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People v. Cathey
Illinois Supreme Court · 2012-03-22 · cited 21×
In People v. Cathey, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the trial court's refusal to rule before trial on a motion in limine to bar the State's use of his prior convictions for attempted murder and aggravated battery with a firearm to impeach him if he testified. The motion argued that the convictions' prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value under the Montgomery balancing test, particularly because the defendant was asserting self-defense and the decision whether to testify depended on knowing whether the priors would be admitted. The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition, and the appellate court affirmed, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed those judgments and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the trial court's deferral of the ruling was erroneous and that appellate counsel should have raised the issue.
criminal lawprocedure
People v. Washington
Illinois Supreme Court · 2012-02-17 · cited 74×
The case involved the prosecution of James Washington for armed robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated vehicular hijacking based on an incident where he allegedly used a firearm during a robbery and hijacking. Due to prior rulings striking down sentencing enhancements, the State indicted and tried the defendant under pre-2000 statutes that required proof of a "dangerous weapon" without distinguishing firearms. The trial court convicted him on the victim's testimony describing the weapon as a gun, but the appellate court reversed for insufficient evidence. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the convictions, reasoning that the preamended statutes applied, a firearm qualifies as a dangerous weapon under those statutes, and the evidence was sufficient; the court also rejected the defendant's claims of indictment variance and improper handling of his motion in limine.
criminal lawprocedure
Sandholm v. Kuecker
Illinois Supreme Court · 2012-01-20 · cited 74×
In Sandholm v. Kuecker, a high school basketball coach sued multiple defendants for defamation per se, false light invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy, and slander per se after they launched a public campaign, including a website, petition, emails, and radio appearance, accusing him of abusive coaching and bullying in an effort to have him removed from his position. The circuit court dismissed the entire suit under the Citizen Participation Act (anti-SLAPP statute), concluding the defendants were immune, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act does not shield defendants from liability for alleged intentional torts based on false statements merely because the conduct involved petitioning or speech aimed at government action; instead, the statute requires a showing that the claims lack merit and are intended to chill protected participation. The court remanded for further proceedings on the merits of the tort claims.
free speechtorts & liabilityprocedure
People v. Adams
Illinois Supreme Court · 2012-01-20 · cited 15×
The case involved defendant Romney Adams's conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance after a traffic stop in which police recovered cocaine. The primary issues on appeal concerned the propriety of the prosecutor's closing arguments, including statements that a testifying officer would not lie because he would risk his credibility, job, and freedom, and that the defendant had two and a half years to fabricate his testimony. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the first argument was improper because it lacked supporting evidence at trial, but it did not constitute plain error under the facts presented. The court further held that the second argument did not violate due process by improperly commenting on post-arrest silence, as it instead permissibly challenged the defendant's credibility based on his opportunity to tailor testimony. Accordingly, the court reversed the appellate court's finding of plain error and affirmed the circuit court's judgment.
criminal lawprocedure
People v. Young
Illinois Supreme Court · 2011-12-15 · cited 3×
The case concerned whether section 407(b)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, which enhances the penalty for delivery of a controlled substance to a Class 1 felony when committed within 1,000 feet of a school, applies to preschools. Defendant Anthony Young was convicted of delivery within 1,000 feet of a church preschool, but the appellate court reduced the conviction to the Class 2 felony of simple delivery. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term school in the statute does not include preschools. The court reasoned that the term is undefined in the Act, prior appellate decisions had interpreted it to mean elementary or secondary schools, and the legislature had amended the statute numerous times without expanding the definition despite those rulings; a parallel definition in the Criminal Code reinforced this settled meaning.
criminal law
ABATE of Illinois, Inc. v. Quinn
Illinois Supreme Court · 2011-10-27 · cited 12×
The case concerned the Illinois legislature's authority to transfer money from the Cycle Rider Safety Training Fund (CRSTF), a trust fund created from motorcycle registration fees, to the state's General Revenue Fund after a 1993 amendment designated the fund as a trust outside the state treasury. Plaintiffs argued that such transfers were unconstitutional takings of private property and that the amendment prevented transfers without further legislative action. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the legislature retains the power to direct transfers from the CRSTF and that the transfers do not constitute an unconstitutional taking, affirming the appellate court. The court reasoned that the fees remain public funds subject to legislative control despite the trust designation and that no private property rights were implicated.
propertytaxes