The case concerned a dispute between the Western Union and Postal Telegraph companies, competitors in the telegraph business, after Western Union refused to extend credit to Postal for transmitting messages that Postal could not handle on its own wires, following Postal's decision to lower its rates post-World War I government control. The Public Service Commission directed Western Union to continue offering credit to Postal on the same basis as to other customers. The court held that the statute governing telegraph companies requires them to receive and transmit dispatches from other lines with impartiality and good faith, treating competitors as customers entitled to the same terms, including credit where financial responsibility is undisputed and credit is extended to similar customers. It modified the Commission's order to require equal treatment without mandating continuation of the exact prior arrangement. The decision emphasized that public service corporations cannot arbitrarily discriminate in credit practices based on competitive status.
The case involved a workers' compensation claim by Benjamin Lorchitsky, who was employed as a packer by Gotham Folding Box Co. and suffered paralysis after an altercation with a stranger assisting (or interfering) with his work on the sidewalk, followed about an hour later by an unexplained fall while carrying bundles inside the employer's premises. The Industrial Commission awarded compensation, finding the injuries arose out of and in the course of employment, and this was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals reversed the award, holding that the commission's findings were uncertain because its incorporated opinion used alternative language regarding whether the injuries stemmed from the sidewalk assault or the later fall. The majority reasoned that this ambiguity meant the cause of injury was not clearly established under the statute's requirements, despite statutory presumptions favoring the claim.
The case concerned a resident of Mechanicville who sued the city after he and his children contracted typhoid fever from drinking water supplied by the municipality, alleging both negligence in the supply of the water and breach of an implied warranty that the water was pure and fit for human consumption. The plaintiff contended that by selling water as a commercial enterprise, the city should be subject to the same implied warranty obligations as a private business. The court affirmed the judgment, determining that while the city operates in a private capacity when supplying water and may be liable for negligence, no implied warranty arises regarding the water's quality. The dissenting opinion maintained that an implied warranty should be recognized to protect consumers who rely on the municipality's supply of this essential resource.
The case concerned an alleged 1907 exclusive dealing agreement between a Brooklyn bread route dealer and a Manhattan bakery partnership (later incorporated) for the supply of pumpernickel bread: the dealer would sell only the bakery's product in a defined territory and the bakery would furnish all required bread at set below-market prices while not selling to others there, with the arrangement to continue as long as both parties remained in business. After eight years of performance, the bakery breached by advertising and selling directly to the dealer's customers. The Appellate Division had reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff and dismissed the complaint solely for lack of mutuality, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the verdict, holding that the evidence—viewed most favorably to the plaintiff—established mutuality through the dealer's forbearance and the parties' long course of dealing, that damages were properly calculated, and that no substitute bread was available to mitigate.
The case involved a mining engineer and corporate officer who sued his employer, a mining company, to recover the reasonable value of technical engineering services he provided over several years, including mapping, planning, and lease negotiations for property sales, which he claimed were outside his usual duties as vice-president and director. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the appellate court reversed, holding that a jury should decide whether the services exceeded ordinary officer responsibilities and whether an express or implied agreement to compensate existed based on prior dealings and the nature of the work. The court reasoned that while corporate officers generally serve without extra pay for standard duties absent a formal agreement, compensation may be implied for specialized services rendered at the request of officers, drawing from the parties' course of conduct and the technical expertise required.
The case involved a dispute over a charter party for a steamship to carry coal, where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant falsely represented it had secured a required federal export license, leading to delays and extra costs; the complaint included one cause of action for fraud inducing the contract and two for breach of contract regarding unpaid hire and demurrage. The certified question was whether these causes of action had been improperly united by combining a tort claim with contract claims. The Court of Appeals held that joinder was proper, reversing the Appellate Division and answering the question in the negative, on the ground that the claims arose out of the same transaction under Code of Civil Procedure section 484, subdivision 9, and were not inconsistent because the fraud allegations did not seek to avoid the contract but instead sought damages while affirming it. Precedent such as Bowen v. Mandeville supported allowing recovery for both fraud and contract performance when the claims are compatible.