The case involved a challenge to New York's bail bond statute requiring real property used as security to have twice the value of the bail amount, unlike personal property. The defendant tried to post bail with real property that didn't meet the double equity rule and argued it was unconstitutional under equal protection. The court upheld the requirement as rational because real property carries higher risks like title defects, foreclosure costs, and exemptions, justifying the stricter valuation. It rejected strict scrutiny and affirmed the dismissal of the habeas corpus proceeding.
In this case, the court examined the constitutionality of a 1989 New York statute that extended eviction protections to non-purchasing tenants in a specific cooperative building at 205 Third Avenue in New York City, based on rights from a 1982 consent judgment settling Martin Act claims. The owners of the unsold shares sued for a declaratory judgment that the law was invalid, and lower courts ruled in their favor on multiple constitutional grounds. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the statute unconstitutionally impaired the contractual obligations in the consent judgment under the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court reasoned that while protecting tenants amid a housing crisis was a legitimate public purpose, the law was not reasonable or necessary because it was narrowly drawn to benefit only a handful of tenants in one building rather than addressing broader needs.
The case involves DES (diethylstilbestrol) litigation in which numerous plaintiffs injured in utero by the drug could not identify the specific manufacturer responsible for the pills their mothers took, leading the court in a prior decision to adopt a national market share theory of liability among the approximately 300 producers. After that ruling, the market share issue was severed and consolidated for a single proceeding, raising the question of whether plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on apportioning shares. The New York Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs have a constitutional right to a jury on this issue under article I, section 2 of the state constitution and CPLR 4101. The core reasoning was that market share determination is an integral part of the underlying tort action for money damages rather than a separate equitable cause of action or preliminary matter, so the right to a jury could not be defeated by severance or consolidation for efficiency.
This case arose from a 1986 construction site accident in which ironworker foreman Bernard Harvey fell two stories after stepping on an unsecured plank, suffering severe and permanent brain and spinal injuries. Harvey and his wife sued the property owners and construction managers, who in turn brought third-party claims against subcontractors; the trial court granted summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240(1), and a jury awarded over $27 million in damages (later reduced) while apportioning fault among the parties. On appeal, the primary issues were whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the unsworn plaintiff to appear before the jury and answer questions demonstrating his injuries, whether the damages award was excessive under the proper statutory standard, and whether an indemnification clause was enforceable. The Court of Appeals held that displaying the plaintiff was within the trial court's discretion and consistent with precedent on demonstrative evidence, rejected most other claims, but remitted the case to the Appellate Division to apply the correct “deviates materially” standard for reviewing the damages award rather than the former “shocks the conscience” test; it also confirmed that the indemnification clause could not shift liability for the defendants’ own negligence under General Obligations Law § 5-322.1.
This case involved Jews for Jesus, Inc. suing the Jewish Community Relations Council of New York and related defendants after the Council circulated a 1985 memorandum to Long Island rabbis urging them to contact churches, restaurants, and catering halls to deny the group access to spaces for conducting religious activities such as interfaith seders. Plaintiffs alleged violations of New York antidiscrimination statutes, including provisions of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296) prohibiting denial of public accommodations based on creed and aiding or inciting such discrimination. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendants, dismissing the complaint. The core reasoning was that dissemination of the memorandum alone, without evidence of any resulting specific discriminatory acts by facility owners or others, did not establish a violation under the statutes, regardless of how provisions like § 296(6) on attempts or incitement were interpreted.
The case involved a hospital challenging the New York State Department of Social Services' use of statistical sampling to calculate Medicaid overpayments of $113,771.24 from nearly 10,000 outpatient cases during a two-year period, rather than conducting a full case-by-case review of all records, which were adequate. The Court of Appeals held that the agency was authorized to employ statistical sampling without needing to show inadequate records, reversing the Appellate Division. The core reasoning was that DSS's broad statutory authority to administer the Medicaid program and prevent excess payments, including through audits and regulations permitting extrapolation from samples, implicitly allowed this method as a way to fill in legislative details rather than exceed its powers or act arbitrarily.