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Judge, Court of Appeals of Maryland · Born 1945
Webb v. Giant of Maryland
Court of Appeals of Maryland · 2021-12-21 · cited 12×
Karen Webb sued Giant of Maryland for negligence after she was injured at a Giant supermarket, alleging that Giant was liable for the actions of an independent contractor whose work caused her harm and that Giant had negligently hired, trained, and supervised its staff. A jury found for Webb, but the Court of Special Appeals reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that reversal. The court held that Giant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the evidence, viewed most favorably to Webb, showed only general oversight of the contractor and did not establish the degree of control needed to impose liability on Giant. It also ruled that the trial court’s spoliation instruction was improper and prejudicial, as there was no proof that a video recording of the incident had ever existed, making the instruction misleading and likely to cause the jury to speculate about missing evidence.
proceduretorts & liability
Hunt v. State
Court of Appeals of Maryland · 2021-06-07 · cited 5×
The case involved Ronnie Hunt’s petition for a writ of actual innocence under Maryland Criminal Procedure Article § 8-301, seeking relief from his 1991 convictions based on newly discovered evidence that Joseph Kopera, the State’s ballistics expert, had fabricated his academic credentials and testified falsely about them for years. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence qualified as newly discovered because the actual-innocence statute incorporates the due-diligence requirement of Maryland Rule 4-331(c), and, given the unique facts of Kopera’s long-undetected fraud (revealed only in 2007), defense counsel in pre-2007 trials had no obligation to investigate his qualifications absent specific red flags. The court further ruled that the statute’s prejudice standard—“a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different”—is equivalent to the materiality tests used in ineffective-assistance and Brady claims, so no separate materiality analysis is required.
criminal lawprocedure
Conner v. State
Court of Appeals of Maryland · 2021-03-26 · cited 1×
The case involved Effrem Antoine Conner, who was sentenced to probation conditioned on completing the Montgomery County Adult Drug Court program and later faced a violation of probation hearing after alleged failures to comply with drug court rules. Conner moved to recuse any drug court judge, arguing that prior involvement by the assigned judge (including presiding over status hearings and participating on the drug court team) created an appearance of bias or relied on personal knowledge that denied him an impartial tribunal. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the denial of the recusal motion and the finding of a probation violation. It held that Maryland Rule 16-207 does not require recusal in such circumstances, that the judge’s knowledge was not acquired from an extrajudicial source or shown to be “personal,” and that nothing in the record indicated ex parte communications or prejudgment of the evidence.
criminal lawprocedure
Attorney Grievance v. Milton
Court of Appeals of Maryland · 2020-03-03 · cited 2×
The case involved disciplinary charges filed by the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland against attorney Gregory J. Milton, stemming from an investigation into an overdraft in his attorney trust account at Capital One Bank. The Court of Appeals of Maryland indefinitely suspended Milton from practicing law, finding he violated multiple rules including those on safekeeping client property, maintaining trust account records, making prohibited cash withdrawals, filing frivolous motions, and failing to cooperate with Bar Counsel's requests for documents and information. The court reasoned that Milton repeatedly ignored or obstructed legitimate inquiries into his account practices despite extensions, engaged in unsupported efforts to quash the investigation, and had a prior disciplinary record of similar misconduct that warranted escalation beyond lesser sanctions used in comparable cases.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Conaway v. State Johnson v. State
Court of Appeals of Maryland · 2019-07-11 · cited 8×
The Court of Appeals consolidated these two cases to address whether probationers may directly appeal circuit court orders revoking probation for technical violations and imposing sentences beyond the presumptive incarceration caps (15, 30, or 45 days) established by the 2016 Justice Reinvestment Act. The court held that Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 12-302(g) requires such challenges to proceed by application for leave to appeal rather than direct appeal, and it affirmed the Court of Special Appeals’ orders dismissing the direct appeals in both Conaway and Johnson. It further ruled that Johnson waived his challenge to the sufficiency of the public-safety findings needed to exceed the caps by failing to object at sentencing, and that his remaining claims about revocation procedure and due process were not cognizable on direct appeal. The court reasoned that the statutory scheme channels probation-revocation review through the discretionary leave-to-appeal process and that ordinary preservation rules apply to sentencing objections.
criminal lawprocedure
Conaway v. State Johnson v. State
Court of Appeals of Maryland · 2019-07-11
These consolidated cases involved two Maryland probationers, Conaway and Johnson, who sought direct appeals after circuit courts revoked their probation for technical violations and imposed sentences exceeding the presumptive incarceration limits set by the 2016 Justice Reinvestment Act. The Court of Appeals held that neither defendant could pursue a direct appeal; instead, review of a probation revocation order must be sought through an application for leave to appeal under Md. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 12-302(g). The Court reasoned that the statute expressly channels such challenges via the leave-to-appeal process rather than as of right, and it declined to reach the merits of the defendants’ claims about the Act’s limits or sentencing procedures because those issues were either waived by failure to object below or not properly before the Court on direct appeal.
criminal lawprocedure