Anne M. Burke

In People v. Cathey, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the trial court's refusal to rule before trial on a motion in limine to bar the State's use of his prior convictions for attempted murder and aggravated battery with a firearm to impeach him if he testified. The motion argued that the convictions' prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value under the Montgomery balancing test, particularly because the defendant was asserting self-defense and the decision whether to testify depended on knowing whether the priors would be admitted. The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition, and the appellate court affirmed, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed those judgments and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the trial court's deferral of the ruling was erroneous and that appellate counsel should have raised the issue.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the prosecution of James Washington for armed robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated vehicular hijacking based on an incident where he allegedly used a firearm during a robbery and hijacking. Due to prior rulings striking down sentencing enhancements, the State indicted and tried the defendant under pre-2000 statutes that required proof of a "dangerous weapon" without distinguishing firearms. The trial court convicted him on the victim's testimony describing the weapon as a gun, but the appellate court reversed for insufficient evidence. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the convictions, reasoning that the preamended statutes applied, a firearm qualifies as a dangerous weapon under those statutes, and the evidence was sufficient; the court also rejected the defendant's claims of indictment variance and improper handling of his motion in limine.

criminal lawprocedure

In Sandholm v. Kuecker, a high school basketball coach sued multiple defendants for defamation per se, false light invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy, and slander per se after they launched a public campaign, including a website, petition, emails, and radio appearance, accusing him of abusive coaching and bullying in an effort to have him removed from his position. The circuit court dismissed the entire suit under the Citizen Participation Act (anti-SLAPP statute), concluding the defendants were immune, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act does not shield defendants from liability for alleged intentional torts based on false statements merely because the conduct involved petitioning or speech aimed at government action; instead, the statute requires a showing that the claims lack merit and are intended to chill protected participation. The court remanded for further proceedings on the merits of the tort claims.

free speechtorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved defendant Romney Adams's conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance after a traffic stop in which police recovered cocaine. The primary issues on appeal concerned the propriety of the prosecutor's closing arguments, including statements that a testifying officer would not lie because he would risk his credibility, job, and freedom, and that the defendant had two and a half years to fabricate his testimony. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the first argument was improper because it lacked supporting evidence at trial, but it did not constitute plain error under the facts presented. The court further held that the second argument did not violate due process by improperly commenting on post-arrest silence, as it instead permissibly challenged the defendant's credibility based on his opportunity to tailor testimony. Accordingly, the court reversed the appellate court's finding of plain error and affirmed the circuit court's judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether section 407(b)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, which enhances the penalty for delivery of a controlled substance to a Class 1 felony when committed within 1,000 feet of a school, applies to preschools. Defendant Anthony Young was convicted of delivery within 1,000 feet of a church preschool, but the appellate court reduced the conviction to the Class 2 felony of simple delivery. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term school in the statute does not include preschools. The court reasoned that the term is undefined in the Act, prior appellate decisions had interpreted it to mean elementary or secondary schools, and the legislature had amended the statute numerous times without expanding the definition despite those rulings; a parallel definition in the Criminal Code reinforced this settled meaning.

criminal law

The case concerned the Illinois legislature's authority to transfer money from the Cycle Rider Safety Training Fund (CRSTF), a trust fund created from motorcycle registration fees, to the state's General Revenue Fund after a 1993 amendment designated the fund as a trust outside the state treasury. Plaintiffs argued that such transfers were unconstitutional takings of private property and that the amendment prevented transfers without further legislative action. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the legislature retains the power to direct transfers from the CRSTF and that the transfers do not constitute an unconstitutional taking, affirming the appellate court. The court reasoned that the fees remain public funds subject to legislative control despite the trust designation and that no private property rights were implicated.

propertytaxes

In this Illinois criminal case, defendant Teryck Taylor was convicted of misdemeanor theft after being identified on a surveillance video as taking money from a school administrator's locked office desk during a fundraiser collection. The trial court admitted a VHS copy of the motion-activated digital recording made by police, over the defendant's objection that the State failed to lay a proper foundation due to a 30-second gap in the footage and questions about the equipment's reliability. The appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the silent-witness foundation was inadequate because the State did not explain the gap or prove the recording process was tamper-proof. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed, ruling that the totality of the evidence—including the officer's testimony about setting up and testing the camera, the continuous operation of the system, the chain of custody, and the absence of any indication of fabrication—established a sufficient foundation for admission. The court held that minor edits or gaps do not automatically render such recordings inadmissible if they do not undermine reliability.

criminal lawprocedure

In Wirtz v. Quinn, plaintiffs challenged four Illinois public acts (96-34, 96-35, 96-37, and 96-38) enacted in 2009 as part of a capital projects plan, claiming they violated multiple provisions of the Illinois Constitution, primarily the single subject clause requiring bills to address only one subject, as well as presentment, veto, appropriations, and other clauses. The circuit court denied the plaintiffs' petition to enjoin disbursement of funds, but the appellate court reversed, finding Public Act 96-34 invalid under the single subject rule because its provisions lacked a natural connection to revenue and holding the remaining acts invalid due to their contingency on the first. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, ruling that the acts complied with the single subject clause as their provisions related to the unified subject of capital projects and revenue generation, and further rejecting the other constitutional challenges regarding legislative procedures, separation of powers, and appropriation limits after examining the bills' structure and content.

business & regulatorytaxes

In People v. White, the defendant faced charges including first degree murder for his role in the 2004 armed robbery and shooting death of a taxi driver. He accepted a plea deal for a 28-year sentence on the murder charge, supported by a factual basis showing that a firearm had been used, yet the agreement and sentence omitted the 15-year mandatory enhancement that would have raised the minimum term to 35 years. The trial court accepted the plea and imposed the below-range sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the sentence and plea were void, reasoning that once the factual basis establishes firearm use triggering the enhancement under section 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i), the trial court lacks authority to impose a sentence that excludes the mandatory term regardless of the parties' agreement. The court affirmed the appellate judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Cook County Employee Appeals Board had jurisdiction to discharge plaintiff Jack Genius, a police sergeant with the Forest Preserve District, after he was suspended without pay in 1996 pending criminal charges that were later dismissed in 2001. The District then sought his discharge under a 2000 county ordinance that replaced the former Civil Service Commission with the Employee Appeals Board and altered disciplinary procedures. The appellate court held the Board lacked jurisdiction because the matter arose after the old civil service rules were repealed and the Board had improperly applied those rules. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 44-50(b)(2) of the Cook County Municipal Code granted the Board authority to hear the discharge action regardless of any procedural errors in applying the prior rules.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned whether SPEED District 802 violated the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act by declining to renew the contract of nontenured teacher Rachel Warning at the end of the 2004-05 school year. The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board found that the nonrenewal constituted retaliation for Warning's union activity in violation of sections 14(a)(3) and 14(a)(1) of the Act; that decision was affirmed by a divided appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court set aside the Board's order and reversed the appellate judgment. The court held that Warning failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because the record showed the district's decision rested on documented performance deficiencies and interpersonal conflicts rather than protected union conduct.

labor & employment

The case involved Leonard Holmes, an Indiana resident stopped by Chicago police for a traffic violation, who was charged with two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon after officers recovered a firearm from a closed and latched backseat armrest compartment in his vehicle. One count alleged carrying an uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible firearm, while the second alleged carrying a firearm without a valid Illinois Firearm Owner's Identification (FOID) card. A jury returned a general guilty verdict, which the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the conviction could not stand under either count because exceptions in the FOID Card Act for nonresidents licensed to carry firearms in their home state must be read into the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute, and because the evidence showed the gun was unloaded and enclosed in a case.

criminal lawguns

The case involved plaintiffs injured in automobile accidents who sued the at-fault drivers and reached settlements; the treating hospitals filed statutory liens under the Health Care Services Lien Act on those proceeds. Lower courts applied the common fund doctrine to require the hospitals to pay a proportionate share of the plaintiffs' attorney fees. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrine does not apply to health care liens under the Act. The court reasoned that the statute is silent on the issue, prior precedent had rejected the doctrine in an identical hospital-lien context, hospitals act as creditors without standing to sue the tortfeasors or control the litigation, and the settlements were created for the plaintiffs' benefit rather than a shared class or subrogation interest.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

In People v. Almore, defendant James Almore was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the death of his girlfriend's two-year-old son, Ethan, after caring for the child at his temporary residence. The trial court imposed an extended 12-year sentence under the Criminal Code based on a finding that Almore and Ethan were "family or household members" because they shared a common dwelling. The appellate court vacated the extended sentence, holding that the evidence did not establish they had shared a dwelling on an extended or regular basis. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the totality of the circumstances—including five consecutive days of cohabitation immediately before the incident, prior stays together over the course of their relationship, and shared living arrangements—supported the trial court's finding that Almore and Ethan shared a common dwelling within the meaning of the statute.

criminal lawfamily law

In People v. Comage, the defendant was charged with obstructing justice after throwing a crack pipe and push rod over a fence while fleeing police officers who were investigating him. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the conviction for obstructing justice. The court reasoned that the items were not concealed under the statute because the officers observed the defendant discard them, knew their location on the other side of the fence, and recovered them within about twenty seconds with no difficulty. This outcome followed from the statutory requirement that concealment must make evidence harder to recover or lead to its destruction.

criminal law

In Kaufmann v. Schroeder, the plaintiff sued her obstetrician and a municipal hospital for injuries from a sexual assault by the doctor during her January 2006 hospitalization, claiming the hospital was negligent in hiring, retaining, and supervising the doctor despite prior incidents. The suit was filed on December 31, 2007, more than one year after the alleged injury. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the claims against the hospital, holding that the one-year limitations period in section 8-101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act applied rather than the two-year period in section 8-101(b) for injuries arising out of patient care. The court reasoned that the sexual assault was separate from patient care, making the shorter period controlling for the municipal defendant.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

The case concerned whether unpaid child support installments in Illinois began accruing mandatory interest in 1987 under Public Act 85-2 or only after later amendments. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate and circuit courts, holding that interest became mandatory effective May 1, 1987. The court reasoned that the 1987 legislation explicitly made each unpaid support payment a judgment by operation of law that shall bear interest under the Code of Civil Procedure, supplanting prior discretionary standards from cases like Finley v. Finley.

family law

The case involved a defendant who filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, challenging his sentence for methamphetamine manufacturing on constitutional grounds related to the inclusion of waste product in the weight calculation. The trial court dismissed the petition without recharacterizing it as a postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, and the appellate court reversed, holding that the failure to recharacterize was reviewable error. The Illinois Supreme Court held that a trial court's decision not to recharacterize a pro se pleading as a postconviction petition may not be reviewed for error. The court reasoned that recharacterization is discretionary under the Act and precedents like People v. Shellstrom, so the trial court's choice not to do so is not subject to appellate scrutiny, though the appellate judgment was affirmed as modified on other grounds.

criminal lawprocedure

The case People v. Jocko concerned whether a trial court must inquire into a defendant's pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel before trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision to remand for such an inquiry, holding that no pretrial inquiry is required. The court reasoned that ineffective assistance claims under Strickland v. Washington depend on the trial's outcome, making them impossible to evaluate beforehand. Additionally, the trial court had no notice of some of the defendant's pro se documents alleging counsel deficiencies.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Dione Alexander, who was convicted of aggravated discharge of a firearm and unlawful use of weapons after firing multiple shots at another student in a crowded high school hallway in Peoria, Illinois. The trial court sentenced him to 24 years in prison as a Class X felon. The appellate court reduced the sentence to the six-year minimum, finding the trial court had improperly considered the school location as an aggravating factor and failed to adequately weigh mitigating factors like the defendant's age and background. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the 24-year sentence, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the appellate court had improperly reweighed the sentencing factors and the sentence was not disproportionate given the multiple shots fired amid bystanders.

criminal lawguns