Jaynee LaVecchia

This case involved a construction worker who suffered serious injuries from a trench collapse at a worksite and sought to bring a common-law tort action against his employer, arguing that the employer's conduct qualified as an 'intentional wrong' under New Jersey’s Workers’ Compensation Act and thus fell outside the Act's exclusive remedy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer defendants, finding the facts insufficient to meet the intentional-wrong exception despite an OSHA willful-violation citation. The Appellate Division reversed, but the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the workers’ compensation bar applied. The Court reasoned that the Act strongly favors the statutory remedy, that an intentional wrong requires proof of substantial certainty that injury or death would result, and that even gross negligence or recklessness by an employer does not satisfy this high standard.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In State v. Randolph, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether defendant Buddy Randolph, who had pleaded guilty to multiple counts of aggravated assault and unlawful weapons possession arising from five separate incidents, should have been allowed to present evidence of his post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts at a remand hearing for resentencing. The resentencing court had declined to consider the evidence, interpreting the Appellate Division's remand order as limited in scope. The Court decided that the remand required a full resentencing with reevaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors, so the defendant was entitled to offer the new evidence, and therefore reversed and remanded for resentencing. The core reasoning examined the ambiguous language of the remand order in light of the exchanges during appellate argument, while noting that the specific facts of each remand determine whether full resentencing proceedings are needed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case is a post-conviction relief matter in which defendant Juan Pablo Santos, a Mexican citizen, pleaded guilty to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child after being found in bed with a fourteen-year-old girl and admitting to an ongoing sexual relationship. Following his removal to Mexico, Santos filed a PCR petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not advised that deportation was a possible consequence of his plea. The PCR court granted an evidentiary hearing and permitted Santos to testify by telephone, but the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed that grant. The court reasoned that its recent decision in State v. Gaitan undermined the basis for holding an evidentiary hearing and that the lower court had not considered newly available evidence, including an affidavit from Santos's defense counsel stating that immigration consequences had been discussed. The matter was remanded for reevaluation of whether Santos meets the standard for an evidentiary hearing.

immigrationcriminal lawprocedure

The case concerned defendant Sally McDonald, who was convicted of second-degree theft by deception and fourth-degree forgery after pleading guilty to defrauding a victim of $1.7 million over several years. She was already serving an extended-term sentence for similar prior offenses when the sentencing court imposed another extended term on the new convictions, to run consecutively. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b) prohibits imposition of a second extended-term sentence when the new offense was committed before the prior extended-term offense, even if the sentences were imposed in separate proceedings. The ruling followed the Court's companion decision in State v. Hudson and emphasized that the statute prevents multiple extended terms based on the sequence of sentencing.

criminal law

The case involved defendant Kevin Hudson, who faced multiple charges from a single indictment for assaults on two victims and, after successfully moving to sever the charges, was tried and sentenced separately, receiving an extended-term sentence in each proceeding for offenses committed before the first sentencing. The New Jersey Supreme Court considered the application of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(1), which requires that sentences imposed at different times conform as far as possible to subsection (a)'s prohibition on multiple extended terms. The court held that Hudson's second extended-term sentence violated the statute and was therefore illegal, reversing and remanding for resentencing. The core reasoning was that subsection (b)(1)'s plain language expressly incorporates subsection (a)'s bar and mandates its application unless impossible, a circumstance not present here given the timing of the offenses and proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a facial constitutional challenge by Whirlpool Properties, Inc., a multi-state corporation, to New Jersey's Throw-Out Rule under N.J.S.A. 54:10A-6(B), which modified the sales factor in the corporate business tax apportionment formula by excluding certain untaxed receipts from the denominator, thereby increasing the tax liability for out-of-state taxpayers. The New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether this rule violated the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause by potentially taxing income earned outside the state. The court determined that the rule could operate constitutionally if limited to receipts from states that lack jurisdiction to tax due to insufficient business activity by the taxpayer, but not if applied to receipts untaxed because a state has no income tax. It therefore adopted a limiting construction of the statute and upheld the rule as facially constitutional under that interpretation, affirming the Appellate Division's judgment as modified.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a pedestrian who slipped on ice on a public sidewalk abutting a 104-unit condominium complex in Hoboken and sued the city, the management company, and the condominium association for his injuries. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the condominium association had no duty to maintain the abutting sidewalk. The court reasoned that longstanding precedent distinguishes between commercial and residential property owners regarding sidewalk liability, and this overwhelmingly owner-occupied condominium qualified as residential rather than commercial.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved International Schools Services, Inc. (ISS), a nonprofit organization, appealing the denial of a local property tax exemption by West Windsor Township for its office condominium units in tax years 2002 and 2003 under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, which exempts property used by nonprofits organized for the moral and mental improvement of people. ISS had previously received the exemption for the portions it occupied but was denied it after the township reviewed its activities involving related for-profit entities. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that ISS was not entitled to the exemption because it had entangled its operations with for-profit affiliates by providing services, below-market rent, and credit lines that benefited those entities. The court reasoned that this commingling meant the property was used for profit, failing the statutory test as interpreted in Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millburn Township.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved defendant George Calleia, who was convicted by a jury of murdering his wife Susan, tampering with evidence, and hindering apprehension, based largely on circumstantial evidence including the location of her body and his statements to police. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions on the ground that hearsay statements by the victim about her intent to divorce were improperly admitted to prove motive. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the convictions, holding that a deceased victim's hearsay statements reflecting her state of mind are admissible under the state-of-mind exception when offered to show motive and the defendant was aware or likely aware of the facts, and that any error in admitting the statements here was harmless in light of other evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Rose, defendant Zarik Rose was convicted as an accomplice of the purposeful murder of Charles Mosley based on evidence that he arranged the killing from jail while awaiting trial on prior attempted murder charges against the same victim. The trial court admitted testimony from fellow inmates about the prior charges and incarceration, along with a copy of the indictment, after finding the evidence admissible either as res gestae or under Evidence Rule 404(b), with limiting instructions to the jury; the Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the conviction, concluding that the evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b) to show motive, plan, and intent without improper propensity use, and further ruled that the common-law res gestae doctrine no longer has independent vitality in New Jersey evidence law.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is part of the long-running Abbott v. Burke litigation in which a class of students from disadvantaged New Jersey school districts sought to enforce prior court orders requiring the state to provide adequate education funding under the state constitution. The plaintiffs filed a motion in aid of litigants' rights asking the court to order the state to fully fund the districts according to the School Funding Reform Act of 2008 (SFRA) rather than allowing reduced appropriations. By a 3-2 vote, the court denied the motion and permitted the state to depart from full SFRA funding levels. The core reasoning was that the state's fiscal situation and legislative choices justified relief from strict adherence to the formula that had replaced earlier parity remedies, while still recognizing the plaintiffs' longstanding constitutional protections.

civil rights

The case concerned whether defendant Jason Shelley could be convicted under New Jersey's school-zone drug statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, for selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of The Goddard School, a licensed childcare center that offered programs for children up to age six and included one kindergarten class with ten students. The trial court upheld the charge, treating the facility as an elementary school, but the Appellate Division vacated the conviction. The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed, holding that the plain language of the statute, which refers to property used for elementary or secondary school purposes, does not encompass this type of childcare center, even with a kindergarten program. The Court applied strict construction to the penal statute and the doctrine of lenity in the absence of clear legislative intent to include such facilities.

criminal law

This case involved a challenge by Pam, a stepmother, to a Title Nine abuse and neglect finding entered against her by the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services concerning her then-teenage stepdaughter Alice. DYFS had opened an investigation after a referral from the child's grandfather alleging physical abuse, financial exploitation, and inadequate supervision and medical care; although the agency determined physical abuse claims were unfounded, the trial court found abuse and neglect based on the accumulated circumstances and entered judgment against Pam and her husband. The Appellate Division affirmed, but the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that Pam had received inadequate notice that physical abuse would be litigated and that the record evidence was legally insufficient to establish actionable abuse or neglect under Title Nine, as the parental decisions, while imperfect, did not meet the statutory threshold.

family lawprocedure

This case involved three female tenured professors at Seton Hall University who sued under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD), alleging that they received lower pay than younger or male colleagues due to age and gender discrimination. The plaintiffs filed their 2007 complaint seeking damages dating back to their initial hires, but lower courts dismissed the claims as untimely by applying the U.S. Supreme Court's Ledbetter framework, which treats only the initial discriminatory pay decision as starting the limitations clock. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that each discriminatory paycheck constitutes a separate violation under the LAD, so the two-year statute of limitations bars recovery only for wages paid more than two years before filing. The court reasoned that this approach aligns with longstanding state precedent on wage claims and does not require adopting the federal Ledbetter analysis. The case was remanded to reinstate the timely portion of the claims for the two years immediately preceding the complaint.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved plaintiff Gina Stelluti, who was injured when handlebars on a spin bike dislodged during a class at defendant Powerhouse Gym shortly after she joined and signed membership forms including a broad pre-injury waiver and release of liability. Stelluti sued the gym for negligence in connection with the equipment and her injuries, but the trial court dismissed the claim and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the exculpatory agreement was enforceable as to the injury sustained, rejecting the argument that such liability waivers are per se invalid in private fitness centers. The court's reasoning centered on the voluntary nature of recreational activities, the absence of gross negligence or intentional misconduct by the gym, the patron's opportunity to assess risks, and New Jersey precedent allowing enforcement of adhesion contracts containing waivers where they do not violate public policy.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether defendant Jeremiah Hupka, a former Hunterdon County sheriff's officer and part-time police officer who pled guilty to fourth-degree criminal sexual contact arising from an off-duty incident, was required to forfeit his public positions and face permanent disqualification from future public employment under N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2. The trial court had ordered disqualification, but the Appellate Division reversed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The Court held that the conviction did not compel forfeiture because the offense did not involve or touch upon defendant's public offices, as required by the statute's plain language and precedents such as State v. McCann. Although the plea included defendant's agreement never to seek law enforcement employment again, the State could not establish the statutory nexus for automatic disqualification on this record.

criminal lawlabor & employment

This case involved a 14-year-old juvenile with limited cognitive abilities who was adjudicated delinquent for conduct that would constitute first-degree aggravated sexual assault if committed by an adult. The juvenile challenged the admission of her confession, arguing that it was obtained involuntarily during police interrogation where her adoptive mother was present but had a conflict of interest as the victim's grandmother and read the Miranda warnings to her. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the confession must be suppressed because the totality of circumstances rendered the statement involuntary, as the police enlisted the mother as an assistant rather than a protector of the child's rights and failed to properly honor the juvenile's attempts to assert silence. The court required a new delinquency hearing before a different judge to avoid taint from the confession but rejected a bright-line rule mandating legal counsel whenever a parent has a conflict due to family relationships with the victim.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved J.S., who as a minor sexually assaulted his younger sister but was adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court at age twenty-one. The court ordered DYFS to provide sex offender evaluations and treatment, despite J.S. having no prior agency involvement and exceeding the typical age for services. DYFS sought reconsideration and appealed, arguing the juvenile court lacked statutory authority to impose such obligations on the agency. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that DYFS's enabling statutes limit its responsibilities to eligible children under twenty-one and do not authorize court-ordered services for adults in this situation. The core reasoning centered on the absence of any statutory basis in juvenile disposition provisions or DYFS's authorizing laws for extending services to an individual over twenty-one with no prior connection to the agency.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

The case involved beachfront property owners suing the Borough of Avalon after it built a protective dune on their land following the 1962 Atlantic nor'easter storm, pursuant to emergency legislation, without following eminent domain procedures or paying compensation. The court recognized that a physical taking had occurred that restricted the owners' use of the property but held that the normal six-year statute of limitations for an inverse condemnation action would ordinarily bar relief. On the unique facts—including the Borough's failure to provide specific notice of the taking, its equivocation when the owners inquired about using the property, and its shifting litigation positions—equity required an exemption from the limitations period. The court therefore reversed in limited part to allow the owners to amend their complaint and pursue a claim for just compensation based on the property's value at the time of the taking around 1965.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a juvenile, C.V., who was adjudicated delinquent and received a suspended sentence to a state training school along with probation that included residential treatment placements. After multiple probation violations, the family court imposed the custodial sentence and denied credit for time spent in the residential programs, granting credit only for detention and court-ordered shelter care under Rule 5:21-3(e). The New Jersey Supreme Court held that residential treatment does not qualify for mandatory day-for-day credit as detention or shelter care, but emphasized that family courts retain broad flexibility under the Juvenile Code to resentence a probation violator to a term shorter than the original suspended sentence, limited only by statutory maximums. The court affirmed the Appellate Division as modified, noting that the resentencing authority allows adjustment to promote rehabilitation without being bound by the prior suspended term.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure