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Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp.
Supreme Court of New Jersey · 2012-06-26 · cited 48×
This case involved a construction worker who suffered serious injuries from a trench collapse at a worksite and sought to bring a common-law tort action against his employer, arguing that the employer's conduct qualified as an 'intentional wrong' under New Jersey’s Workers’ Compensation Act and thus fell outside the Act's exclusive remedy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer defendants, finding the facts insufficient to meet the intentional-wrong exception despite an OSHA willful-violation citation. The Appellate Division reversed, but the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the workers’ compensation bar applied. The Court reasoned that the Act strongly favors the statutory remedy, that an intentional wrong requires proof of substantial certainty that injury or death would result, and that even gross negligence or recklessness by an employer does not satisfy this high standard.
labor & employmenttorts & liability
State v. Randolph
Supreme Court of New Jersey · 2012-06-18 · cited 125×
In State v. Randolph, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether defendant Buddy Randolph, who had pleaded guilty to multiple counts of aggravated assault and unlawful weapons possession arising from five separate incidents, should have been allowed to present evidence of his post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts at a remand hearing for resentencing. The resentencing court had declined to consider the evidence, interpreting the Appellate Division's remand order as limited in scope. The Court decided that the remand required a full resentencing with reevaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors, so the defendant was entitled to offer the new evidence, and therefore reversed and remanded for resentencing. The core reasoning examined the ambiguous language of the remand order in light of the exchanges during appellate argument, while noting that the specific facts of each remand determine whether full resentencing proceedings are needed.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Santos
Supreme Court of New Jersey · 2012-05-08 · cited 61×
The case is a post-conviction relief matter in which defendant Juan Pablo Santos, a Mexican citizen, pleaded guilty to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child after being found in bed with a fourteen-year-old girl and admitting to an ongoing sexual relationship. Following his removal to Mexico, Santos filed a PCR petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not advised that deportation was a possible consequence of his plea. The PCR court granted an evidentiary hearing and permitted Santos to testify by telephone, but the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed that grant. The court reasoned that its recent decision in State v. Gaitan undermined the basis for holding an evidentiary hearing and that the lower court had not considered newly available evidence, including an affidavit from Santos's defense counsel stating that immigration consequences had been discussed. The matter was remanded for reevaluation of whether Santos meets the standard for an evidentiary hearing.
immigrationcriminal lawprocedure
State v. McDonald
Supreme Court of New Jersey · 2012-02-06 · cited 4×
The case concerned defendant Sally McDonald, who was convicted of second-degree theft by deception and fourth-degree forgery after pleading guilty to defrauding a victim of $1.7 million over several years. She was already serving an extended-term sentence for similar prior offenses when the sentencing court imposed another extended term on the new convictions, to run consecutively. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b) prohibits imposition of a second extended-term sentence when the new offense was committed before the prior extended-term offense, even if the sentences were imposed in separate proceedings. The ruling followed the Court's companion decision in State v. Hudson and emphasized that the statute prevents multiple extended terms based on the sequence of sentencing.
criminal law
State v. Hudson
Supreme Court of New Jersey · 2012-02-06 · cited 85×
The case involved defendant Kevin Hudson, who faced multiple charges from a single indictment for assaults on two victims and, after successfully moving to sever the charges, was tried and sentenced separately, receiving an extended-term sentence in each proceeding for offenses committed before the first sentencing. The New Jersey Supreme Court considered the application of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(1), which requires that sentences imposed at different times conform as far as possible to subsection (a)'s prohibition on multiple extended terms. The court held that Hudson's second extended-term sentence violated the statute and was therefore illegal, reversing and remanding for resentencing. The core reasoning was that subsection (b)(1)'s plain language expressly incorporates subsection (a)'s bar and mandates its application unless impossible, a circumstance not present here given the timing of the offenses and proceedings.
criminal lawprocedure
Whirlpool Properties, Inc. v. DIR., DIV. OF TAX.
Supreme Court of New Jersey · 2011-07-28 · cited 31×
The case involved a facial constitutional challenge by Whirlpool Properties, Inc., a multi-state corporation, to New Jersey's Throw-Out Rule under N.J.S.A. 54:10A-6(B), which modified the sales factor in the corporate business tax apportionment formula by excluding certain untaxed receipts from the denominator, thereby increasing the tax liability for out-of-state taxpayers. The New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether this rule violated the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause by potentially taxing income earned outside the state. The court determined that the rule could operate constitutionally if limited to receipts from states that lack jurisdiction to tax due to insufficient business activity by the taxpayer, but not if applied to receipts untaxed because a state has no income tax. It therefore adopted a limiting construction of the statute and upheld the rule as facially constitutional under that interpretation, affirming the Appellate Division's judgment as modified.
taxesbusiness & regulatory