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Reyes v. City of New York
New York Court of Appeals · 2026-06-23
In Reyes v. City of New York, plaintiff SeanPaul Reyes, an independent journalist, was arrested after entering the publicly accessible lobby of an NYPD precinct and recording police activity despite warnings based on the department’s Trespass Policy prohibiting such recording inside its facilities. He sued the City in federal court, claiming violations of New York’s Civil Rights Law § 79-p and New York City Administrative Code § 14-189—the Right to Record Acts—which establish a private right to record law enforcement activity without physical interference. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified the question whether these statutes apply inside police stationhouse lobbies, and the New York Court of Appeals reformulated and answered it in the negative. The court reasoned that the statutes’ texts are silent on location and thus ambiguous, but their legislative history—centered on incidents of recording police misconduct on public streets and sidewalks—shows no intent to extend the right indoors, and applying it to precinct lobbies would create privacy risks for victims and witnesses and potentially interfere with law enforcement functions.
free speechcivil rights
People v. Flesch
New York Court of Appeals · 2026-05-26
In People v. Flesch, the defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree assault in exchange for the prosecution's recommendation of a five-year probation sentence, but the original plea deal proved illegal because the offense required imprisonment. After the newly elected District Attorney sought to withdraw the recommendation and was disqualified due to a conflict, a special prosecutor was appointed and accepted shock probation—an alternative sentence the defendant himself proposed as meeting his expectations under the agreement. The sentencing court declined to impose probation without a mental health component, offered the defendant multiple chances to withdraw his plea, and ultimately imposed a four-year prison term followed by post-release supervision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the prosecution did not breach the plea agreement because the original sentence was unlawful, the special prosecutor supported a lawful alternative consistent with the defendant's requests, and the defendant chose not to withdraw his plea despite knowing the court would not impose the negotiated term.
criminal lawprocedure
People v. Harris
New York Court of Appeals · 2026-05-26
The case concerned whether Jamien Harris's guilty plea to two counts of criminal possession of a firearm, based on weapons found in her home on November 21, 2021, barred a subsequent indictment for the second-degree murder of her grandmother the previous day under CPL 40.40(2), which prohibits separate prosecutions for joinable offenses arising from the same criminal transaction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal of the trial court's dismissal and reinstated the murder indictment. It held that the offenses were not part of the same criminal transaction because the simple possession charges were complete upon the defendant's dominion and control over the firearms on November 21 and were independent of the prior murder, which involved distinct acts and timing under the statutory definition in CPL 40.10(2)(a). The court reasoned that the possession was not unified with the homicide by a common purpose or continuous conduct, and the prosecution's evidence and instructions to the first grand jury focused solely on possession without relying on the shooting.
gunscriminal lawprocedure
People v. Flesch
New York Court of Appeals · 2026-05-26
In People v. Flesch, the defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree assault in exchange for the prosecution's recommendation of a five-year probation sentence, but the original plea deal proved illegal because the offense required imprisonment. After the newly elected District Attorney sought to withdraw the recommendation and was disqualified due to a conflict, a special prosecutor was appointed and accepted shock probation—an alternative sentence the defendant himself proposed as meeting his expectations under the agreement. The sentencing court declined to impose probation without a mental health component, offered the defendant multiple chances to withdraw his plea, and ultimately imposed a four-year prison term followed by post-release supervision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the prosecution did not breach the plea agreement because the original sentence was unlawful, the special prosecutor supported a lawful alternative consistent with the defendant's requests, and the defendant chose not to withdraw his plea despite knowing the court would not impose the negotiated term.
criminal lawprocedure
People v. Harris
New York Court of Appeals · 2026-05-26
The case concerned whether Jamien Harris's guilty plea to two counts of criminal possession of a firearm, based on weapons found in her home on November 21, 2021, barred a subsequent indictment for the second-degree murder of her grandmother the previous day under CPL 40.40(2), which prohibits separate prosecutions for joinable offenses arising from the same criminal transaction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal of the trial court's dismissal and reinstated the murder indictment. It held that the offenses were not part of the same criminal transaction because the simple possession charges were complete upon the defendant's dominion and control over the firearms on November 21 and were independent of the prior murder, which involved distinct acts and timing under the statutory definition in CPL 40.10(2)(a). The court reasoned that the possession was not unified with the homicide by a common purpose or continuous conduct, and the prosecution's evidence and instructions to the first grand jury focused solely on possession without relying on the shooting.
gunscriminal lawprocedure
People v. N.H.
New York Court of Appeals · 2026-04-23 · cited 2×
The case concerned whether a defendant could validly waive a hearing under Penal Law § 60.12 as part of a plea agreement. N.H., charged with an eligible offense, sought either an alternative sentence under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act or a hearing to prove eligibility based on domestic violence she had experienced; the prosecution conditioned a plea deal on her waiving that hearing, which she accepted. The Court of Appeals held that such waivers are invalid. It reasoned that the DVSJA’s statutory scheme deliberately requires courts to determine, after a hearing that considers evidence of abuse and its link to the offense, whether a standard sentence would be unduly harsh, thereby advancing the Legislature’s goal of ensuring judges account for domestic violence’s impact on survivors before imposing sentence. The court therefore reversed the Appellate Division and remitted the matter for further proceedings.
criminal lawprocedure