who sought to rezone their 162-acre property on Edisto Island from Agricultural Residential and Agricultural Preservation districts to a planned development district under Charleston County's Zoning and Land Development Regulations, which would reallocate dwelling units while reducing the overall total from 64 to 55. Adjoining owners challenged the resulting ordinance, and a master-in-equity granted summary judgment voiding it on the ground that it impermissibly increased density in the AG-10 area beyond limits set by more specific provisions of the regulations. The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that state law and the planned-development article of the regulations expressly authorize variations from base zoning density requirements, that the county council's adoption of the ordinance was at least fairly debatable, and therefore that the ordinance was valid and must be reinstated.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over whether South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G) held a valid option to purchase a fifty-eight-acre tract of land from Linda Hartough under a 2001 contract that lacked a specified expiration date. SCE&G sought a declaratory judgment affirming the option's enforceability after Hartough questioned its validity due to the missing deadline and her acquisition of interest post-contract. The court affirmed the special referee's ruling that the option was valid and enforceable, reasoning that South Carolina law requires exercise within a reasonable time when no deadline is specified, with reasonableness determined by the completion of a related quiet title action. The court also upheld the award of attorney's fees to SCE&G based on the contract's provisions.

propertyprocedure

In this workers’ compensation case, Bryan Robbins sought additional benefits from Walgreens after settling his 2003 back injury claim, alleging a change of condition that worsened his degenerative disc disease and required further treatment including surgery. The single commissioner, Appellate Panel, and circuit court all denied the claim, finding no physical change of condition because pre- and post-settlement MRIs and symptoms were essentially the same and no physician opined that the condition had worsened. The court also held that Robbins’s alternative argument for ongoing medical treatment to lessen disability was not preserved, as it was not raised in the original settlement or before the single commissioner. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that substantial evidence supported the denial and that the correct legal standard had been applied.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Maxwell v. Maxwell, the husband appealed the family court's dismissal of his action to end alimony payments awarded to his wife under a 2002 settlement agreement from their prior separate maintenance case, after he discovered her pre-agreement adultery and sought divorce. The family court ruled that the husband was barred from raising the adultery issue due to his failure to plead it earlier, res judicata, and the agreement's explicit non-modifiability clause, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that South Carolina law allows parties to enter settlement agreements making alimony non-modifiable and not subject to later court changes, and that such agreements control over the statutory bar on alimony for adultery when approved by the court. The agreement's terms, which permitted modification only by mutual written consent adopted by the family court, made termination unavailable regardless of the adultery.

family law

In this breach of contract case, HK New Plan sued Bradley Coker and his father Dale for unpaid rent under a commercial lease for a martial arts studio after Dale stopped making payments. The trial court granted summary judgment to HK New Plan, ruling that a 2002 lease renewal and amendment signed only by Dale did not release Bradley from liability under the 1998 original lease. Bradley appealed, contending the amendment had released him. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the amendment's provisions created ambiguities about whether and when Bradley was released, including references to Dale as successor in interest, sole signature lines, and differing effective versus commencement dates, which must be resolved by a jury rather than summary judgment.

propertyprocedure

The case involved borrower James Bostic, who paid off his mortgage to American Home Mortgage Servicing by sending a cashier’s check for the full payoff amount via certified mail; after American Home accepted the payment but delayed filing the mortgage satisfaction beyond statutory deadlines, Bostic sued for violation of South Carolina Code sections 29-3-310 and 29-3-320 seeking a statutory penalty. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Bostic, holding that the mailed payment satisfied the statutory “request” requirement and that the late filing triggered the penalty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court erred in interpreting the payment as fulfilling the request requirement under the Recording Statutes and remanded the case. The core reasoning centered on statutory interpretation of what constitutes a sufficient “request” for mortgage satisfaction, distinguishing it from mere tender of payment.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned David Neal's application for a critical area permit to build a dock on a waterfront property in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, that had only five feet of frontage along Charleston Harbor. OCRM initially denied the permit under a regulation requiring 75 feet of waterfrontage for lots platted and recorded after May 23, 1993, but granted it on Neal's second application after determining the lot had existed in its current configuration since the early 1900s and had not been resubdivided. Neighbor Don Brown appealed, leading the Appellate Panel to reverse the permit issuance; the circuit court affirmed that reversal. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the regulation applies only to properties newly subdivided or resubdivided after the 1993 date and does not bar the permit here.

environmentproperty

In State v. Spare, the defendant appealed after the circuit court revoked one year of his probation for breach of trust based on arrears in paying $41,370 in restitution. Spare had pleaded guilty in 2003, received a suspended sentence with probation, and was later cited twice for nonpayment; at the revocation hearing, evidence showed he was employed full-time at Cracker Barrel but had limited income due to garnishments, taxes, and other constraints, and his probation agent noted he paid what he could. The Court of Appeals vacated the revocation and remanded for further proceedings, holding that a court may not revoke probation solely for nonpayment of restitution without first determining on the record whether the failure was willful or resulted from a bona fide effort to pay, and if the latter, considering alternatives to incarceration as required by Bearden v. Georgia and related South Carolina precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a breach of contract dispute between concrete supplier Hardaway and placement contractor Hall arising from a power plant construction project, where Hardaway sought payment of an unpaid balance and Hall counterclaimed for alleged failures to meet production rates and other terms. The master-in-equity found Hall was a third-party beneficiary under related contracts, ruled that Hardaway had performed, and awarded Hardaway the outstanding amount plus attorney’s fees. On appeal, the court held that the record supported the judgment for Hardaway on the main claim but modified the award by deducting a charge for ice and reduced the attorney’s fees by the amount attributable to a lost sanctions motion while finding other challenges unpreserved.

business & regulatory

In this case, Omar Gentile was convicted after a bench trial of trafficking in cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine near a school, based on evidence seized during a search of his residence pursuant to a warrant. Gentile appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence because the warrant lacked probable cause. The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the supporting affidavit and testimony—consisting of citizen complaints about narcotics activity and foot traffic, police surveillance of visitors, and the arrest of one visitor found with marijuana—were insufficient to establish probable cause under the totality of the circumstances. The court distinguished prior cases where the defendant himself was searched after leaving the residence or where officers directly verified drug odors, noting the lack of any independent confirmation of narcotics inside Gentile's home. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved neighbors Carol and Charles Shaw and Roth and Delia Snowden suing Christopher Coleman for nuisance after he escalated his firearm discharges and engaged in harassing behavior following a disputed property sale in 2002. Coleman defended by claiming his property was a protected shooting range under the South Carolina Shooting Range Protection Act. The trial court found the property was not a shooting range because its primary use was residential and issued a permanent injunction barring Coleman from discharging firearms toward the neighbors' property or persons and from yelling or provoking them. On appeal, the court held that Coleman did operate a shooting range but affirmed the injunction as modified, concluding that the evidence of shots fired over neighbors' heads and other dangerous conduct established a valid nuisance claim warranting injunctive relief.

gunspropertytorts & liability

The case involved a dispute between Patricia Grand Hotel, the owner of an oceanfront hotel in Myrtle Beach, and MacGuire Enterprises, the operator of the Chantilly’s restaurant under a lease for specific hotel space including a restaurant, lounge, and later the pool bar. After an eviction and damages action over the pool bar, the parties reached a settlement that amended the lease to include the pool bar, increased rent, and addressed competition in food and beverage sales, but they disagreed on whether the non-compete applied only to the leased premises or the entire hotel property. The circuit court interpreted the settlement agreement as limited to the demised premises and ordered that Patricia Grand cease selling Icees there while allowing MacGuire exclusive sales in those areas. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the hearing transcript showed the parties had a meeting of the minds only on competition at the pool bar and related areas, with no discussion or agreement regarding a broader ban across the entire hotel. The court found the interpretation consistent with the parties’ expressed intentions and the plain meaning of their statements during the settlement hearing.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved Anthony Marlar's convictions for first-degree burglary and first-degree criminal sexual conduct based on a 1993 home invasion and rape, where he was identified partly through victim testimony and accomplice testimony from Jerry Fields; Marlar sought post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to cross-examine Fields on motive, introduce exculpatory pubic hair evidence, and permit Marlar to testify. The PCR court denied relief, finding counsel provided reasonable assistance and that Marlar failed to present evidence on certain claims. The court vacated the denial and remanded for a new PCR hearing, reasoning that the PCR order improperly concluded no evidence was presented on the claims when Marlar had in fact offered supporting testimony and evidence at the hearing, and that the order failed to make specific findings on each issue raised.

criminal lawprocedure

David Rhoad appealed the post-conviction relief judge's decision to hold him in contempt after Rhoad withdrew his PCR application, made an obscene gesture toward his trial counsel, used profanity toward the judge, and had an altercation with deputies. The court affirmed the contempt findings and sentences. The core reasoning was that Rhoad's conduct showed sufficient disrespect for the court and disruption of proceedings to support direct contempt, with no prior warning required, and that his claim of entitlement to a jury trial for aggregate sentences exceeding six months was not preserved because he neither requested a jury nor objected to the sentences.

criminal lawprocedure