Get above the noise
Log in for answers tailored to you — saved chats, your topics, and the full IJR suite.
On the bench with
State v. Trier
Montana Supreme Court · 2012-05-04 · cited 9×
In State v. Trier, the defendant was charged with driving under the influence and related offenses in Yellowstone County Justice Court, demanded a jury trial, and received multiple continuances along with explicit court orders requiring his and his counsel's physical appearance at a final pretrial conference, with warnings that non-appearance would waive the jury trial right. After Trier and his attorney failed to appear at the conference due to a scheduling error by counsel, the Justice Court denied a request to reset the matter as a jury trial, conducted a non-jury trial, and found Trier guilty of operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08% BAC or greater. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the waiver of the jury trial right under Article II, Section 26 of the Montana Constitution was valid because it resulted from Trier's own failure to appear despite repeated warnings, rather than any forced waiver by statute. The Court distinguished the case from prior precedent invalidating statutory forced waivers and concluded the District Court properly upheld the Justice Court's actions.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Green
Montana Supreme Court · 2012-04-19 · cited 3×
In State v. Green, the defendant appealed alcohol-related conditions imposed as part of his sentence after pleading guilty to felony aggravated assault arising from a domestic incident in which he strangled and attempted to suffocate his wife. The conditions prohibited alcohol use or possession, required breath and fluid testing, and mandated a chemical dependency evaluation. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conditions, holding that they were reasonably related to the offender's rehabilitation because of his history of violent conduct and undiagnosed mental health issues, even though alcohol played no role in the offense and the defendant had no history of alcohol abuse. A dissent argued there was no sufficient nexus between the conditions and either the crime or the offender to support the restrictions.
criminal law
St. Germain v. State
Montana Supreme Court · 2012-04-17 · cited 21×
This case involves Joel St. Germain's appeal from the district court's dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief following his 2004 convictions on multiple counts of incest and sexual intercourse without consent. St. Germain raised claims of ineffective assistance against both his trial counsel and appellate counsel, alleging various errors such as failure to challenge a juror for cause, inadequate investigation, and improper handling of witnesses. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, applying the Strickland v. Washington two-prong test for ineffective assistance claims and concluding that St. Germain failed to demonstrate either deficient performance by counsel or resulting prejudice on any of the claims. The court reviewed the record de novo but found that counsel's actions fell within the range of reasonable professional judgment and that any alleged errors did not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial or appeal.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Kirn
Montana Supreme Court · 2012-03-27 · cited 20×
In State v. Kirn, Douglas Kirn was convicted by a jury of two felony counts of assault on a peace officer after an incident in which Billings police officers responded to a noise complaint at his apartment, he became agitated during their interaction, made physical contact with one officer, retreated to retrieve a loaded shotgun while making a threatening comment, and then returned in a stance that concealed the weapon, leading the officers to fear for their safety and draw their guns. Kirn moved to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence at the close of the state's case, arguing the officers could not have reasonably apprehended serious bodily injury by use of a weapon since they did not see the shotgun until he dropped it. The district court denied the motion, and Kirn was convicted; on appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the denial. The court held that precedent establishes a victim need not personally observe a weapon to experience reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury from its use, and the evidence of Kirn's belligerent behavior, retreat, bladed stance, and the officers' testimony of fear was sufficient for a rational jury to find the elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
criminal lawguns
State v. Bollman
Montana Supreme Court · 2012-03-06 · cited 14×
The case involved Richard Bollman appealing his conviction for felony DUI, his fifth offense, after a jury trial in Montana district court. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, upholding the admission of expert testimony regarding horizontal gaze nystagmus testing and the denial of a motion for mistrial based on an officer's inadvertent reference to felony DUIs. The court reasoned that the expert testimony met the reliability standards under Montana law and that the officer's remark did not prejudice the defendant given the strength of other evidence and the lack of a request for a curative instruction.
criminal lawprocedure
Pederson v. ROCKY MOUNTAIN BANK
Montana Supreme Court · 2012-03-06 · cited 9×
In Pederson v. Rocky Mountain Bank, the plaintiffs sued the bank for negligence, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, violation of the Consumer Protection Act, common law bad faith, and punitive damages, alleging issues with a 2007 construction loan, denial of a mortgage due to credit deterioration, subsequent alternative loans in 2008, and failures to release deeds or advise on financing options. The district court dismissed the claims on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, finding the statutes of limitations had run, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the claims accrued by March 10, 2008, when the Pedersons signed the new loan agreements with knowledge of the core facts, starting the two- or three-year limitation periods under Montana law. Filing the complaint on March 14, 2011, was untimely, and the limitations periods were not tolled because the bank-customer relationship created no fiduciary duty and mere ignorance of facts does not extend the deadlines.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability