Richard Duncan Simons

The case involved a dispute over an insurance policy issued by Lloyd's of London syndicates to cover property interests in Russia, where the insurers refused to pay a claim for alleged expropriation. The plaintiffs sued in New York, but the defendants moved to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds after initiating arbitration in London pursuant to the policy's arbitration clause. The court decided that the "Service of Suit Clause" was not a mandatory forum selection clause but merely a consent to jurisdiction in the United States, and thus did not preclude dismissal. It reasoned that the clause's plain language did not limit jurisdiction to a specific forum, and other factors like the parties' foreign status, the policy's issuance in England, and the availability of arbitration supported dismissal.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved three defendants convicted of promoting gambling in the first degree and conspiracy related to a bookmaking operation based in Manhattan that hedged bets through calls to Nassau County. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that Nassau County had geographical jurisdiction because the hedging activities by an accomplice established an element of the offense in that county. The court reasoned that advancing or profiting from unlawful gambling is a distinct element of the crime under Penal Law § 225.10, allowing venue where such conduct occurs, and that the trial court's jury instructions on jurisdiction were adequate despite including a conspiracy theory. The Appellate Division had dismissed the conspiracy count, but the promoting gambling convictions stood.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a former partner of Milbank, Tweed seeking supplemental withdrawal payments under the firm's partnership agreement after moving to another firm. The agreement provided for such payments but reduced them dollar-for-dollar based on the partner's new annual earned income above $100,000, and an arbitrator ruled that the partner was not entitled to any payments under the terms. Lower courts vacated the award on public policy grounds, concluding that the payment reduction constituted an impermissible forfeiture of earned income and restraint on the practice of law. The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the parties' broad arbitration clause assigned these questions to the arbitrator in the first instance and that the award did not on its face violate public policy.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved former Merrill Lynch account executives who resigned and joined a competitor, prompting Merrill Lynch to obtain temporary injunctions in federal courts in Illinois and Kentucky barring solicitation of clients and use of records. The employees then petitioned New York Supreme Court under CPLR article 75 to compel expedited arbitration before the New York Stock Exchange, which the court ordered despite objections that the employment agreements, Form U-4, and NYSE rules contained no provision authorizing expedited proceedings without both parties' consent. After the arbitrators lifted the injunctions, the trial court confirmed the award and the Appellate Division affirmed, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that neither the Federal Arbitration Act nor state law empowered a court to impose expedited arbitration absent explicit agreement by the parties or governing rules. The core reasoning was that the NYSE Constitution and Rules require standard timelines for notice, answers, discovery, and challenges, and expedited arbitration is permitted only with consent or when the Exchange itself is a party.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentprocedure

In People v. Branch, the defendant was convicted of murder and related crimes after a key prosecution witness changed his account on the stand regarding whether the defendant carried a gun during the incident. The trial court allowed the prosecutor a brief recess to confer privately with the witness, with safeguards including unlimited cross-examination by the defense and notice to the jury, after which the witness reverted to his prior testimony implicating the defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's ruling, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the conference. The core reasoning was that trial courts have broad discretion to manage proceedings, including mid-testimony consultations with witnesses, consistent with precedents like Perry v. Leeke that permit such measures when supported by reasonable inferences and balanced by protective procedures, and that reversal is warranted only for clear legal error rather than differing factual assessments.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a nursing home's lawsuit against a patient's husband to recover fees for care provided to his wife, who was in a persistent vegetative state and required artificial nutrition via a feeding tube. The husband had directed the facility to remove the tube based on his wife's prior wishes, refused further payment when it declined, and later obtained a court order confirming those wishes after litigation; the wife died after transfer to another facility. The Court of Appeals held that the nursing home was entitled to payment for services rendered before the final judicial determination of the patient's wishes. The core reasoning was that New York law at the time did not recognize surrogate decision-making for incompetent patients without clear and convincing evidence established through court proceedings, so the provider could not be expected to discontinue treatment unilaterally and was not liable for breaching the admission agreement by continuing care.

healthcarecivil rights

The case concerned a New York statute that imposed a five-day lag payroll on nonjudicial employees of the Unified Court System to address budget shortfalls, deferring pay that would later be repaid upon termination. Plaintiffs, including unions and employees, challenged the law as unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' rulings, holding that the employees' collective bargaining agreements remained in effect under Civil Service Law § 209-a(1)(e) after their stated expiration dates, and that the lag payroll impaired those contract rights in violation of the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court reasoned that the continuation-of-benefits provision incorporated into the agreements created enforceable contractual obligations that the new statute could not override without violating federal protections, and it rejected arguments for severability or repeal.

labor & employmentfederal power

This case involved challenges by public employee unions and individuals to amendments in New York's Retirement and Social Security Law that restricted Tier III employees' (hired on or after July 1, 1976) ability to withdraw their retirement contributions upon leaving service before vesting and reduced ordinary death benefits payable to their estates. The court held that subdivision c of sections 613 and 606 of article 15 unconstitutionally diminished or impaired the pension benefits of these employees in violation of section 7 of article V of the New York Constitution. The core reasoning was that prior law under article 14 allowed refunds of contributions if service terminated before 10 years and provided higher death benefits computed as multiples of final salary, while the 1983 changes altered those rights by delaying refunds until age 62 or death and capping death benefits at one-twelfth of recent wages times years of service. The court modified the lower court judgments to declare the statutes invalid as applied to affected employees hired before September 1, 1983, and to allow refunds of contributions made after that date.

labor & employment

The case involved Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation suing the City School District of Troy to recover portions of real property taxes paid in 1974-1977, alleging the levies exceeded the 2% constitutional limit on taxation under NY Const, art VIII, § 10. The school district moved to dismiss, arguing the complaint was deficient for failing to allege compliance with the notice-of-claim requirements in Education Law § 3813. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the complaint stated valid causes of action, holding that no such pleading was required. The core reasoning distinguished actions challenging illegal or void taxes (recoverable in a plenary suit for money had and received) from those involving merely erroneous assessments under Real Property Tax Law article 7, where different procedures apply.

taxespropertyprocedure