Mike Wheat

In State v. Trier, the defendant was charged with driving under the influence and related offenses in Yellowstone County Justice Court, demanded a jury trial, and received multiple continuances along with explicit court orders requiring his and his counsel's physical appearance at a final pretrial conference, with warnings that non-appearance would waive the jury trial right. After Trier and his attorney failed to appear at the conference due to a scheduling error by counsel, the Justice Court denied a request to reset the matter as a jury trial, conducted a non-jury trial, and found Trier guilty of operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08% BAC or greater. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the waiver of the jury trial right under Article II, Section 26 of the Montana Constitution was valid because it resulted from Trier's own failure to appear despite repeated warnings, rather than any forced waiver by statute. The Court distinguished the case from prior precedent invalidating statutory forced waivers and concluded the District Court properly upheld the Justice Court's actions.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Green, the defendant appealed alcohol-related conditions imposed as part of his sentence after pleading guilty to felony aggravated assault arising from a domestic incident in which he strangled and attempted to suffocate his wife. The conditions prohibited alcohol use or possession, required breath and fluid testing, and mandated a chemical dependency evaluation. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conditions, holding that they were reasonably related to the offender's rehabilitation because of his history of violent conduct and undiagnosed mental health issues, even though alcohol played no role in the offense and the defendant had no history of alcohol abuse. A dissent argued there was no sufficient nexus between the conditions and either the crime or the offender to support the restrictions.

criminal law

This case involves Joel St. Germain's appeal from the district court's dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief following his 2004 convictions on multiple counts of incest and sexual intercourse without consent. St. Germain raised claims of ineffective assistance against both his trial counsel and appellate counsel, alleging various errors such as failure to challenge a juror for cause, inadequate investigation, and improper handling of witnesses. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, applying the Strickland v. Washington two-prong test for ineffective assistance claims and concluding that St. Germain failed to demonstrate either deficient performance by counsel or resulting prejudice on any of the claims. The court reviewed the record de novo but found that counsel's actions fell within the range of reasonable professional judgment and that any alleged errors did not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial or appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Kirn, Douglas Kirn was convicted by a jury of two felony counts of assault on a peace officer after an incident in which Billings police officers responded to a noise complaint at his apartment, he became agitated during their interaction, made physical contact with one officer, retreated to retrieve a loaded shotgun while making a threatening comment, and then returned in a stance that concealed the weapon, leading the officers to fear for their safety and draw their guns. Kirn moved to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence at the close of the state's case, arguing the officers could not have reasonably apprehended serious bodily injury by use of a weapon since they did not see the shotgun until he dropped it. The district court denied the motion, and Kirn was convicted; on appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the denial. The court held that precedent establishes a victim need not personally observe a weapon to experience reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury from its use, and the evidence of Kirn's belligerent behavior, retreat, bladed stance, and the officers' testimony of fear was sufficient for a rational jury to find the elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

criminal lawguns

The case involved Richard Bollman appealing his conviction for felony DUI, his fifth offense, after a jury trial in Montana district court. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, upholding the admission of expert testimony regarding horizontal gaze nystagmus testing and the denial of a motion for mistrial based on an officer's inadvertent reference to felony DUIs. The court reasoned that the expert testimony met the reliability standards under Montana law and that the officer's remark did not prejudice the defendant given the strength of other evidence and the lack of a request for a curative instruction.

criminal lawprocedure

In Pederson v. Rocky Mountain Bank, the plaintiffs sued the bank for negligence, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, violation of the Consumer Protection Act, common law bad faith, and punitive damages, alleging issues with a 2007 construction loan, denial of a mortgage due to credit deterioration, subsequent alternative loans in 2008, and failures to release deeds or advise on financing options. The district court dismissed the claims on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, finding the statutes of limitations had run, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the claims accrued by March 10, 2008, when the Pedersons signed the new loan agreements with knowledge of the core facts, starting the two- or three-year limitation periods under Montana law. Filing the complaint on March 14, 2011, was untimely, and the limitations periods were not tolled because the bank-customer relationship created no fiduciary duty and mere ignorance of facts does not extend the deadlines.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case concerned the Marjorie Q. Ward Revocable Trust, which was amended in 1998 to direct the trustee to reduce son Jack Ward's equal share of the residue by the amount he owed his stepsister Joan under a 1989 promissory note (with interest) at the time of their mother's death, and to pay that sum directly to Joan. Jack had received a Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge of the debt in 2005, and after Ms. Ward's death in 2009 the amount owed totaled $298,356.16. The district court ruled from the bench that Jack's trust distribution should be reduced by that sum, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the trust language was unambiguous and controlled the distribution, that the bankruptcy discharge eliminated only Jack's personal liability and did not rewrite the trust's adjustment mechanism, and that the trustee was required to follow the trust's terms rather than federal bankruptcy rules that bar collection of a discharged debt.

family lawproperty

The case involved consolidated appeals by multiple defendants, including Damon Peters, who were charged with DUI after providing breath samples on the Intoxilyzer 8000 device; each sought production of the device's source code and related software information to challenge the evidence. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's orders limiting these discovery requests, holding that the source code is a trade secret exclusively controlled by the manufacturer CMI, Inc., which is not accessible to the prosecution and could not be compelled through out-of-state subpoena. In Peters' separate appeal, the court also affirmed denial of his motion to suppress, concluding that the investigatory stop was supported by particularized suspicion from a corroborated witness report and that Miranda warnings were not required because he was not in custody.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves Robert Daron Riggs's appeal from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief following his 2002 convictions for incest, sexual intercourse without consent, and sexual assault involving four minor victims. Riggs claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file motions, interview witnesses, object to evidence, conduct proper voir dire, and other pretrial and trial errors. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of relief, applying the two-prong Strickland v. Washington test and concluding that Riggs failed to show either deficient performance by counsel or resulting prejudice that would have changed the trial outcome. The court reviewed the remaining claims individually, found no merit in arguments about excluded statements or other issues, and determined there was no cumulative error warranting reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

In Miller v. Begley, plaintiff John Miller, who had previously been convicted of homicide, sued attorney Patrick Begley for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraudulent deceit after Begley provided limited representation in Miller's separate lawsuit against another attorney. The district court granted summary judgment to Begley, finding that he had reasonably assisted Miller with discovery and that the dismissal of the underlying claims resulted from independent legal deficiencies. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed, holding that Miller failed to raise genuine issues of material fact because the evidence showed Begley had only agreed to limited discovery assistance within his professional judgment and had not breached any duties. The court applied the standard that questions of fact may be resolved as a matter of law when reasonable minds cannot differ, and Miller's affidavits and recordings did not create triable issues on the contract or tort claims.

proceduretorts & liability

In State v. McCaslin, the defendant appealed a district court judgment imposing a five-year fully suspended sentence for failure to register as a sexual or violent offender, with 142 days of pretrial incarceration credited only against any future revocation commitment rather than the current sentence. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the credit must instead be applied to the present suspended sentence. The court reasoned that Montana Code Annotated § 46-18-403(1) requires credit for each day of pretrial incarceration against a "judgment of imprisonment," which includes a suspended sentence, to avoid penalizing indigent defendants who cannot post bail. The case was remanded with instructions to apply the credit to McCaslin's current five-year suspended term.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose after a 2007 rear-end collision in a Montana highway construction zone, in which UTR and its employee Paulsen admitted negligence but sued the Montana DOT and several contractors for contribution, claiming the roadway design, signage, and maintenance were also negligent and contributed to the crash. A jury found UTR and Paulsen 100 percent at fault and assigned zero liability to the defendants. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly excluded post-crash evidence such as a highway patrol memorandum and a later-installed no-left-turn sign, that various challenged evidentiary and closing-argument rulings were not erroneous, and that the special verdict form was sufficient because the jury's intent to assign full fault to the plaintiffs was clear from its apportionment of liability. The court noted that the plaintiffs had not objected to the verdict when it was announced.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this case, a homeowner who purchased property in a private Montana subdivision subject to recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs) sued the homeowners association and developer over alleged financial mismanagement, conflicts of interest, improper accounting, and a related defamation claim. The district court granted the defendants' motion to stay the lawsuit and compel arbitration under an arbitration clause in the CCRs. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the arbitration provision was valid and enforceable as to the contract and governance claims because it was within the buyer's reasonable expectations and not adhesive, but that the defamation claim qualified as a personal-injury action exempt from arbitration under § 27-5-114(2)(a), MCA. The court therefore remanded for arbitration of all claims except the defamation claim.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In State v. Hartsoe, the defendant was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, kidnapping, and violation of a protection order arising from an alleged attack on his wife while a protection order was in place; he fired his counsel, sought to represent himself, was held in contempt during proceedings, and was convicted by a jury on the aggravated assault and protection order counts after being shackled during voir dire. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions in part but remanded for further proceedings, holding that the district court violated Hartsoe's due process rights by permitting shackling without a record showing consideration of less restrictive alternatives as a last resort. The court also addressed the self-representation request, finding no error in granting it after warnings, and remanded on the contempt issue for compliance with statutory and due process requirements. The error from shackling was deemed not structural, with the state bearing the burden to show it was harmless under the circumstances.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a lawsuit by the estate of Madeleine Willson and her husband Robert against her longtime physician Dr. Addison, Benefis Hospitals, and Peace Hospice, alleging that medications administered during her brief hospice stay for advanced metastatic breast cancer either caused or hastened her death, along with claims related to the destruction of a narcotic count record under the hospital's three-year retention policy. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied the plaintiffs' request for sanctions or default judgment based on alleged spoliation. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs produced no evidence linking the medications to an expedited death and that the record destruction occurred routinely without bad faith, concealment, or prejudice to the plaintiffs since patient medication doses were documented elsewhere. The court also declined to address unpreserved claims such as loss of chance or survival actions.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

The case involved Joshua Micone's challenge to a Department of Public Health and Human Services order requiring repayment of $22,657.32 in Medicaid benefits paid to his family from 2003 to 2006. The Department determined that Micone's wife held a countable interest in a family limited partnership that exceeded eligibility resource limits, which Micone had not disclosed on applications. After an administrative hearing, the Board of Public Assistance upheld the repayment demand, and both the district court and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the hearing officer's decision, issued more than ninety days after submission, did not violate statutory timing requirements under § 2-4-623, MCA, and that substantial evidence supported the finding that the partnership interest was an available resource. The majority rejected arguments that the delay or the resource determination prejudiced Micone's rights.

healthcareprocedure

This case centered on C.R. Weaver, who sued Advanced Restaurant Supply, Wilbur Curtis Manufacturing, and related defendants over a propane-incompatible coffee urn purchased for Glacier Kitchens, Inc., a corporation in which Weaver held a 90% stake; the malfunction allegedly caused termination of Glacier Kitchens' food service contract with the U.S. Forest Service, leading Weaver to seek nearly $1 million in damages. Weaver filed the action in his individual capacity, claiming he personally bought and leased the urn to the corporation. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that Weaver lacked standing to assert claims belonging to the corporation and was not a party to the USFS contract under which damages were sought. The court further held that denial of leave to amend the complaint after the scheduling deadline was not an abuse of discretion.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the parents of an 18-year-old pitcher who was fatally struck by a batted ball hit with an aluminum baseball bat suing the bat's manufacturer, Hillerich & Bradsby, in strict products liability for failure to warn of enhanced risks from higher batted-ball speeds and reduced reaction times. A jury rejected the design-defect claim but found the manufacturer liable on the failure-to-warn claim and awarded $850,000 in damages. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure-to-warn claim was properly submitted to the jury under Montana products-liability law, that the district court correctly denied summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, and that evidentiary and instructional rulings were within the court's discretion.

torts & liability

This case involved a petition to transfer territory consisting of about 90% of a former school district and serving roughly 36 students from Dutton/Brady K-12 School District No. 28C to Conrad High School and Elementary Districts No. 10 in Montana. After a public hearing, a three-member panel of county superintendents denied the petition by a 2-1 vote, citing negative effects on educational opportunities and a substantial tax burden on the remaining taxpayers in the transferring district. The district court affirmed the denial, and the Montana Supreme Court upheld that ruling, concluding the panel had properly applied the statutory criteria in section 20-6-105, MCA, and had not acted arbitrarily in determining that the transfer was not in the best and collective interests of all affected students.

taxesprocedure

This case concerned the interpretation of § 69-8-201(2), MCA (2007), part of Montana's Electric Utility Industry Generation Reintegration Act, which addressed whether customers who had switched to competitive electricity suppliers under prior deregulation laws could continue receiving service from those suppliers after October 1, 2007. The Montana Public Service Commission ruled that 'customer' referred to individual meters or delivery points, limiting competitive supply to only those meters already served by Electric City Power, Inc. (ECP) on that date, and NorthWestern Energy refused transfers for additional points belonging to the City of Great Falls and Benefis Health Care. The District Court reversed the PSC, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that 'customer' means the entity or person as a whole based on the statute's plain language, its context in preserving prior supplier choices, and the legislative intent, rather than individual meters. The Court also found the PSC's tariff notice rules inconsistent with the statute and thus inapplicable.

business & regulatory