Warren Earl Burger

The case Bowsher v. Synar involved a constitutional challenge to provisions of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), under which the Comptroller General was tasked with reviewing deficit estimates from OMB and CBO, calculating required spending reductions, and reporting those to the President for automatic sequestration orders. The Supreme Court ruled that these reporting provisions violated the separation of powers doctrine. The core reasoning was that the assigned functions constituted executive power because they required interpretation of law and exercise of judgment in implementation, yet the Comptroller General remained subject to removal by Congress, rendering the officer part of the legislative branch and preventing Congress from retaining control over execution of the laws.

federal power

The case involved whether New York could close an adult bookstore under its public health nuisance law after undercover officers observed repeated acts of prostitution, lewdness, and solicitation on the premises with the owners' knowledge. The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not prevent enforcement of the closure order. The Court reasoned that the statute targeted non-expressive conduct unrelated to the sale of books, imposed no prior restraint on any particular materials, and allowed the business to operate elsewhere, distinguishing it from cases where regulations directly burdened protected speech.

free speechcriminal law

This case involved a high school student disciplined by his school for delivering a speech at a mandatory assembly that used elaborate sexual metaphors and innuendo to nominate a classmate for student office. The student sued the school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment free speech rights, and lower courts ruled in his favor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the First Amendment does not prevent a school from disciplining a student for lewd or indecent speech at a school-sponsored event. The Court reasoned that schools may regulate such speech to teach appropriate social behavior and maintain an orderly educational environment, distinguishing this from protected political expression in cases like Tinker v. Des Moines.

free speechcivil rights

The case concerned whether the First Amendment provides a right of public and press access to transcripts of preliminary hearings in criminal prosecutions, specifically in a high-profile California murder case where the defendant successfully moved to close the 41-day hearing and seal the record to protect his right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court held that qualified public access to such hearings is guaranteed under the First Amendment and reversed the California Supreme Court's ruling that no such right existed. The Court reasoned that preliminary hearings have historically been open to the public, perform a function similar to a trial by allowing presentation of evidence and cross-examination, and that closure requires specific findings of a substantial probability of prejudice to the defendant's rights along with consideration of alternatives like voir dire or sequestration. The decision emphasized that the mere possibility of prejudicial publicity does not overcome the access right.

criminal lawfree speechprocedure

The case concerned whether police violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting a warrantless aerial observation from 1,000 feet in navigable airspace of marijuana plants growing in a fenced backyard within the curtilage of a home, after receiving an anonymous tip. The Supreme Court reversed the California Court of Appeal and held that the observation did not constitute an unreasonable search. The Court reasoned that although the respondent had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy through fencing, society would not recognize as reasonable an expectation that the backyard would be shielded from naked-eye views from public airspace where any member of the public could lawfully fly. The officers' use of a standard camera from a lawful altitude did not require a warrant, as the information obtained was exposed to public view.

criminal law

This case concerned the constitutionality of federal firearms laws that prohibited individuals who had been involuntarily committed to mental institutions from purchasing or possessing guns, while allowing certain felons to seek administrative relief from similar prohibitions. The District Court ruled that the distinction violated equal protection principles and created an impermissible irrebuttable presumption. While the appeal was pending, Congress amended the relevant statute to permit former mental patients to apply for relief as well, rendering the constitutional issues moot. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

gunscriminal lawcivil rights

This case involved Dow Chemical Company challenging the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) use of aerial photography to inspect its 2,000-acre chemical manufacturing facility in Midland, Michigan, without a warrant or consent, after Dow denied a second on-site inspection. The Supreme Court decided that EPA's aerial observation and photography did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment and was within EPA's statutory investigatory authority. The Court reasoned that Dow did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the exposed areas of its plant visible from navigable airspace, as these areas were akin to open fields rather than curtilage, and the photography used conventional equipment similar to that used in mapmaking. The decision reversed the District Court's ruling and affirmed the Court of Appeals.

environmentcriminal lawfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether a justice of the Alabama Supreme Court violated the Due Process Clause by participating in a decision upholding a $3.5 million punitive damages award against Aetna for bad-faith refusal to pay an insurance claim. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the justice's involvement deprived Aetna of due process because he had filed two similar bad-faith lawsuits against other insurers seeking punitive damages, creating a direct and substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome. The Court reasoned that this interest was neither remote nor speculative, as the Alabama decision established precedent that could benefit the justice's own claims, and therefore the justice should have recused himself. The Court rejected arguments that the interest was too slight to require disqualification under the Fourteenth Amendment.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned federal charges against James Lane and Dennis Lane for mail fraud, conspiracy, and perjury arising from alleged insurance fraud schemes involving arson at a restaurant, a duplex, and a planned flower shop. The District Court denied severance motions and tried the counts jointly, resulting in convictions, even though evidence of one arson was admitted with limiting instructions. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling that misjoinder under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b) was prejudicial per se. The Supreme Court held that misjoinder errors are subject to harmless-error review under Rule 52(a) and concluded that any misjoinder here was harmless because of the limiting instructions, separate consideration of each defendant and count, and the distinct nature of the evidence; it also found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Due Process Clause barred a state trial judge from imposing a 50-year sentence on retrial for murder after a jury had imposed a 20-year sentence in the first trial. The defendant had received a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct, elected to have the judge set the sentence at the second trial, and the judge provided findings based on new witness testimony showing the defendant's direct role in the crime plus the fact that he had been released from prison only months before the offense. The Supreme Court held that the presumption of vindictiveness from North Carolina v. Pearce does not apply when different sentencing authorities (jury then judge) are involved and the judge articulates objective, non-vindictive reasons supported by evidence unavailable at the first trial; the Court therefore reversed the state appellate decision limiting the sentence to 20 years.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned whether a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when his attorney refused to present or assist with testimony the attorney believed to be perjured. Whiteside was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing a man he claimed was reaching for a gun; shortly before trial he told his lawyer he would testify to seeing something metallic, which the lawyer concluded was false based on prior statements and investigation. The lawyer warned Whiteside that such testimony would be perjury, that he would have to inform the court, and that he might withdraw or impeach the testimony, leading Whiteside to testify only that he believed a gun was present. The Supreme Court held that the attorney's conduct did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights, reasoning that the right to counsel does not encompass a right to have the attorney assist in committing perjury and that attorneys have an ethical duty under professional rules and state law to avoid suborning false testimony.

criminal lawprocedure

The case addressed whether the Federal Reserve Board could expand its regulatory reach under the Bank Holding Company Act by redefining "bank" to cover nonbank institutions that offered NOW accounts or purchased money market instruments instead of making conventional commercial loans. The Board amended Regulation Y to treat deposits payable "as a matter of practice" on demand and certain money-market purchases as qualifying activities. The Tenth Circuit invalidated the amendments, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court reasoned that the statute's plain language limits banks to institutions accepting deposits with a legal right of demand withdrawal and engaging in commercial lending, and the legislative history confirmed Congress's intent to exclude the very institutions the Board sought to regulate. The Board therefore lacked authority to enlarge its jurisdiction beyond the boundaries set by Congress.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned whether the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 requires a new 30-day trial preparation period to begin upon arraignment on a superseding indictment. The Supreme Court held that the Act does not impose such a requirement and reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision vacating the conviction. The Court reasoned that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(2) ties the 30-day period to the defendant's first appearance through counsel rather than to the date of any indictment, and contrasted this with § 3161(c)(1), which expressly references the indictment date for the 70-day outside limit on commencing trial. The opinion noted that Congress demonstrated its ability to tie time periods to indictment dates when it chose to do so.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by the father of a man shot by police officers, along with related state-law claims. Before trial, the officers offered a $100,000 settlement that included costs and attorney's fees; the plaintiff rejected it, went to trial, and recovered a total of $60,000. The Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which requires a plaintiff who rejects a settlement offer and then obtains a lesser judgment to pay the defendant's post-offer costs, applies to attorney's fees recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of "costs" in Rule 68 encompasses fees authorized by § 1988, and that this reading advances the Rule's goal of promoting settlement without conflicting with the fee-shifting statute.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned whether the mother of an off-duty Army private murdered by another serviceman could recover damages from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act by alleging that the Army negligently failed to supervise or warn others about the killer, who had a prior manslaughter conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the suit was barred. The Court reasoned that the claim arose out of an assault and battery, which is expressly excluded from the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) regardless of how it is characterized as negligence, and that the Feres doctrine independently precluded recovery for injuries to servicemen arising from military service because such suits would improperly involve courts in sensitive military personnel decisions.

torts & liabilityfederal power

The case involved a Connecticut statute granting employees an absolute right not to work on their designated Sabbath day. Donald Thornton, a store manager at Caldor who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, refused Sunday shifts and was transferred to a lower-paying position after invoking the law, prompting a grievance that led to orders for reinstatement. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Connecticut Supreme Court's ruling that the statute violated the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that the law lacked a secular purpose, had the primary effect of advancing religion by conferring benefits only on a religious basis, and risked excessive government entanglement through inquiries into employees' religious sincerity, under the Lemon test.

religious libertylabor & employment

The case concerned an attorney appointed under the Criminal Justice Act who submitted a fee claim for representing an indigent defendant, encountered documentation issues with the Court of Appeals, and wrote a letter criticizing the low compensation rates and process before withdrawing from future appointments. The Court of Appeals suspended the attorney from practice for six months, initially citing refusal to accept assignments but later focusing on the disrespectful tone of the letter at a hearing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the suspension, reasoning that the show cause order did not reference the letter's tone, that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c) applies to lesser sanctions than suspension, and that federal courts may rely on state professional conduct codes while exercising inherent authority over attorney discipline.

criminal lawfree speechprocedure

The case concerned a New Mexico statute that limited a $2,000 property tax exemption for Vietnam veterans to those who had resided in the state before May 8, 1976. Appellants, who moved to New Mexico in 1981 and otherwise qualified as honorably discharged veterans, were denied the exemption and challenged the residency cutoff under the Equal Protection Clause and the right to migrate. The Supreme Court reversed the New Mexico Court of Appeals and held the statute unconstitutional, reasoning that it created fixed, permanent distinctions among concededly bona fide resident veterans based solely on the date of their arrival without furthering a legitimate state purpose.

civil rightstaxes

The case involved a libel lawsuit brought by respondent against petitioner for sending letters to the President and other officials containing allegedly false and damaging statements about the respondent while he was under consideration for a U.S. Attorney position. The Supreme Court held that the Petition Clause of the First Amendment does not grant absolute immunity from libel claims for such communications. The Court reasoned that the right to petition is not absolute and must be balanced against reputational interests, consistent with precedents like New York Times v. Sullivan that require a showing of actual malice rather than providing blanket protection.

free speech

This case concerned a shareholder lawsuit alleging that Burlington Northern violated §14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act by withdrawing its initial hostile tender offer for El Paso Gas and replacing it with a new friendly offer after negotiations, which allegedly manipulated the market for El Paso shares, along with failing to disclose certain compensation agreements to executives. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that §14(e) requires a misrepresentation or nondisclosure to establish a violation because the term 'manipulative' refers to intentional conduct designed to deceive investors by controlling or artificially affecting securities prices. The Court reasoned from the statute's text, its similarity to §10(b), and its purpose as a disclosure provision that fully informed investors could decide how to respond to tender offers.

business & regulatory