Abram Elkus

The case concerned a dispute between the Western Union and Postal Telegraph companies, competitors in the telegraph business, after Western Union refused to extend credit to Postal for transmitting messages that Postal could not handle on its own wires, following Postal's decision to lower its rates post-World War I government control. The Public Service Commission directed Western Union to continue offering credit to Postal on the same basis as to other customers. The court held that the statute governing telegraph companies requires them to receive and transmit dispatches from other lines with impartiality and good faith, treating competitors as customers entitled to the same terms, including credit where financial responsibility is undisputed and credit is extended to similar customers. It modified the Commission's order to require equal treatment without mandating continuation of the exact prior arrangement. The decision emphasized that public service corporations cannot arbitrarily discriminate in credit practices based on competitive status.

business & regulatory

The case involved a workers' compensation claim by Benjamin Lorchitsky, who was employed as a packer by Gotham Folding Box Co. and suffered paralysis after an altercation with a stranger assisting (or interfering) with his work on the sidewalk, followed about an hour later by an unexplained fall while carrying bundles inside the employer's premises. The Industrial Commission awarded compensation, finding the injuries arose out of and in the course of employment, and this was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals reversed the award, holding that the commission's findings were uncertain because its incorporated opinion used alternative language regarding whether the injuries stemmed from the sidewalk assault or the later fall. The majority reasoned that this ambiguity meant the cause of injury was not clearly established under the statute's requirements, despite statutory presumptions favoring the claim.

labor & employment

The case concerned a resident of Mechanicville who sued the city after he and his children contracted typhoid fever from drinking water supplied by the municipality, alleging both negligence in the supply of the water and breach of an implied warranty that the water was pure and fit for human consumption. The plaintiff contended that by selling water as a commercial enterprise, the city should be subject to the same implied warranty obligations as a private business. The court affirmed the judgment, determining that while the city operates in a private capacity when supplying water and may be liable for negligence, no implied warranty arises regarding the water's quality. The dissenting opinion maintained that an implied warranty should be recognized to protect consumers who rely on the municipality's supply of this essential resource.

torts & liability

The case concerned an alleged 1907 exclusive dealing agreement between a Brooklyn bread route dealer and a Manhattan bakery partnership (later incorporated) for the supply of pumpernickel bread: the dealer would sell only the bakery's product in a defined territory and the bakery would furnish all required bread at set below-market prices while not selling to others there, with the arrangement to continue as long as both parties remained in business. After eight years of performance, the bakery breached by advertising and selling directly to the dealer's customers. The Appellate Division had reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff and dismissed the complaint solely for lack of mutuality, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the verdict, holding that the evidence—viewed most favorably to the plaintiff—established mutuality through the dealer's forbearance and the parties' long course of dealing, that damages were properly calculated, and that no substitute bread was available to mitigate.

business & regulatory

The case involved a mining engineer and corporate officer who sued his employer, a mining company, to recover the reasonable value of technical engineering services he provided over several years, including mapping, planning, and lease negotiations for property sales, which he claimed were outside his usual duties as vice-president and director. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the appellate court reversed, holding that a jury should decide whether the services exceeded ordinary officer responsibilities and whether an express or implied agreement to compensate existed based on prior dealings and the nature of the work. The court reasoned that while corporate officers generally serve without extra pay for standard duties absent a formal agreement, compensation may be implied for specialized services rendered at the request of officers, drawing from the parties' course of conduct and the technical expertise required.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a charter party for a steamship to carry coal, where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant falsely represented it had secured a required federal export license, leading to delays and extra costs; the complaint included one cause of action for fraud inducing the contract and two for breach of contract regarding unpaid hire and demurrage. The certified question was whether these causes of action had been improperly united by combining a tort claim with contract claims. The Court of Appeals held that joinder was proper, reversing the Appellate Division and answering the question in the negative, on the ground that the claims arose out of the same transaction under Code of Civil Procedure section 484, subdivision 9, and were not inconsistent because the fraud allegations did not seek to avoid the contract but instead sought damages while affirming it. Precedent such as Bowen v. Mandeville supported allowing recovery for both fraud and contract performance when the claims are compatible.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether judgment creditors could maintain an action through the sheriff to reach and recover an attached equitable asset—an attachment debtor's intangible interest in a warehouse receipt for tobacco, subject to the defendant's lien—after the defendant sold the tobacco and refused to account for the proceeds. The court held that the complaint stated a sufficient cause of action, allowing the sheriff to proceed under the Code of Civil Procedure without first obtaining a judgment and having an execution returned unsatisfied. The core reasoning was that the interest constituted a chose in action reachable by attachment under section 649 but not by ordinary execution, and that subdivision 1 of section 655 (supplemented by section 708) empowered the sheriff to maintain actions to reduce such attached property to possession while the attachment remained in force.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a workers' compensation claim by Morris Verschleiser, who was employed as a trucker at Joseph Stern & Son's abattoir. While waiting on the killing floor, a piece of flesh was dropped on his neck by a coworker or inspector; after he threw it down and struck another employee with it in response, that employee kicked him, causing injury. The Industrial Commission awarded compensation, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and affirmed the award, holding that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment as it stemmed from workplace interactions and environment among employees, and the statute provides compensation for such risks without regard to fault or who initiated the altercation.

labor & employment

The case concerned a claim for benefits under an accident insurance policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiff, which provided additional coverage for the beneficiary (the plaintiff's wife) if she lost her life by reason and in consequence of the burning of a building while inside it. After the wife died in a fire at the family home, the plaintiff sued for recovery, and a jury found in his favor that the death occurred under the policy terms; the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, ruling that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because it did not establish that the burning of the building itself caused the death, as opposed to the beneficiary catching fire first while using gasoline to clean gloves. The court applied its prior decision in Houlihan v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., which interpreted nearly identical policy language to require proof of the building's burning as a condition precedent to liability.

business & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over an accident insurance policy that provided for doubled benefits if the insured sustained injury while on a public conveyance operated by a common carrier for passenger service. The plaintiff was injured when he fell while exiting a taxicab he had hired from the Yellow Taxi Service, Inc., after engaging it at a curb stand in Albany. The court held that the taxicab qualified as such a conveyance, entitling the plaintiff to the enhanced coverage. The reasoning centered on the taxi company's charter and operations, which involved holding itself out to serve the public indiscriminately, compliance with local ordinances requiring acceptance of fares, and the principle that temporary exclusive use by a passenger does not convert the vehicle into a private one, consistent with historical definitions of common carriers.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned a dispute over title to a narrow strip of land in the Bronx occupied by part of a building that had been erected in 1892 on the defendant's predecessor's lots but encroached onto the plaintiff's adjoining lot due to an error in an old survey map. The plaintiff sued to recover possession of the land and remove the encroachment, while the defendant claimed ownership by adverse possession based on more than twenty years of continuous, open use by himself and his predecessors, including through a deed conveying the building. The trial court and Appellate Division ruled for the plaintiff, finding no sufficient proof of intent to possess the disputed strip or privity between successive occupants. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the evidence showed the requisite adverse, continuous possession with privity established by transfer of the building and inferred intent to hold the entire structure.

property

The case concerned whether a railroad company could lawfully construct and maintain additional switch tracks across a state highway that had been planned and partially improved, where the tracks were built rapidly without any prior approvals or consents from state or local authorities as required by section 146 of the Highway Law. The trial court ruled that the highway commissioner's consent and prescribed conditions were necessary before such construction, but the Appellate Division reversed; the Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the need for compliance with the Highway Law. The core reasoning was that the statute presupposed regulatory oversight by the highway commissioner for tracks crossing improved or planned highways, that permissions obtained later from a Supreme Court justice or the Public Service Commission did not satisfy or eliminate this requirement, and that initial disregard of legal formalities warranted strict enforcement against the railroad.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved the conviction of the defendant for uttering a forged American Express check. During cross-examination after the defendant testified in his own defense, the trial court admitted a letter he had received and to which he admitted sending money in response for the purposes indicated in the letter, allowing it to impeach his credibility based on the nature of the act. The Appellate Division reversed on the ground that the letter was irrelevant hearsay improperly admitted to show the defendant's character or other crimes. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant's admission that he acted in compliance with the letter adopted its purpose and made the letter material to credibility, as a defendant who takes the stand waives the privilege against self-incrimination on matters affecting credibility and may be questioned about vicious or criminal acts without claiming privilege.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a carpenter's claim for workers' compensation after he developed a frog felon infection in his right hand, which he attributed to bruising from continual use of a screwdriver while employed by R. H. Howes Construction Co. The Industrial Commission awarded benefits, finding the injury arose from his employment, but the Court of Appeals reversed that determination on appeal. The court held that the claimant's testimony was insufficient to prove the injury was caused by an accident, as it described only the ordinary effects of repeated tool use without evidence of an unforeseen event or specific incident. The order of the Appellate Division and the commission's determination were reversed, with the claim remitted for rehearing.

labor & employment

The case involves the State of New York seeking to enjoin a railroad corporation from constructing a multi-span bridge across the Hudson River, insisting on a single span, despite federal authorization. The court affirmed the judgment overruling the state's demurrer to the defenses, holding that Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to authorize the bridge for interstate commerce via the Bridge Act of 1906, and the state cannot interfere with or penalize the exercise of that federal franchise. The reasoning emphasizes that federal power over navigable waters and commerce preempts state regulation in this context, and the state's attempt to forfeit the franchise through legislation would improperly nullify congressional acts.

federal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Wagner Trading Company suing Battery Park National Bank for conversion after the company's president, C.J. Wagner, indorsed fifteen checks payable to the company and deposited them into his personal account at the bank, which then collected and disbursed the proceeds on Wagner's personal checks. The company had never received most of the funds, which totaled over $14,000. The court affirmed judgment for the plaintiff, holding that Wagner's authority to indorse checks was limited to corporate business purposes under the bylaws and resolutions, which required countersignatures and did not permit transfers for personal use. The bank, by accepting the checks for deposit to Wagner's personal account without verifying his authority, acted at its peril and could not claim the funds as the company owed it no duty that would support defenses like estoppel or negligence.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved a negligence claim by the estate of George Kretik, who was struck and killed by a New York Central Railroad train at an unprotected grade crossing on Jackson Street in Lowville, New York, on January 10, 1917. The plaintiff alleged that the engineer failed to exercise due care by not seeing Kretik lying near the tracks and stopping the train in time. The court reversed the trial verdict in favor of the plaintiff and ordered a new trial, holding that the evidence was insufficient to show the engineer breached the duty of reasonable care. The reasoning centered on the principle that an engineer may assume a person on or near the tracks will move to safety and is not required to lean out of the cab to check absent specific reason to believe someone is present, with no proof that the engineer could or should have seen Kretik under the conditions.

torts & liability