Glenn T. Harrell jr

Karen Webb sued Giant of Maryland for negligence after she was injured at a Giant supermarket, alleging that Giant was liable for the actions of an independent contractor whose work caused her harm and that Giant had negligently hired, trained, and supervised its staff. A jury found for Webb, but the Court of Special Appeals reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that reversal. The court held that Giant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the evidence, viewed most favorably to Webb, showed only general oversight of the contractor and did not establish the degree of control needed to impose liability on Giant. It also ruled that the trial court’s spoliation instruction was improper and prejudicial, as there was no proof that a video recording of the incident had ever existed, making the instruction misleading and likely to cause the jury to speculate about missing evidence.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved Ronnie Hunt’s petition for a writ of actual innocence under Maryland Criminal Procedure Article § 8-301, seeking relief from his 1991 convictions based on newly discovered evidence that Joseph Kopera, the State’s ballistics expert, had fabricated his academic credentials and testified falsely about them for years. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence qualified as newly discovered because the actual-innocence statute incorporates the due-diligence requirement of Maryland Rule 4-331(c), and, given the unique facts of Kopera’s long-undetected fraud (revealed only in 2007), defense counsel in pre-2007 trials had no obligation to investigate his qualifications absent specific red flags. The court further ruled that the statute’s prejudice standard—“a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different”—is equivalent to the materiality tests used in ineffective-assistance and Brady claims, so no separate materiality analysis is required.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Effrem Antoine Conner, who was sentenced to probation conditioned on completing the Montgomery County Adult Drug Court program and later faced a violation of probation hearing after alleged failures to comply with drug court rules. Conner moved to recuse any drug court judge, arguing that prior involvement by the assigned judge (including presiding over status hearings and participating on the drug court team) created an appearance of bias or relied on personal knowledge that denied him an impartial tribunal. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the denial of the recusal motion and the finding of a probation violation. It held that Maryland Rule 16-207 does not require recusal in such circumstances, that the judge’s knowledge was not acquired from an extrajudicial source or shown to be “personal,” and that nothing in the record indicated ex parte communications or prejudgment of the evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved disciplinary charges filed by the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland against attorney Gregory J. Milton, stemming from an investigation into an overdraft in his attorney trust account at Capital One Bank. The Court of Appeals of Maryland indefinitely suspended Milton from practicing law, finding he violated multiple rules including those on safekeeping client property, maintaining trust account records, making prohibited cash withdrawals, filing frivolous motions, and failing to cooperate with Bar Counsel's requests for documents and information. The court reasoned that Milton repeatedly ignored or obstructed legitimate inquiries into his account practices despite extensions, engaged in unsupported efforts to quash the investigation, and had a prior disciplinary record of similar misconduct that warranted escalation beyond lesser sanctions used in comparable cases.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The Court of Appeals consolidated these two cases to address whether probationers may directly appeal circuit court orders revoking probation for technical violations and imposing sentences beyond the presumptive incarceration caps (15, 30, or 45 days) established by the 2016 Justice Reinvestment Act. The court held that Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 12-302(g) requires such challenges to proceed by application for leave to appeal rather than direct appeal, and it affirmed the Court of Special Appeals’ orders dismissing the direct appeals in both Conaway and Johnson. It further ruled that Johnson waived his challenge to the sufficiency of the public-safety findings needed to exceed the caps by failing to object at sentencing, and that his remaining claims about revocation procedure and due process were not cognizable on direct appeal. The court reasoned that the statutory scheme channels probation-revocation review through the discretionary leave-to-appeal process and that ordinary preservation rules apply to sentencing objections.

criminal lawprocedure

These consolidated cases involved two Maryland probationers, Conaway and Johnson, who sought direct appeals after circuit courts revoked their probation for technical violations and imposed sentences exceeding the presumptive incarceration limits set by the 2016 Justice Reinvestment Act. The Court of Appeals held that neither defendant could pursue a direct appeal; instead, review of a probation revocation order must be sought through an application for leave to appeal under Md. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 12-302(g). The Court reasoned that the statute expressly channels such challenges via the leave-to-appeal process rather than as of right, and it declined to reach the merits of the defendants’ claims about the Act’s limits or sentencing procedures because those issues were either waived by failure to object below or not properly before the Court on direct appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a Maryland asbestos liability claim in which William Busch and his wife alleged that his mesothelioma resulted from bystander exposure to asbestos insulation installed by Wallace & Gale during construction of Loch Raven High School, where Busch worked in the boiler room. The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict (reduced to roughly $7.28 million) in favor of the Buschs. The court held that Maryland law permits plaintiffs to prove exposure to a defendant’s asbestos products through circumstantial evidence from which a jury may draw reasonable inferences, and that the evidence here—chiefly that W&G was the primary (if not sole) heating-pipe and equipment insulator on the project and performed insulation work in the boiler room—met that standard. Although no direct evidence placed W&G’s asbestos materials in the boiler room during Busch’s presence, the majority concluded the record supported a permissible inference that W&G’s products were a substantial causative factor.

torts & liability

Ingram v. State concerned whether a Maryland court could order restitution as part of a sentence for theft under Criminal Law Article § 7-104 without any request from the State or victim, as generally required by Criminal Procedure Article § 11-603(b)(1). The Court of Appeals held that § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) creates an independent “theft exception” mandating restitution in such cases, affirming the order requiring Ingram to pay $18,964.55 for stolen tires after his guilty plea. The court reasoned that the theft-specific statute supplies both authority and a directive for restitution regardless of a request, and can be read harmoniously with the general procedural rules without ambiguity, so the rule of lenity did not apply. The decision rested on statutory construction, the facts of Ingram’s plea, and the absence of any conflicting procedural defect.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Brian Donlon, a Montgomery County public school teacher, who claimed protection under Maryland’s State Whistleblower Protection Law (WBL) after reporting alleged misconduct, arguing that the county board of education qualified as a unit of the State Executive Branch. The Court of Appeals held that county boards of education are not State entities or Executive Branch units for purposes of the WBL, so their teachers are not covered by that statute. The court reasoned that boards possess a hybrid State-local character whose classification depends on the specific legal context, and that the WBL’s plain language and history showed no intent to include local school employees. It further noted that the Legislature’s subsequent enactment of the separate Public School Employee Whistleblower Protection Act confirmed the WBL’s limited scope. The court also rejected Donlon’s judicial-estoppel argument, finding no inconsistency between the board’s prior sovereign-immunity positions and its current stance.

labor & employment

The case concerned a class action by property developers and owners (the Dabbs Class) seeking refunds of road and school impact fees collected by Anne Arundel County under its Impact Fee Ordinance, on grounds that the fees were not spent or encumbered within the required six-year period and that county ordinances altering refund rules constituted takings or interfered with vested rights. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the lower courts' denial of refunds. It held that Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard (and their extension in Koontz) do not apply to legislatively imposed, area-wide impact fees set by predetermined schedules, as those fees lack the individualized exactions at issue in those precedents. Statutory amendments, including Bill No. 27-07's definition of encumbrance and the 2009 repeal of the refund provision in § 17-11-210, were procedural changes that applied to pending claims without affecting vested rights, which the court found had not accrued before repeal.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned disciplinary proceedings against Maryland attorney Melodie Venee Shuler, who was accused of professional misconduct while representing a client in criminal matters. The Court of Appeals found that Shuler violated multiple rules of professional conduct, including those requiring competence, diligence, communication, and cooperation with bar counsel, based on her repeated failures to file promised motions, visit her jailed client, investigate the case, provide accurate information, and respond to disciplinary inquiries. Considering these violations along with a prior disciplinary suspension for similar conduct and the absence of any mitigating factors, the court concluded that disbarment was the appropriate sanction and issued a per curiam order to that effect on April 3, 2017.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a challenge by neighboring business owners to the Maryland Department of the Environment’s issuance of a construction permit for a crematorium in a commercial park, focusing on whether the agency correctly interpreted the term “premises” in COMAR 26.11.15.06 when evaluating ambient air impacts from toxic emissions. The Court of Appeals held that the MDE permissibly treated the entire commercial park’s property line as the relevant “premises” for compliance screening rather than the applicant’s individual building or suite. The majority reasoned that this reading aligned with dictionary definitions of the term, its usage elsewhere in the same regulatory scheme, and the agency’s established methods for modeling and limiting emissions to avoid unreasonable risks to human health. Dissenting judges argued that the term should refer to the specific suite to ensure meaningful testing and fulfill the regulation’s protective purpose.

business & regulatoryenvironment

The case involved Andrew Glenn’s request under Maryland’s Public Information Act for copies of applications submitted to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to operate surgical abortion facilities. The Department released the applications but redacted the names and email addresses of individual owners, administrators, and medical directors, asserting that disclosure would cause substantial injury to the public interest under General Provisions Article § 4-358. The Court of Appeals held that the temporary denial was within the agency’s authority and justified. The court reasoned that, although the PIA strongly favors disclosure, the limited redactions were permissible given the specific safety concerns arising from prior unlicensed operations, the fact that corporate names remained public, and the requester’s failure to contest the agency’s evidence at the circuit court hearing. The ruling emphasized that the denial was temporary and narrow rather than a permanent exemption.

abortionhealthcareprocedure

Gail B. Litz sued the Maryland Department of the Environment, other state agencies, and the Town of Goldsboro after pollution from failing septic systems in Goldsboro contaminated her lake, destroying her campground business and leading to foreclosure on the property. She alleged inverse condemnation against all defendants and trespass against the Town, claiming the government failed to enforce environmental laws despite a duty to do so. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Litz’s third amended complaint stated viable claims for inverse condemnation, which is a constitutional action for just compensation not subject to the notice or immunity provisions of the Maryland Tort Claims Act or Local Government Tort Claims Act. It further held that governmental inaction in the face of an affirmative duty can support such a claim and that the trespass count against the Town could proceed subject to the LGTCA. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these allegations at the preliminary motion stage.

environmentpropertytorts & liability

In Montgomery County v. Bhatt, a private landowner sought to acquire a portion of a former railroad right-of-way (now the Capital Crescent Trail, with future plans for the Purple Line commuter rail) through adverse possession after maintaining a fence and shed that encroached on the land for over twenty years. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that adverse possession cannot be claimed against the property. The court reasoned that lands devoted to public use, including railroad rights-of-way treated as equivalent to public highways, are protected from such claims, and the interim trail use under the federal Rails-to-Trails program—coupled with the planned rail restoration—did not show the clear intent and act of abandonment required to end that protection. The court therefore reversed the Circuit Court and reinstated the District Court’s ruling for the County.

property

This case arose from a fatal 2010 collision in Baltimore City between a police cruiser driven by Officer Timothy Beall and a motorcycle ridden by Haines Holloway-Lilliston, leading his mother, Connie Holloway-Johnson, to sue Beall for negligence, gross negligence, battery, and a state constitutional violation, seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. The circuit court granted Beall’s motion for judgment in part, sending only the negligence claim to the jury, which returned a verdict later reduced to $200,000 under the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA) damages cap; the Court of Special Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals held that the LGTCA cap applies regardless of whether the officer pleads it and that punitive damages require proof of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, which cannot be inferred from battery or Article 24 claims alone. Because the plaintiff had already received the maximum single-injury compensatory recovery allowed under the LGTCA, submitting the other claims would not have produced additional damages. The court therefore reversed the intermediate appellate judgment in part and directed reinstatement of the circuit court’s capped verdict.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

In Jakeem Roy v. Sandra B. Dackman, a child lead poisoning case, the plaintiff appealed the circuit court’s exclusion of his proffered expert witness—a board-certified pediatrician with 20 years of experience—and the resulting grant of summary judgment to the defendants. The Court of Appeals reviewed the exclusion of the expert under an abuse-of-discretion standard and held that the pediatrician was qualified under Maryland Rule 5-702 to offer an opinion on medical causation but lacked the necessary qualifications and factual basis to testify about the source of the lead exposure when relying solely on circumstantial evidence. The majority therefore distinguished between the two subjects of proposed testimony while affirming the general principles governing appellate review of summary judgment and expert qualification rulings. Dissenting judges maintained that the circuit court’s decision to exclude the expert on both issues did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In County Council of Prince George’s County v. Zimmer Development Co., the case concerned the District Council’s authority to review and reverse a Planning Board approval of a comprehensive design plan and specific design plan for property in Adelphi that had been rezoned years earlier to a floating zone. The Council initially reversed the Planning Board, remanded limited issues, and then attempted a second reversal on broader grounds, prompting judicial review. The Court of Appeals held that the Council exercises only appellate jurisdiction and may reverse the Planning Board solely for lack of substantial evidence, arbitrariness, capriciousness, or legal error; after a remand under county code § 27-523, review is confined to the remanded issues. Because the Planning Board’s decision satisfied the applicable standards and no further agency discretion remained, the Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s order reversing the Council and directing it to approve the plans.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether the Prince George’s County District Council, acting in its appellate zoning role under the Regional District Act, could lawfully deny comprehensive and specific design plans (CDP-1001 and SDP-1001) for a floating-zone property in Adelphi after the county Planning Board had approved them. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the District Council possessed only limited appellate authority, could reverse the Planning Board solely for lack of substantial evidence, arbitrariness, or legal error, and—after a partial remand—could address only the issues it had sent back. Because the Council exceeded those limits by denying the plans on other grounds, the Court affirmed the judgments below that reversed the Council’s denial and ordered it to approve the plans as the Planning Board had decided.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned disciplinary proceedings against Maryland attorney John T. Hamilton, Jr., based on complaints from three former clients alleging failures in representation, communication, fee handling, and trust account management, along with his lack of response to Bar Counsel inquiries. The Court of Appeals of Maryland found that Hamilton violated multiple Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (including 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, 8.1, and 8.4), Maryland Rule 16-604, and Business Occupations and Professions Article § 10-306 through acts such as missing court dates, causing discovery sanctions against clients, charging unreasonable fees, misrepresenting case filings, and misappropriating client funds. The court ordered disbarment as the sanction. It reasoned that the cumulative pattern of incompetence, dishonesty, and non-cooperation with disciplinary authorities—particularly the intentional misappropriation of funds—demonstrated that Hamilton lacked the core qualities needed to practice law and required the strongest measure to protect the public, consistent with precedents like Attorney Grievance Commission v. Wallace.

business & regulatory