The case arose from a truck accident in which Ann McClurg and her late husband sued driver Harrell Wayne Deaton and his employer, New Prime, Inc., for negligence; after the defendants failed to answer, a default judgment was entered, prompting the defendants to seek relief under Rule 60(b), SCRCP, on grounds including fraud and misrepresentation by the plaintiffs' counsel. The circuit court denied the motions, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari. The majority affirmed the denial, holding that a meritorious defense is a prerequisite to Rule 60(b) relief but that the defendants had neither raised nor obtained a ruling on that issue in the circuit court, leaving it unpreserved for appellate review. The Court expressly declined to decide whether a defense limited to damages (rather than liability) would suffice or what the proper scope of any relief would be.
In this South Carolina Supreme Court case, a lender (Matrix) that refinanced its own existing mortgage on a property sought equitable subrogation to gain priority over an intervening judgment lien that had been enrolled after the original mortgage but before the refinance mortgage was recorded. The master-in-equity granted the subrogation, but the court reversed, holding that equitable subrogation is unavailable to a lender that refinances its own prior debt because the doctrine requires a third party to satisfy the original obligation. The decision relied on state precedent and the Restatement (Third) of Property, which distinguish subrogation from a lender merely replacing its own mortgage. The court also addressed but did not resolve related issues of attorney supervision in loan closings and unclean hands.
The case involved Amaurys C. Fonseca, who was convicted of committing a lewd act upon a minor based on a 2003 incident after the trial court admitted testimony from the victim about a separate 2001 incident under Rule 404(b) exceptions for motive, intent, and lack of accident. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the 2001 evidence was inadmissible because the defendant did not deny touching the victim and the act was not subject to varying interpretations, and that it also failed to qualify as evidence of a common scheme or plan due to dissimilarities and the time gap between incidents. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in full, adopting its reasoning as its own. A dissent argued that the incidents shared sufficient similarities to support admission under the common scheme or plan exception.
This case concerns a petition for reinstatement filed by an attorney who was placed on interim suspension in October 2004 and indefinitely suspended from practicing law in South Carolina in January 2005. After the petition was referred to the Committee on Character and Fitness, that body held a hearing and issued a report recommending reinstatement with conditions; neither the petitioner nor the Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed exceptions. The court granted the petition, ordering that the attorney complete the South Carolina Bar’s Legal Ethics and Practice Program and Trust Account School within six months of reinstatement and submit quarterly financial reports to the Commission on Lawyer Conduct for two years thereafter, after which he may be sworn in at the next admission ceremony.
This case involved a petition for reinstatement filed by a lawyer who had been suspended from practice for nine months in 2009. The petition was referred to the Committee on Character and Fitness, which held a hearing and recommended reinstatement with specific conditions; neither the petitioner nor the Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed exceptions to the report. The court granted the petition for reinstatement, ordering the lawyer to enter a two-year monitoring contract with Lawyers Helping Lawyers that requires abstinence from alcohol and drugs, random testing, and submission of results to the Commission on Lawyer Conduct. The decision was based on the unopposed recommendation under Rule 33(d) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.
This case arose from a personal injury lawsuit in which the plaintiff sought damages for injuries from a car accident. After the defendant used peremptory strikes to remove several African-American jurors, including one with dreadlocks, the plaintiff raised a Batson challenge alleging racial motivation. The trial court denied the motion after finding the strikes race-neutral based on the juror's appearance and the attorney's credibility, and the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the dreadlocks explanation was not facially race-neutral under the second step of the Batson analysis and remanded for a new trial.
