Consuelo Maria Callahan

In Rodis v. City & County of San Francisco, an elected official sued two San Francisco police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights after he was arrested in 2003 on suspicion of passing counterfeit currency, which turned out to be a genuine older $100 bill. The district court denied the officers' summary judgment motion asserting qualified immunity, concluding there was no probable cause because the officers lacked evidence of intent to defraud. Following a Supreme Court remand to apply Pearson v. Callahan, the Ninth Circuit reversed and held the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, reasoning that their actions did not violate clearly established law and that their belief in probable cause based on the bill's appearance was not plainly incompetent.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved a Mexican citizen petitioning for review of a removal order after multiple convictions for aggravated DUI under Arizona law, which the Department of Homeland Security charged as crimes involving moral turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Ninth Circuit denied the petition, upholding the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that a conviction under Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-1383(A)(1) for driving under the influence while on a suspended or revoked license qualifies as a crime of moral turpitude. The court applied the categorical approach and reasoned that the combination of the base act of DUI and the willful violation of a known driving prohibition distinguishes it from simple DUI and satisfies the definition of moral turpitude, deferring to the BIA's prior interpretation in Matter of Lopez-Meza. It distinguished Hernandez-Martinez v. Ashcroft as addressing only the divisibility of the statute without overruling the BIA on this point.

immigrationcriminal law

In Rodis v. City and County of San Francisco, an elected official was arrested by San Francisco police officers after tendering a genuine but older $100 bill at a drugstore whose employees suspected it was counterfeit; the officers did not investigate the bill's authenticity further or obtain evidence of intent to defraud before making the arrest under 18 U.S.C. § 472, and the plaintiff was released after a Secret Service agent confirmed the bill was real. Rodis sued the city, police chief, and officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a Fourth Amendment violation from the warrantless arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to the city and chief but denied qualified immunity to the two arresting officers. On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the officers lacked probable cause because they had no evidence of the specific intent to defraud required by the statute and that this constitutional requirement was clearly established at the time of the arrest.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case Hoopai v. Astrue involved Oren Hoopai's appeal of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of disability insurance benefits under Title II, based on claims of permanent disability from back pain and depression following a work injury. The ALJ found that Hoopai could not perform his past heavy work but could do light work and that a significant number of suitable jobs existed in the economy, leading to a conclusion that he was not disabled. The district court upheld the denial, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the ALJ's step-five determination was supported by substantial evidence without needing vocational expert testimony because the non-exertional limitations from depression did not significantly limit the occupational base. The court also ruled that the ALJ made the required specific findings on functional limitations in areas such as daily living and concentration, and that Hoopai had no right to cross-examine on job identifications drawn from the grids and Dictionary of Occupational Titles.

labor & employmentfederal power

The case concerned the proper venue for a declaratory relief action brought by Black Diamond Asphalt, Inc. against the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA) in San Joaquin County Superior Court. Black Diamond sought a declaration that CIGA had a statutory duty to defend and indemnify it in an underlying wrongful death lawsuit pending in that county, after the insurer of a co-defendant became insolvent. CIGA moved to transfer venue to Los Angeles County, where its principal office is located, arguing that the liability was neither contractual nor tortious. The court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 395.5 permits venue in San Joaquin County because the statutory obligation or liability at issue arises there, where the underlying covered claim is pending. It therefore directed the trial court to deny the venue change motion.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a petition for relief from the six-month deadline to file a government claim against the State of California for wrongful death and personal injury arising from a highway fire incident on June 1, 2001, where the claimants sought relief under Government Code section 946.6 on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect after waiting over seven months to consult an attorney. The trial court granted the petition, but the Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and deny the petition. The court reasoned that excusable neglect requires a showing of reasonable diligence during the entire claim-filing period, which was absent here because the claimant took no investigative or legal steps for six months despite awareness of the incident from newspaper reports, and the attorney's later diligence did not excuse the prior inaction. The decision emphasized that the policy favoring merits resolution cannot override statutory time limits without the required evidentiary showing.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved an eight-year-old boy injured when he fell from a ski lift during a lesson at June Mountain Ski Area, operated by Mammoth Mountain Ski Area. His mother had signed a release of liability form assuming risks and releasing Mammoth from claims including negligence when enrolling him in the program. The trial court granted summary adjudication dismissing ordinary negligence claims based on the release, and a jury later found no gross negligence by the defendant as a common carrier. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that the release was valid and barred ordinary negligence claims without violating public policy under Civil Code sections 2175 and 1668 or the Tunkl precedent, as the statutes distinguish gross negligence. The court also upheld admission of the release at trial and the related jury instructions.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In People v. Britt, a jury convicted defendant Douglas Richard Britt of burglary, indecent exposure, and annoying or molesting a child after he was observed masturbating outside the bedroom window of two sisters ages 10 and 14; the convictions were supported by fingerprints on the window, identification by one victim, and testimony about prior uncharged sexual misconduct. Britt was sentenced to 17 years in prison after findings on prior conviction allegations. On appeal he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of the prior misconduct testimony under Evidence Code section 1108, and other rulings, but the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, reasoning that section 1108 permits use of such evidence to show propensity in sex offense cases, which can properly bear on identity when the defendant claims mistaken identification.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge by Californians Against Waste to the Department of Conservation's method of calculating processing fees that beverage manufacturers must pay under the California Beverage Container Recycling and Litter Reduction Act to fund recycling when scrap values are low. The trial court granted a writ of mandate, ruling that the Department's formula improperly included a recycling factor not present in the statute, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The court held that the plain language of Public Resources Code section 14575 requires the fees to be calculated based on a portion of the average processing payment per container sold, rather than on projections of total payments or containers returned. It rejected the Department's arguments about potential surpluses, concluding that legislative intent is determined first by statutory text and that any needed changes are for the Legislature to make.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned Robert Hamilton's challenge to the DMV's one-year disqualification of his commercial driving privilege after his no-contest plea to driving a vehicle with a blood-alcohol content of .08 percent or more under Vehicle Code section 23152(b). Although Hamilton had been cited for driving a commercial vehicle with a lower BAC threshold and court records showed he was operating a commercial truck, the DMV acted under section 15300(a)(1), which mandates the penalty for a conviction of driving a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence. The trial court denied his petition for writ of mandate, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the DMV lacked jurisdiction because Hamilton's actual conviction did not match the specific offense described in the statute. The court reasoned that the statutory language requires a conviction for the commercial-specific violation and that the DMV could not rely on extraneous court records to impose the commercial penalty for a general-vehicle conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a mother's appeal from juvenile court orders terminating her parental rights to her infant son and freeing him for adoption after the child was removed due to positive drug tests at birth and the mother's history of substance abuse. The mother argued that all orders were void because the court failed to appoint a separate guardian ad litem for the minor under section 326.5, in addition to appointed counsel, following changes to comply with federal CAPTA requirements. The court held that the mother had standing but had waived the issue by not raising it below, and it addressed the merits to clarify the law. The core reasoning was that appointment of counsel for the minor, as required by section 317 and rule 1438, satisfies the guardian ad litem obligation under state and federal law when counsel can advocate for the child's interests, so no separate appointment was needed and the orders were affirmed.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a father charged under Penal Code section 278.5 with withholding his young children from their mother, the lawful custodian, after taking them to Jordan instead of returning them following visitation. The trial court rejected his attempt to present a necessity defense under section 278.7 due to his failure to comply with the statute's notice and reporting requirements to authorities and courts. The jury convicted him, and on appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that the statutory defense requires such compliance as a condition precedent, consistent with common law principles.

criminal lawfamily law

The case involved the state's petition to commit defendant Harold Carmony as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act after his 1982 convictions for sexual offenses against minors and his impending release from a 34-year prison sentence. Following a court trial with expert testimony on his mental health and recidivism risk, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Carmony met the SVP criteria of having a diagnosed mental disorder (pedophilia) making him likely to reoffend and ordered his two-year commitment to the Department of Mental Health. On appeal, Carmony argued that a 1982 finding he was not a mentally disordered sex offender barred relitigation of his mental condition, that he was denied due process due to lack of notice and counsel during pre-petition psychological evaluations, and other errors. The Court of Appeal affirmed the commitment order, holding that the prior MDSO determination had no collateral estoppel effect because mental health status is not fixed and can change over time, and that due process was satisfied because counsel was appointed and Carmony had the opportunity to challenge the evaluations before the probable cause hearing and at trial.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved plaintiff Andrew Jakubowsky's claims of wrongful termination based on age and disability discrimination and defamation against his former employer MCI Telecommunications and a supervisor, which were resolved by summary judgment after his attorney failed to oppose the motion or appear at the hearing. More than five months later, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for relief from the judgment under the mandatory attorney fault provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b). The Court of Appeal reversed the order, concluding it was jurisdictionally defective because the application was not accompanied by a copy of the proposed pleading as required by the statute, and separately holding that a summary judgment does not qualify as a default, default judgment, or dismissal eligible for mandatory relief under the provision.

procedurelabor & employment

Ananda Church of Self-Realization sued Massachusetts Bay Insurance for breach of duties to defend and indemnify it against two lawsuits (Murphy and Flynn) stemming from an agent removing trash bags containing confidential attorney documents from the property of opposing counsel in a separate employment case. The trial court sustained the insurer's demurrer without leave to amend, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The court held that the claims did not raise a potential for coverage under the policy's property damage provision, which defined such damage as physical injury to tangible property or loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. The reasoning was that once the documents were placed in the trash, the owners retained no ownership or possessory rights, so their removal could not constitute covered property damage.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

In Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp., plaintiff Robert Lovejoy alleged that AT&T committed fraud by falsely claiming written authorization to switch his business's toll-free 800 number from Pacific Bell without his consent, a practice known as "slamming," which led to the number's termination during a billing dispute and caused him to lose his drilling business. The trial court granted AT&T's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the fraud claim after earlier denying summary judgment on that count while applying the filed rate doctrine to dismiss a negligence claim. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the complaint sufficiently pleaded fraud with particularity and that the filed rate doctrine, which limits challenges to tariffed rates, does not bar claims based on willful misconduct or fraudulent misrepresentations unrelated to rate disputes. The court also upheld the denial of summary judgment, noting potential violations of state disclosure requirements for service changes.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

In Simmons v. Allstate Insurance, Allstate sued Simmons and related entities under the Unfair Practices Act for alleged fraudulent medical billing, unnecessary treatments, and unlicensed operations in their chiropractic clinics. Simmons responded with a cross-complaint alleging defamation and other torts based on Allstate's lawsuit filings, media statements, and claim denials, which Simmons claimed were part of a conspiracy to drive chiropractors out of business. The trial court granted Allstate's anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the claims arose from protected petitioning and speech activity on matters of public interest connected to judicial and administrative proceedings. The court further ruled that leave to amend was properly denied, as it would undermine the statute's goal of early dismissal of meritless suits intended to chill First Amendment rights.

procedurefree speechbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

In People v. Stevens, the defendant entered a no-contest plea to evading a police officer and driving with a blood alcohol level above 0.08, admitted prior convictions and a prison term enhancement, and received a four-year prison sentence. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's orders requiring him to pay $400 in costs for appointed counsel and to report to the parole office in Kern County upon release. The court struck the parole reporting order, holding that Penal Code section 3003 assigns decisions about the county of parole to the paroling authority rather than the sentencing court, and that the limited exception in section 1170(a)(3) did not apply because the defendant's presentence credits did not equal or exceed his prison term. The judgment was affirmed as modified, with no change to the attorney-fee order.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Stevens, the defendant entered a no-contest plea to evading a police officer and driving with more than 0.08 percent blood alcohol, admitted priors including a prison term enhancement, and received a four-year prison sentence. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's orders requiring him to pay $400 in costs for appointed counsel and to report to the parole office in Kern County upon release. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, reasoning that Penal Code section 1170 imposes a duty on the sentencing court to direct the defendant to report to the parole office closest to his last legal residence, and the record contained substantial evidence that Kern County qualified as that location under the applicable parole statutes.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Christopher Daniel Burgess, who was convicted by a jury of first degree murder of a child, assault by a caretaker resulting in death, and infliction of cruel corporal punishment resulting in traumatic condition, along with prior prison term admissions. He was sentenced to 27 years to life, with various counts stayed under Penal Code section 654. On appeal, Burgess challenged his convictions on grounds including prosecutorial misconduct and insufficient evidence, and contested the trial court's application of a 15 percent limit on presentence custody credits under section 2933.1, arguing it improperly modified the voter-approved sentencing provisions of section 190 without voter approval. The Court of Appeal rejected the challenges to the convictions, modified the stayed sentence on count two to 15 years to life, and held that the credit limitation was properly applied because section 2933.1 addresses public safety factors for violent felons without conflicting with the intent of the Briggs Initiative to increase punishment for murder.

criminal lawprocedure