The case involved a dispute over an insurance policy issued by Lloyd's of London syndicates to cover property interests in Russia, where the insurers refused to pay a claim for alleged expropriation. The plaintiffs sued in New York, but the defendants moved to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds after initiating arbitration in London pursuant to the policy's arbitration clause. The court decided that the "Service of Suit Clause" was not a mandatory forum selection clause but merely a consent to jurisdiction in the United States, and thus did not preclude dismissal. It reasoned that the clause's plain language did not limit jurisdiction to a specific forum, and other factors like the parties' foreign status, the policy's issuance in England, and the availability of arbitration supported dismissal.
This case involved three defendants convicted of promoting gambling in the first degree and conspiracy related to a bookmaking operation based in Manhattan that hedged bets through calls to Nassau County. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that Nassau County had geographical jurisdiction because the hedging activities by an accomplice established an element of the offense in that county. The court reasoned that advancing or profiting from unlawful gambling is a distinct element of the crime under Penal Law § 225.10, allowing venue where such conduct occurs, and that the trial court's jury instructions on jurisdiction were adequate despite including a conspiracy theory. The Appellate Division had dismissed the conspiracy count, but the promoting gambling convictions stood.
This case involved a former partner of Milbank, Tweed seeking supplemental withdrawal payments under the firm's partnership agreement after moving to another firm. The agreement provided for such payments but reduced them dollar-for-dollar based on the partner's new annual earned income above $100,000, and an arbitrator ruled that the partner was not entitled to any payments under the terms. Lower courts vacated the award on public policy grounds, concluding that the payment reduction constituted an impermissible forfeiture of earned income and restraint on the practice of law. The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the parties' broad arbitration clause assigned these questions to the arbitrator in the first instance and that the award did not on its face violate public policy.
The case involved former Merrill Lynch account executives who resigned and joined a competitor, prompting Merrill Lynch to obtain temporary injunctions in federal courts in Illinois and Kentucky barring solicitation of clients and use of records. The employees then petitioned New York Supreme Court under CPLR article 75 to compel expedited arbitration before the New York Stock Exchange, which the court ordered despite objections that the employment agreements, Form U-4, and NYSE rules contained no provision authorizing expedited proceedings without both parties' consent. After the arbitrators lifted the injunctions, the trial court confirmed the award and the Appellate Division affirmed, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that neither the Federal Arbitration Act nor state law empowered a court to impose expedited arbitration absent explicit agreement by the parties or governing rules. The core reasoning was that the NYSE Constitution and Rules require standard timelines for notice, answers, discovery, and challenges, and expedited arbitration is permitted only with consent or when the Exchange itself is a party.
In People v. Branch, the defendant was convicted of murder and related crimes after a key prosecution witness changed his account on the stand regarding whether the defendant carried a gun during the incident. The trial court allowed the prosecutor a brief recess to confer privately with the witness, with safeguards including unlimited cross-examination by the defense and notice to the jury, after which the witness reverted to his prior testimony implicating the defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's ruling, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the conference. The core reasoning was that trial courts have broad discretion to manage proceedings, including mid-testimony consultations with witnesses, consistent with precedents like Perry v. Leeke that permit such measures when supported by reasonable inferences and balanced by protective procedures, and that reversal is warranted only for clear legal error rather than differing factual assessments.
This case involved a nursing home's lawsuit against a patient's husband to recover fees for care provided to his wife, who was in a persistent vegetative state and required artificial nutrition via a feeding tube. The husband had directed the facility to remove the tube based on his wife's prior wishes, refused further payment when it declined, and later obtained a court order confirming those wishes after litigation; the wife died after transfer to another facility. The Court of Appeals held that the nursing home was entitled to payment for services rendered before the final judicial determination of the patient's wishes. The core reasoning was that New York law at the time did not recognize surrogate decision-making for incompetent patients without clear and convincing evidence established through court proceedings, so the provider could not be expected to discontinue treatment unilaterally and was not liable for breaching the admission agreement by continuing care.