Robert D. Rucker

Steven Ray Hollin was convicted in 2006 of conspiracy to commit burglary as a Class B felony and found to be a habitual offender, based largely on testimony from his co-defendant Nathan Vogel. Hollin later sought post-conviction relief, claiming the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose Vogel’s pending criminal charges, probation revocation proceedings, and shift in his account of events, which could have impeached Vogel’s credibility. The post-conviction court granted relief, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer. The Supreme Court affirmed the post-conviction court, holding that the suppressed evidence was favorable and material because Vogel’s testimony supplied the only proof of an agreement between the two men, creating a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the information been disclosed. The case was remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether United Parcel Service could exempt certain income earned by its foreign captive reinsurance subsidiaries (UPINSCO and UPS Re) from Indiana adjusted gross income tax by claiming those subsidiaries were subject to Indiana’s gross premiums tax instead. The Indiana Tax Court granted summary judgment to UPS, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed that ruling. The court held that the reinsurance transactions did not occur in Indiana and that the subsidiaries were not “doing business” in the state, even if the underlying risks involved Indiana property or activities. Because subjection to the premiums tax is a prerequisite for the income-tax exemption under Indiana Code sections 6-3-2-2.8(4) and 27-1-18-2, UPS failed to establish its entitlement to summary judgment. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

In Webb v. State, Brice Webb was charged with murder after fatally shooting his girlfriend during a domestic dispute in their apartment; he requested a jury instruction on reckless homicide as a lesser-included offense, but the trial court denied it, and he was convicted. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on transfer, holding that the denial was proper under the Wright test. The majority reasoned that Webb’s own testimony—claiming he was not present and did not shoot the victim—created no serious evidentiary dispute about whether he acted with the intent required for murder versus recklessness; if the jury believed him, it would acquit him entirely rather than convict on the lesser charge. A dissent argued that the instruction should have been given based on other evidence of the shooting circumstances, but the court’s ruling stood on the lack of conflicting proof regarding mens rea.

criminal lawprocedure

In Smith v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed whether the trial court properly revoked Troy R. Smith’s probation after he failed to make required weekly child support payments under a 2007 plea agreement for a Class D felony non-support conviction. The trial court found a violation and ordered Smith to serve his suspended three-year sentence, a decision the Court of Appeals reversed on grounds that the State failed to prove the violation was knowing and that full revocation was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, holding that Smith’s testimony—admitting he had not raised money for support and was “barely skimming by”—supported a finding that he knowingly failed to pay despite awareness of the obligation. The Court further ruled that Smith did not carry his burden to demonstrate inability to pay or bona fide efforts, as his medical issues alone did not establish incapacity to work or excuse the missed payments.

criminal lawfamily law

The case concerned whether State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company had a duty to defend and indemnify Flexdar, Inc. under commercial general liability policies for costs of cleaning up trichloroethylene (TCE) contamination discovered at Flexdar’s rubber-stamp manufacturing site, or whether coverage was barred by the policies’ absolute pollution exclusion. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the exclusion was ambiguous and therefore did not bar coverage. The Court reasoned that the policy defined “pollutant” in broad terms that could reasonably be read to include substances used in ordinary business operations, and under established Indiana precedent such ambiguity must be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case arose from a contract dispute in which the State of Indiana sued IBM for breach after terminating a 2006 agreement to modernize the state's welfare system, with IBM filing counterclaims. IBM sought to depose Governor Mitch Daniels, prompting the State to seek a protective order under Indiana Code § 34-29-2-1, which grants the governor an unqualified privilege from obeying subpoenas to testify in civil matters. The trial court initially issued a protective order but later granted IBM's motion to compel the deposition with limits, finding that an exception might apply if the governor possessed unique personal knowledge. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute's plain language creates an absolute bar to compelling the governor's testimony via subpoena in this civil contract action, without exception for relevance or the governor's involvement in the underlying events.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Kays v. State, Rebecca Kays was convicted of Class B misdemeanor battery after injuring her neighbor during a property-line dispute and was ordered to pay $1,496.15 in restitution as a condition of probation, despite her only income being $674 per month in Social Security disability benefits. The trial court imposed the restitution without a detailed inquiry into her ability to pay. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court failed to properly assess ability to pay and that Social Security benefits could not be considered under the federal anti-attachment statute, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, ruling that a trial court may consider a defendant’s Social Security income when evaluating the “amount the person can or will be able to pay” under Indiana Code § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(5), even though the benefits themselves remain protected from direct levy or attachment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with that holding.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

In Hoglund v. State, Keith Hoglund was convicted of two counts of Class A felony child molesting based on his daughter's testimony that he had repeatedly forced her to perform oral sex on him starting when she was four years old. On appeal, Hoglund challenged the admission of testimony from three expert witnesses—a pediatrician, psychologist, and counselor—who each stated in varying terms that the child was not prone to exaggerate or fantasize about sexual matters. The Indiana Supreme Court held that such testimony is the equivalent of vouching for the child's credibility and is therefore inadmissible under the rules of evidence, expressly overruling prior precedent that had allowed relaxed standards for child witnesses in sex abuse cases. The court nevertheless affirmed the conviction, finding that any error was harmless because the State presented substantial independent evidence of guilt through the child's own testimony and the improperly admitted statements were cumulative of other evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned certified questions from a federal district court about whether Mark Thatcher, a Kokomo police officer injured in the line of duty in 1984, placed on disability benefits from the 1977 Police Officers’ and Firefighters’ Pension and Disability Fund, and later found recovered in 2008, could be reappointed under Indiana law. The Indiana Supreme Court held that Indiana Code section 36-8-4-7(a), which bars reappointment of a police officer unless the person can complete twenty years of service before age sixty, applies to a recovered member of the 1977 Fund. However, the court further held that time spent receiving disability benefits does not count toward the “years of service” required by that statute. The court’s reasoning rested on the plain language of the statutes: Indiana Code section 36-8-8-12(e) expressly limits the inclusion of disability time to calculations of retirement benefits only, and the ordinary meaning of “service” refers to active employment rather than a period of disability.

labor & employment

In Joey Addison v. State of Indiana, the defendant, an African American man, was charged with murder after shooting a man 14 times outside his home in 2008; he raised an insanity defense based on evidence of severe mental deterioration, was tried by jury, and convicted. On appeal, Addison challenged the State's use of peremptory strikes to remove all three African American venirepersons from the jury panel, arguing a violation of Batson v. Kentucky. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the State's proffered race-neutral reason for striking one venireperson (Turner)—his supposed undue reliance on professional testimony—was pretextual. The court reached this conclusion because the prosecutor mischaracterized Turner's voir dire answers, failed to question him about the issue, and allowed similarly situated white jurors to remain, demonstrating purposeful racial discrimination that denied Addison equal protection and a fair trial.

criminal lawcivil rights

In Cartwright v. State, Jerrme Cartwright was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of Class C felony attempted battery with a deadly weapon and one count of Class B felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, arising from a December 2008 shooting incident outside a residence in Evansville. He appealed on the ground that the State’s peremptory strike of the sole African-American prospective juror violated the Equal Protection Clause under Batson v. Kentucky. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the State had articulated race-neutral reasons for the strike—including the juror’s family criminal history, health-related difficulties processing information, and reluctance to serve—and that Cartwright had failed to demonstrate those reasons were pretextual. The court noted that comparable non-minority venirepersons had also been dismissed and emphasized that, once race-neutral explanations are offered, the burden rests with the defendant to prove purposeful discrimination, which was not carried here.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Abbott v. State, Antwon Abbott was convicted after a jury trial of possessing cocaine as a Class B felony—elevated from a Class D felony because the offense occurred within 1,000 feet of school property—and sentenced to the maximum 20 years based on his criminal history and lack of remorse. Abbott appealed, challenging the sentence as inappropriate in light of the offense and his character. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and revised the sentence to 12 years, holding that the nature of the offense warranted a reduction even though the statutory school-zone enhancement applied. The majority reasoned that the offense involved a modest quantity of drugs discovered during a police-initiated stop, and that the proximity enhancement, while strict-liability in nature, did not justify the maximum term given the mitigating circumstances surrounding the location. The Court summarily affirmed the conviction and other rulings.

criminal law

In this case, medical provider Indiana Spine Group sought payment from employer Pilot Travel Centers for the unpaid balance of authorized treatment given to an injured employee under the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Act; the employer had made partial payments in 2004 and 2008, but the provider filed its claim with the Worker’s Compensation Board in 2009. The Board dismissed the claim as untimely under the two-year limitation period in Indiana Code section 22-3-3-27. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Worker’s Compensation Act is silent on the limitation period applicable to a medical provider’s claim for outstanding fees. As a result, the ten-year general statute of limitation in Indiana Code section 34-11-1-2 controls, and the provider’s filing fell within that period.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Putnam County Sheriff v. Price, Pamela Price sued the Putnam County Sheriff’s Department for negligence after her car hit ice on County Road 375 West, overturned, and caused injury; she alleged the department failed to warn the public of the known hazard even though a deputy had responded earlier that morning to another accident at the same spot and notified the Highway Department. The trial court denied the Sheriff’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed and ordered dismissal. The court held that the Sheriff owed no common-law duty to warn because the department neither owned, maintained, nor controlled the county road, a responsibility assigned by statute to the county highway supervisor; without such a relationship to the roadway, the complaint alleged no facts establishing negligence.

torts & liability

The case involved Countrywide Home Loans, which held a first mortgage on real estate and foreclosed on it without naming Citizens State Bank, a junior lienholder with a recorded judgment lien. After acquiring title at the sheriff's sale and conveying the property to FNMA, Countrywide sought a strict foreclosure to eliminate Citizens Bank's interest. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the original mortgage remained in effect as to the omitted junior lienholder and could be foreclosed against it, with Citizens Bank retaining a right to redeem by paying the mortgage amount. The core reasoning relied on precedent establishing that an omitted party's rights are unaffected by the initial foreclosure but that the senior mortgage survives via equitable assignment without merger, allowing the foreclosing party to proceed against the junior interest.

propertyprocedure

The case involved Donald A. Pierce, who was convicted by a jury of four counts of child molesting—three as Class A felonies and one as a Class C felony—and adjudicated as a repeat sex offender based on a prior conviction. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences totaling 124 years, enhanced by ten years for the repeat offender status. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court revised the sentence to a total of 80 years, determining that this term was appropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender, while affirming the convictions. The court directed that one Class A felony count receive an enhanced 40-year term, with the other counts running concurrently, and attached the repeat offender enhancement to the enhanced count.

criminal law

The case involved Elmer D. Baker, who was convicted of three counts of child molesting based on allegations involving multiple acts against his grandchildren and a cousin over several years from 2000 to 2003. Baker appealed, arguing that his convictions should be vacated because they were not the product of a unanimous jury verdict, as the trial court did not give a specific unanimity instruction regarding which acts formed the basis for the counts. The Indiana Supreme Court held that Baker waived the issue by failing to request such an instruction and that any error did not rise to the level of fundamental error, since the trial turned on the victims' credibility and the jury resolved that question against the defendant. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

criminal lawprocedure

In Coleman v. State, the defendant was charged with murder and attempted murder after shooting two individuals during a confrontation on his property stemming from a prior robbery. In the first trial, the jury acquitted Coleman of murder but hung on the attempted murder charge; on retrial, he was convicted of attempted murder as a Class A felony and sentenced to 45 years. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar retrial on the attempted murder count following the acquittal on murder, as the charges involved distinct victims and elements. The court further rejected the self-defense claim, finding sufficient evidence that Coleman fired at close range after the victims were on his property and that he failed to contact police despite opportunities to do so. Finally, the court affirmed the sentence as appropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B), citing the nature of the offense, the presence of bystanders including children, and Coleman's prior criminal record including a felony and probation status at the time.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerns the Indiana Department of State Revenue's use tax assessment against Belterra Resort Indiana, LLC, for its receipt of a riverboat as a capital contribution from its parent company. In the original opinion, the Indiana Supreme Court applied the step transaction doctrine to treat the contribution as a taxable retail transaction and entered summary judgment for the Department. On rehearing, Belterra challenged the doctrine's application, raised factual issues, and argued it was not subject to a negligence penalty or that any penalty should be waived for reasonable cause. The Court granted rehearing solely on the penalty question, remanded it to the Tax Court to assess timeliness and decide the penalty issue, and otherwise affirmed its prior ruling.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involved whether a for-profit limited liability company could claim a property tax exemption for part of its office building leased to a church at below-market rates. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the Tax Court's decision granting the exemption, holding that the owner was not entitled to the religious and charitable purposes exemption. The court reasoned that the owner's for-profit leasing activity meant it lacked an independent exempt purpose separate from the church's, and merely providing below-market rent to a charitable lessee is insufficient to qualify for the exemption under Indiana law.

taxespropertyreligious liberty