Steven Ray Hollin was convicted in 2006 of conspiracy to commit burglary as a Class B felony and found to be a habitual offender, based largely on testimony from his co-defendant Nathan Vogel. Hollin later sought post-conviction relief, claiming the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose Vogel’s pending criminal charges, probation revocation proceedings, and shift in his account of events, which could have impeached Vogel’s credibility. The post-conviction court granted relief, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer. The Supreme Court affirmed the post-conviction court, holding that the suppressed evidence was favorable and material because Vogel’s testimony supplied the only proof of an agreement between the two men, creating a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the information been disclosed. The case was remanded for a new trial.
The case concerned whether United Parcel Service could exempt certain income earned by its foreign captive reinsurance subsidiaries (UPINSCO and UPS Re) from Indiana adjusted gross income tax by claiming those subsidiaries were subject to Indiana’s gross premiums tax instead. The Indiana Tax Court granted summary judgment to UPS, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed that ruling. The court held that the reinsurance transactions did not occur in Indiana and that the subsidiaries were not “doing business” in the state, even if the underlying risks involved Indiana property or activities. Because subjection to the premiums tax is a prerequisite for the income-tax exemption under Indiana Code sections 6-3-2-2.8(4) and 27-1-18-2, UPS failed to establish its entitlement to summary judgment. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.
In Webb v. State, Brice Webb was charged with murder after fatally shooting his girlfriend during a domestic dispute in their apartment; he requested a jury instruction on reckless homicide as a lesser-included offense, but the trial court denied it, and he was convicted. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on transfer, holding that the denial was proper under the Wright test. The majority reasoned that Webb’s own testimony—claiming he was not present and did not shoot the victim—created no serious evidentiary dispute about whether he acted with the intent required for murder versus recklessness; if the jury believed him, it would acquit him entirely rather than convict on the lesser charge. A dissent argued that the instruction should have been given based on other evidence of the shooting circumstances, but the court’s ruling stood on the lack of conflicting proof regarding mens rea.
In Smith v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed whether the trial court properly revoked Troy R. Smith’s probation after he failed to make required weekly child support payments under a 2007 plea agreement for a Class D felony non-support conviction. The trial court found a violation and ordered Smith to serve his suspended three-year sentence, a decision the Court of Appeals reversed on grounds that the State failed to prove the violation was knowing and that full revocation was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, holding that Smith’s testimony—admitting he had not raised money for support and was “barely skimming by”—supported a finding that he knowingly failed to pay despite awareness of the obligation. The Court further ruled that Smith did not carry his burden to demonstrate inability to pay or bona fide efforts, as his medical issues alone did not establish incapacity to work or excuse the missed payments.
The case concerned whether State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company had a duty to defend and indemnify Flexdar, Inc. under commercial general liability policies for costs of cleaning up trichloroethylene (TCE) contamination discovered at Flexdar’s rubber-stamp manufacturing site, or whether coverage was barred by the policies’ absolute pollution exclusion. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the exclusion was ambiguous and therefore did not bar coverage. The Court reasoned that the policy defined “pollutant” in broad terms that could reasonably be read to include substances used in ordinary business operations, and under established Indiana precedent such ambiguity must be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage.
The case arose from a contract dispute in which the State of Indiana sued IBM for breach after terminating a 2006 agreement to modernize the state's welfare system, with IBM filing counterclaims. IBM sought to depose Governor Mitch Daniels, prompting the State to seek a protective order under Indiana Code § 34-29-2-1, which grants the governor an unqualified privilege from obeying subpoenas to testify in civil matters. The trial court initially issued a protective order but later granted IBM's motion to compel the deposition with limits, finding that an exception might apply if the governor possessed unique personal knowledge. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute's plain language creates an absolute bar to compelling the governor's testimony via subpoena in this civil contract action, without exception for relevance or the governor's involvement in the underlying events.