Leslie E. Stein

• People v. Suazo

  New York Court of Appeals · 2018-11-27 · cited 14×

  In People v. Suazo, a noncitizen defendant was charged in New York City with several misdemeanors arising from a domestic incident; the prosecution reduced the top charges to class B misdemeanors, which under CPL 340.40 are tried without a jury and carry a maximum jail term of three months. The defendant moved for a jury trial, arguing that the charges were deportable offenses under federal immigration law and therefore serious enough to trigger the Sixth Amendment right to a jury. The trial court and Appellate Division denied the motion, treating deportation as a collateral civil consequence rather than a criminal penalty that affects the right to a jury. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when a defendant shows a charged offense carries the potential penalty of removal from the United States, the Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial because that consequence renders the prosecution sufficiently serious. The decision rests on the principle that the jury-trial guarantee protects against government oppression in cases where the stakes for the defendant’s liberty are substantial, extending beyond the maximum authorized sentence of incarceration.

  immigrationcriminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

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• Town of Aurora v. Village of E. Aurora

  New York Court of Appeals · 2018-11-20 · cited 35×

  The case concerned a dispute between the Town of Aurora and the Village of East Aurora over responsibility for maintaining and repairing the Brooklea Drive Bridge, a structure located in both municipalities that the Village had planned, financed, and built in the early 1970s. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Town is responsible for the bridge. The court reasoned that Village Law § 6-606 sets forth the exclusive methods by which a village may assume control of a bridge after 1897—through a board resolution subject to permissive referendum or a formal agreement with the town—and the Village had followed neither procedure. Under the default rule of Village Law § 6-604, therefore, responsibility remained with the Town.

  propertyprocedure

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• Garcia v. New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene

  New York Court of Appeals · 2018-06-28 · cited 32×

  The case concerned a challenge by parents to amendments adopted by the New York City Board of Health requiring annual influenza vaccinations for children ages 6 to 59 months attending city-regulated child care or school-based programs, with exemptions for medical or religious reasons. Petitioners argued that the rules exceeded the Board's delegated authority, violated separation of powers, and were preempted by state Public Health Law § 2164, which mandates certain other vaccines for school children but does not list influenza. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and Supreme Court, upholding the rules and denying the request to enjoin their enforcement. The Court held that the Board acted within its long-standing authority under Administrative Code § 17-109 to require additional immunizations beyond those listed in state law, that the state statute neither expressly nor impliedly preempted the field, and that no conflict existed because the local rules were consistent with and supplementary to the state framework.

  healthcarebusiness & regulatory

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• People v. Odum

  New York Court of Appeals · 2018-05-03

  In People v. Odum, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether breathalyzer test results could be admitted in a driving-while-intoxicated prosecution when the test was given more than two hours after arrest following police warnings about license revocation and evidentiary use of a refusal. The court affirmed the suppression of the test results and the defendant’s initial refusal. It held that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194’s two-hour limit on “deemed consent” had expired, so the results were admissible only if the defendant gave express, voluntary consent; the warnings delivered after the deadline were statutorily unauthorized and rendered the subsequent consent involuntary. Because the test therefore was neither conducted under the statute nor supported by voluntary consent, the evidence was properly excluded under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195(1).

  criminal lawprocedure

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