Solomon Wachtler

The case involved a challenge to New York's bail bond statute requiring real property used as security to have twice the value of the bail amount, unlike personal property. The defendant tried to post bail with real property that didn't meet the double equity rule and argued it was unconstitutional under equal protection. The court upheld the requirement as rational because real property carries higher risks like title defects, foreclosure costs, and exemptions, justifying the stricter valuation. It rejected strict scrutiny and affirmed the dismissal of the habeas corpus proceeding.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rightsproperty

In this case, the court examined the constitutionality of a 1989 New York statute that extended eviction protections to non-purchasing tenants in a specific cooperative building at 205 Third Avenue in New York City, based on rights from a 1982 consent judgment settling Martin Act claims. The owners of the unsold shares sued for a declaratory judgment that the law was invalid, and lower courts ruled in their favor on multiple constitutional grounds. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the statute unconstitutionally impaired the contractual obligations in the consent judgment under the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court reasoned that while protecting tenants amid a housing crisis was a legitimate public purpose, the law was not reasonable or necessary because it was narrowly drawn to benefit only a handful of tenants in one building rather than addressing broader needs.

propertycivil rights

The case involves DES (diethylstilbestrol) litigation in which numerous plaintiffs injured in utero by the drug could not identify the specific manufacturer responsible for the pills their mothers took, leading the court in a prior decision to adopt a national market share theory of liability among the approximately 300 producers. After that ruling, the market share issue was severed and consolidated for a single proceeding, raising the question of whether plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on apportioning shares. The New York Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs have a constitutional right to a jury on this issue under article I, section 2 of the state constitution and CPLR 4101. The core reasoning was that market share determination is an integral part of the underlying tort action for money damages rather than a separate equitable cause of action or preliminary matter, so the right to a jury could not be defeated by severance or consolidation for efficiency.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from a 1986 construction site accident in which ironworker foreman Bernard Harvey fell two stories after stepping on an unsecured plank, suffering severe and permanent brain and spinal injuries. Harvey and his wife sued the property owners and construction managers, who in turn brought third-party claims against subcontractors; the trial court granted summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240(1), and a jury awarded over $27 million in damages (later reduced) while apportioning fault among the parties. On appeal, the primary issues were whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the unsworn plaintiff to appear before the jury and answer questions demonstrating his injuries, whether the damages award was excessive under the proper statutory standard, and whether an indemnification clause was enforceable. The Court of Appeals held that displaying the plaintiff was within the trial court's discretion and consistent with precedent on demonstrative evidence, rejected most other claims, but remitted the case to the Appellate Division to apply the correct “deviates materially” standard for reviewing the damages award rather than the former “shocks the conscience” test; it also confirmed that the indemnification clause could not shift liability for the defendants’ own negligence under General Obligations Law § 5-322.1.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved Jews for Jesus, Inc. suing the Jewish Community Relations Council of New York and related defendants after the Council circulated a 1985 memorandum to Long Island rabbis urging them to contact churches, restaurants, and catering halls to deny the group access to spaces for conducting religious activities such as interfaith seders. Plaintiffs alleged violations of New York antidiscrimination statutes, including provisions of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296) prohibiting denial of public accommodations based on creed and aiding or inciting such discrimination. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendants, dismissing the complaint. The core reasoning was that dissemination of the memorandum alone, without evidence of any resulting specific discriminatory acts by facility owners or others, did not establish a violation under the statutes, regardless of how provisions like § 296(6) on attempts or incitement were interpreted.

civil rightsfree speechreligious liberty

The case involved a hospital challenging the New York State Department of Social Services' use of statistical sampling to calculate Medicaid overpayments of $113,771.24 from nearly 10,000 outpatient cases during a two-year period, rather than conducting a full case-by-case review of all records, which were adequate. The Court of Appeals held that the agency was authorized to employ statistical sampling without needing to show inadequate records, reversing the Appellate Division. The core reasoning was that DSS's broad statutory authority to administer the Medicaid program and prevent excess payments, including through audits and regulations permitting extrapolation from samples, implicitly allowed this method as a way to fill in legislative details rather than exceed its powers or act arbitrarily.

healthcarebusiness & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This case concerned petitioners' efforts to recover property, including jewelry and currency, seized by police from their business during a 1985 arrest for possession of stolen property and held by the city property clerk. After petitioners pleaded guilty in 1987 to charges involving only certain items, they sought return of the remaining property under the expedited McClendon v. Rosetti procedure, but their demand lacked a District Attorney release and came after the 90-day deadline. The court held that the property clerk must return the property, ruling that a claimant's failure to obtain a release is not a bar when the District Attorney refuses to issue one without initiating forfeiture proceedings or providing a valid reason for retention, and that proof of a demand on the District Attorney suffices. The core reasoning was that the McClendon order was designed to shift the burden from claimants to the government to justify continued detention of non-contraband property, and allowing the District Attorney to block return by inaction would undermine due process protections. The court also rejected claims that petitioners waived their rights through plea agreements.

criminal lawpropertyprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a New York City Department of Environmental Protection employee, John Daly, who was charged with misconduct for threatening and assaulting a coworker to deter him from reporting a prior racially motivated incident. After an administrative hearing, the Department dismissed Daly, but the Civil Service Commission reversed that determination on appeal under Civil Service Law §76 and ordered his reinstatement with back pay. The Department then brought an Article 78 proceeding seeking to overturn the Commission's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the statute's language making the Commission's decision "final and conclusive, and not subject to further review in any court" precludes judicial review of the merits, though courts may still intervene if the agency acted unconstitutionally, illegally, or beyond its jurisdiction; finding none of those exceptions applied here, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division's dismissal of the proceeding.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a subcontractor's suit against a general contractor and its surety for an alleged unpaid balance of about $88,000 on a construction contract for a sewage filtration plant. The defendants asserted counterclaims for breach and negligence but failed to respond to a demand for a bill of particulars, resulting in an absolute preclusion order that eliminated the counterclaims; they opposed summary judgment on the complaint using their general denial and evidence of payment credits and incomplete work. The lower courts granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that the preclusion order also barred any defense because the counterclaims were intertwined with the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the preclusion order did not extend to the defendants' general denial or evidence supporting it, because a bill of particulars is a limited device to amplify pleadings rather than broad discovery, and the order was confined to the counterclaims.

procedure

This case is a replevin action in which the Guggenheim Museum sought to recover a Chagall gouache that it believed had been stolen from its collection in the late 1960s by a mailroom employee; the painting had been purchased in good faith by the Lubells from a gallery in 1967 and remained in their possession until the museum demanded its return in 1986. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant on statute of limitations grounds, but the Appellate Division reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. The court held that in a replevin action for a chattel, the three-year statute of limitations begins to run upon the owner's demand for return and the possessor's refusal, not upon the theft itself, and that the owner's diligence (or lack thereof) in searching for the item is irrelevant to that defense. It reasoned that requiring reasonable diligence by owners would undermine the clarity of the rule and shift the burden inappropriately onto victims of theft, potentially encouraging trafficking in stolen art. The court noted, however, that the defendant's laches defense remains available and may take the museum's conduct into account at trial.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the Oneida County Department of Social Services seeking to recover public assistance payments made to Douglas Thurston after he turned 21 by placing a lien on the proceeds of his personal injury settlement under Social Services Law §§ 104 and 104-b. Thurston had sued the City of Utica and police officers under 42 USC §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988 for an incident that occurred when he was a minor, settling the claim for $65,000 after reaching adulthood. The lower courts disallowed the lien on the portion of the settlement representing personal injury damages, limiting recovery to medical expenses. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the payments at issue were made after Thurston reached majority, the limitations in § 104(2) for minors did not apply, allowing the Department to use either a direct action or a lien under § 104(1) and § 104-b against his property. The court reasoned that the nature of the settlement as compensation for an injury sustained during minority did not insulate adult-era assistance payments from recovery.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a workers' compensation claim by Thomas De Mayo, who was awarded benefits for a 1974 workplace injury; after the case was reopened in 1983, a 1985 award for a 30% schedule loss of use of his right leg shifted liability to the Special Fund for Reopened Cases under Workers' Compensation Law § 25-a because more than seven years had passed since the accident. The question was whether the Special Fund was subject to the 20% penalty under § 25(3) (former [c]) for failing to pay or appeal the award within 10 days, as the Fund did not pay until 18 days after the decision. The court held that the Special Fund is liable for the penalty, reasoning that the Fund steps into the shoes of the insurance carrier upon the passage of time under § 25-a, succeeds to both the duty to pay and related timing requirements, and that § 25-a(2) preserves the claimant's procedural rights including assessment of the late-payment penalty; this interpretation aligns with the statute's policy of ensuring prompt compensation payments.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Robert Zellweger, a 91-year-old man with Alzheimer’s disease living in a nursing home, whose wife applied for Medicaid benefits on his behalf after their savings were nearly depleted. The Department of Social Services granted benefits but later discontinued them citing excess resources and denied subsequent applications; the wife’s requests for fair hearings were rejected as untimely under the 60-day limit. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and held that the 60-day period was tolled because the county failed to send the discontinuation notice to the wife (the actual applicant) rather than the incompetent recipient, omitted required information about hearing rights and deadlines, and violated its own regulations on timely decisions. As a result, the matter was remitted for a hearing on the merits of the benefit denials from March 1984 through May 1986.

healthcareprocedure

This case involved three consolidated shareholders' derivative actions under New York Business Corporation Law sections 626 and 720, brought on behalf of Ketek Electric Corporation against one of its 50% shareholder-officers, Schachter, for diverting corporate assets and opportunities to his wholly owned company, Hoteltron. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's rulings that damages for the diverted profits must be awarded to the injured corporation Ketek rather than directly to the innocent shareholder Kulik, and that the innocent shareholder's legal expenses and attorneys' fees should be paid out of that corporate recovery. The court reasoned that the general rule in derivative actions requires recovery for the benefit of the corporation, that the potential indirect benefit to the wrongdoer as a shareholder does not justify an exception even for closely held corporations, and that Business Corporation Law section 626(e) authorizes reimbursement of fees from the corporate award but does not permit imposing them on the losing party. The court also upheld the calculation of net profits but rejected an award for speculative lost royalties.

business & regulatory

The case involved a defendant convicted after a jury trial of attempted promoting prostitution in the second degree and grand larceny in the third degree, based on evidence that he approached a 24-year-old undercover officer whom he believed to be a 15-year-old runaway, encouraged her to engage in prostitution, and stole her gold chain when she refused to give it to him. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the Court of Appeals upheld the attempted promoting prostitution conviction. The court held that factual impossibility is not a defense to an attempt under Penal Law § 110.10 when the defendant would have committed the completed offense had the facts been as he believed them, and his mistake about the officer's age—an aggravating circumstance rather than the core prohibited conduct—did not negate the intent required for the attempt. The court distinguished the case from People v. Campbell because the strict liability element here attached to an aggravating factor, not to an unintended result.

criminal law

The case concerned whether the State of New York effected a constitutional taking of property by enjoining the operators of Abbott Manor Nursing Home from closing the facility without providing the required 90 days' notice and obtaining Department of Health approval under 10 NYCRR 401.3(g), and by overseeing a receivership to ensure continued patient care. The Court of Appeals held that no taking occurred under either the State or Federal Constitutions. The core reasoning was that the State's actions prevented an abrupt closure in violation of health regulations, the operators never properly sought closure approval, their desire to close later changed, and they made no claim that the delay extended beyond a reasonable time needed to arrange alternative care for patients.

propertybusiness & regulatoryhealthcare

The case involved a claim by Arlene Cottongim, a white female at-will deputy sheriff employed by the Onondaga County Sheriff's Department, that she was forced to resign after a black male colleague visited her home while both were on sick leave. The State Division of Human Rights Commissioner determined that the department had discriminated against her on the basis of race and sex, awarding her lost wages, mental anguish damages, and an order to offer reinstatement. The Appellate Division upheld the finding, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Commissioner's determination was supported by substantial evidence of disparate treatment, including the lack of any prior enforcement of reporting rules and the lighter discipline imposed on the male deputy for related conduct. The court further ruled that the Human Rights Law authorizes the Commissioner to order reinstatement as a remedy for discriminatory termination to restore the employee to the position lost due to unlawful discrimination.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved a challenge by public interest groups, low-income residents, and taxpayers to the Town of Brookhaven's zoning ordinance, claiming that the town's special permit and rezoning processes for multifamily housing discouraged development of low-cost shelter and violated constitutional standards. The lower courts upheld the ordinance, finding it facially valid and that numerous multifamily projects had been approved, with housing shortages attributed more to economic factors than to town practices. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that plaintiffs failed to prove exclusionary implementation and emphasizing that rezoning is a legislative function courts should not assume. The decision was based on affirmed factual findings supported by the record, without addressing facial validity under prior precedents like Berenson v. Town of New Castle.

propertycivil rights

The case involved a dispute over a real estate sales contract where the buyers provided a $21,000 down payment on a $210,000 newly constructed house but later attempted to cancel based on a rider allowing termination if taxes exceeded $3,500. The buyers stopped payment on the check after providing notice that was not received within the contract's three-day window, leading the seller to sue for the down payment amount after reselling the property to another buyer. The trial court denied summary judgment to the seller on the down payment issue, but the Appellate Division granted it, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under the longstanding rule from Lawrence v. Miller, a vendor may retain the down payment upon the purchaser's willful default even if the property is resold at the same price. The court reasoned that the cancellation notice was ineffective due to untimely receipt, the traditional 10% down payment serves as reasonable liquidated damages in real estate deals, and parties to arm's-length contracts should be bound by their terms without judicial intervention to alter the outcome.

property

The case involved a defendant convicted of arson and reckless endangerment after his retained attorney was disqualified by the trial court due to a potential conflict of interest from also representing the defendant's cousin in a related arson matter. The defendant had been advised of the conflict and the prosecutor's plea offer but stated he had no information to provide and wished to continue with the same counsel, prompting the court to conduct an inquiry into the waiver. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court could not disqualify counsel on conflict grounds where the defendant made an informed decision to waive conflict-free representation, as the court's role was limited to ensuring awareness of the risks rather than overriding the choice.

criminal lawprocedure