Opinions apply existing precedent without questioning its validity, e.g., rejecting collateral-estoppel claim under SVPA framework while citing settled due-process cases ([1]). People v. Carmony ↗
Reconsideration watch
Decisions resting on authority a higher court later overturned
In Rodis v. City & County of San Francisco, an elected official sued two San Francisco police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights after he was arrested in 2003 on suspicion of passing counterfeit currency, which turned out to be a genuine older $100 bill. The district court denied the officers' summary judgment motion asserting qualified immunity, concluding there was no probable cause because the officers lacked evidence of intent to defraud. Following a Supreme Court remand to apply Pearson v. Callahan, the Ninth Circuit reversed and held the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, reasoning that their actions did not violate clearly established law and that their belief in probable cause based on the bill's appearance was not plainly incompetent.
The case involved a Mexican citizen petitioning for review of a removal order after multiple convictions for aggravated DUI under Arizona law, which the Department of Homeland Security charged as crimes involving moral turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Ninth Circuit denied the petition, upholding the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that a conviction under Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-1383(A)(1) for driving under the influence while on a suspended or revoked license qualifies as a crime of moral turpitude. The court applied the categorical approach and reasoned that the combination of the base act of DUI and the willful violation of a known driving prohibition distinguishes it from simple DUI and satisfies the definition of moral turpitude, deferring to the BIA's prior interpretation in Matter of Lopez-Meza. It distinguished Hernandez-Martinez v. Ashcroft as addressing only the divisibility of the statute without overruling the BIA on this point.
In Rodis v. City and County of San Francisco, an elected official was arrested by San Francisco police officers after tendering a genuine but older $100 bill at a drugstore whose employees suspected it was counterfeit; the officers did not investigate the bill's authenticity further or obtain evidence of intent to defraud before making the arrest under 18 U.S.C. § 472, and the plaintiff was released after a Secret Service agent confirmed the bill was real. Rodis sued the city, police chief, and officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a Fourth Amendment violation from the warrantless arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to the city and chief but denied qualified immunity to the two arresting officers. On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the officers lacked probable cause because they had no evidence of the specific intent to defraud required by the statute and that this constitutional requirement was clearly established at the time of the arrest.
The case Hoopai v. Astrue involved Oren Hoopai's appeal of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of disability insurance benefits under Title II, based on claims of permanent disability from back pain and depression following a work injury. The ALJ found that Hoopai could not perform his past heavy work but could do light work and that a significant number of suitable jobs existed in the economy, leading to a conclusion that he was not disabled. The district court upheld the denial, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the ALJ's step-five determination was supported by substantial evidence without needing vocational expert testimony because the non-exertional limitations from depression did not significantly limit the occupational base. The court also ruled that the ALJ made the required specific findings on functional limitations in areas such as daily living and concentration, and that Hoopai had no right to cross-examine on job identifications drawn from the grids and Dictionary of Occupational Titles.
The case concerned the proper venue for a declaratory relief action brought by Black Diamond Asphalt, Inc. against the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA) in San Joaquin County Superior Court. Black Diamond sought a declaration that CIGA had a statutory duty to defend and indemnify it in an underlying wrongful death lawsuit pending in that county, after the insurer of a co-defendant became insolvent. CIGA moved to transfer venue to Los Angeles County, where its principal office is located, arguing that the liability was neither contractual nor tortious. The court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 395.5 permits venue in San Joaquin County because the statutory obligation or liability at issue arises there, where the underlying covered claim is pending. It therefore directed the trial court to deny the venue change motion.
This case involved a petition for relief from the six-month deadline to file a government claim against the State of California for wrongful death and personal injury arising from a highway fire incident on June 1, 2001, where the claimants sought relief under Government Code section 946.6 on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect after waiting over seven months to consult an attorney. The trial court granted the petition, but the Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and deny the petition. The court reasoned that excusable neglect requires a showing of reasonable diligence during the entire claim-filing period, which was absent here because the claimant took no investigative or legal steps for six months despite awareness of the incident from newspaper reports, and the attorney's later diligence did not excuse the prior inaction. The decision emphasized that the policy favoring merits resolution cannot override statutory time limits without the required evidentiary showing.