The case Bowsher v. Synar involved a constitutional challenge to provisions of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), under which the Comptroller General was tasked with reviewing deficit estimates from OMB and CBO, calculating required spending reductions, and reporting those to the President for automatic sequestration orders. The Supreme Court ruled that these reporting provisions violated the separation of powers doctrine. The core reasoning was that the assigned functions constituted executive power because they required interpretation of law and exercise of judgment in implementation, yet the Comptroller General remained subject to removal by Congress, rendering the officer part of the legislative branch and preventing Congress from retaining control over execution of the laws.
The case involved whether New York could close an adult bookstore under its public health nuisance law after undercover officers observed repeated acts of prostitution, lewdness, and solicitation on the premises with the owners' knowledge. The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not prevent enforcement of the closure order. The Court reasoned that the statute targeted non-expressive conduct unrelated to the sale of books, imposed no prior restraint on any particular materials, and allowed the business to operate elsewhere, distinguishing it from cases where regulations directly burdened protected speech.
This case involved a high school student disciplined by his school for delivering a speech at a mandatory assembly that used elaborate sexual metaphors and innuendo to nominate a classmate for student office. The student sued the school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment free speech rights, and lower courts ruled in his favor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the First Amendment does not prevent a school from disciplining a student for lewd or indecent speech at a school-sponsored event. The Court reasoned that schools may regulate such speech to teach appropriate social behavior and maintain an orderly educational environment, distinguishing this from protected political expression in cases like Tinker v. Des Moines.
The case concerned whether the First Amendment provides a right of public and press access to transcripts of preliminary hearings in criminal prosecutions, specifically in a high-profile California murder case where the defendant successfully moved to close the 41-day hearing and seal the record to protect his right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court held that qualified public access to such hearings is guaranteed under the First Amendment and reversed the California Supreme Court's ruling that no such right existed. The Court reasoned that preliminary hearings have historically been open to the public, perform a function similar to a trial by allowing presentation of evidence and cross-examination, and that closure requires specific findings of a substantial probability of prejudice to the defendant's rights along with consideration of alternatives like voir dire or sequestration. The decision emphasized that the mere possibility of prejudicial publicity does not overcome the access right.
The case concerned whether police violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting a warrantless aerial observation from 1,000 feet in navigable airspace of marijuana plants growing in a fenced backyard within the curtilage of a home, after receiving an anonymous tip. The Supreme Court reversed the California Court of Appeal and held that the observation did not constitute an unreasonable search. The Court reasoned that although the respondent had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy through fencing, society would not recognize as reasonable an expectation that the backyard would be shielded from naked-eye views from public airspace where any member of the public could lawfully fly. The officers' use of a standard camera from a lawful altitude did not require a warrant, as the information obtained was exposed to public view.
This case concerned the constitutionality of federal firearms laws that prohibited individuals who had been involuntarily committed to mental institutions from purchasing or possessing guns, while allowing certain felons to seek administrative relief from similar prohibitions. The District Court ruled that the distinction violated equal protection principles and created an impermissible irrebuttable presumption. While the appeal was pending, Congress amended the relevant statute to permit former mental patients to apply for relief as well, rendering the constitutional issues moot. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.