Courtney Hudson Goodson

Terrance Proctor, who was convicted as a juvenile of multiple counts of aggravated robbery and robbery, received a life sentence plus 200 years to be served consecutively. After Graham v. Florida invalidated life-without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, his life term was reduced to 40 years, resulting in a cumulative 240-year sentence; he then petitioned for habeas corpus relief claiming the sentence was an unconstitutional de facto life term and grossly disproportionate. The circuit court denied the petition, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the prior remedy complied with Graham, the judgment was not facially invalid, the trial court had jurisdiction, and the disproportionality claim did not establish a basis for habeas relief under state law.

criminal law

In Beene v. State, petitioner Cecil D. Beene sought a belated appeal of his 2016 conviction for second-degree sexual assault, alleging that his trial counsel failed to file a notice of appeal despite his requests made through counsel and his mother. The Arkansas Supreme Court treated the motion as one for belated appeal and, after remanding for an evidentiary hearing, denied it. The trial court found that Beene had not expressed a desire to appeal within the required thirty-day period, crediting the attorney's testimony over Beene's, and the Supreme Court upheld this finding as not clearly erroneous, noting that the right to appeal may be waived by failing to timely inform counsel of the desire to appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved James E. Whitney appealing the denial of his motion to reconsider an order setting a $35 partial filing fee for his pro se tort complaint against the Washington County Sheriff and others. The Supreme Court of Arkansas dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion for reconsideration was filed 197 days after the original order, which exceeded the 90-day limit under Rule 60(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The court reasoned that the motion did not involve a clerical error correctable at any time and thus was untimely, making the circuit court's denial proper. The motion to file a nonconforming brief was deemed moot as a result.

procedure

The case involves James Edward Whitney appealing the circuit court's denial of his petition to proceed in forma pauperis on his pro se habeas corpus petition against Wendy Kelley, Director of the Arkansas Department of Correction. The Supreme Court of Arkansas remanded the matter to the circuit court for additional findings, rendering the appellant's motion to file a nonconforming brief moot. The core reasoning is that Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 72 requires the circuit court to make specific findings on both the petitioner's indigency and whether the facts allege a colorable cause of action, which the lower court's order failed to adequately provide by only addressing the lack of a cognizable habeas claim without proper indigency findings or explanations.

procedurecriminal law

The case involved James E. Whitney appealing the circuit court's denial of his motion for reconsideration of an order imposing a $20 partial filing fee on his pro se civil tort complaint against four defendants. The Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as it was clear the circuit court had correctly denied the reconsideration motion. The court reasoned that the motion was filed 155 days after the October 2017 order, exceeding the 90-day limit under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) for modifying judgments to correct errors or prevent injustice, and it did not involve a clerical error correctable at any time. Consequently, Whitney's separate motion to file a nonconforming brief on appeal was rendered moot.

proceduretorts & liability

In Bunch v. State, petitioner Rodney Bunch sought permission from the Arkansas Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that prosecutors withheld evidence of his prior convictions in violation of Brady v. Maryland, leading to an illegal enhancement of his sentence as a habitual offender to life imprisonment for aggravated robbery. The court denied the petition, holding that Bunch failed to allege facts extrinsic to the record that were unknown at sentencing or that would have altered the outcome, and that coram nobis is not available to seek a reduction in sentence. The court also denied Bunch's motion for sanctions against the Attorney General's office, ruling that the motion was meritless and that Rule 11 sanctions do not apply to criminal proceedings. The decision rested on the narrow scope of coram nobis relief, which requires a strong presumption of judgment validity and is limited to specific grounds not met here.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, James E. Whitney appealed the circuit court's denial of his motion for reconsideration of an order setting a partial filing fee of $35 for his pro se petition for a writ of mandamus against Governor Asa Hutchinson. The Supreme Court of Arkansas dismissed the appeal, finding that Whitney's motion for reconsideration was filed 197 days after the original order, which exceeded the 90-day limit under Rule 60(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The court reasoned that the motion did not involve a clerical error correctable at any time, and thus was untimely, making the circuit court's denial appropriate and rendering Whitney's motion to file a nonconforming brief moot.

procedure

Russell Berger appealed an order from the Jefferson County Circuit Court that denied his petition to proceed in forma pauperis on a civil-rights complaint against Arkansas Department of Correction employees, finding him not indigent and requiring payment of the filing fee with an initial partial amount set. The Arkansas Supreme Court held the order appealable under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2(a)(2) because it effectively prevented Berger from pursuing the action if he was indigent, but found the order insufficient for review as it lacked any factual basis or explanation for the indigency determination under the factors outlined in Burmingham v. State. The court remanded for a supplemental order with specific findings of fact on indigency while directing that the remand not permit reconsideration of the initial ruling, only an explanation of its reasoning.

civil rightsprocedure

Marchello Porter appealed the denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his robbery conviction obtained through a nolo contendere plea, for which he received 120 months' imprisonment. Porter filed the petition under Act 1780 seeking relief based on alleged scientific evidence of innocence but instead alleged prosecutorial misconduct in withholding a security videotape that he claimed showed he was not the person who left with the stolen property. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the trial court's denial, ruling that Porter identified no scientific evidence for testing and thus failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for relief under the Act.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an interlocutory appeal by Helena Country Club from a circuit court order disqualifying its attorney, Charles Halbert, from representing it in a lawsuit filed by Billy Ray Brocato. Brocato had sued the Club for breach of contract and violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act over unpaid pool maintenance services, and the Club filed a counterclaim alleging fraud and overbilling. The circuit court disqualified Halbert after Brocato sought to introduce evidence of an alleged statement by Halbert during settlement discussions and indicated he might call Halbert as a witness. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by disqualifying counsel without applying the required three-part test from Weigel v. Bradley to determine if an attorney’s testimony is necessary, and noting that Brocato never moved for disqualification or met the test’s elements of materiality, necessity, and prejudice.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved USAC Leasing, LLC challenging Faulkner County's 2013 and 2014 ad valorem tax assessments on its gas compressors through appeals first to the county board of equalization and then to county court. A non-attorney corporate representative signed the appeal petitions to county court. The circuit court dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction after finding that this constituted the unauthorized practice of law, rendering the petitions null and void. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by failure to object earlier and that the non-attorney representation invalidated the county court proceedings. The decision relied on precedent treating such filings as improper corporate practice of law.

taxespropertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Cooper v. Kalkwarf, a divorced couple disputed the mother's petition to relocate with their minor son from Arkansas to Texas after her new husband accepted a job there. The circuit court granted the petition under the Hollandsworth presumption favoring relocation when one parent has primary physical custody. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the parties had in practice exercised joint custody rather than true primary custody by the mother, so the Hollandsworth presumption did not apply and the lower court should instead have conducted a best-interest analysis under Singletary without that presumption. The decision rested on factual findings that parenting time was nearly equal, the father paid support, and other indicators showed shared responsibilities.

family law

In Thompson v. State, petitioner James Ray Thompson, convicted of two counts of rape, filed a pro se petition seeking to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to pursue a writ of error coram nobis, primarily alleging that the prosecutor withheld a 911 recording of the victim's call in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The Arkansas Supreme Court denied the petition and the accompanying motion to reply, holding that the recording was played in full during the trial, admitted into evidence, and thus not withheld or extrinsic to the record. The court reasoned that Thompson failed to demonstrate a fundamental error of fact that would have prevented the judgment, that the victim's statements were consistent with her trial testimony, and that the requirements for coram nobis relief or a Brady claim were not met.

criminal lawprocedure

In Williams v. State, appellant Fred Lee Williams appealed the trial court's dismissal of his pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis following his 2014 guilty plea to felon in possession of a firearm. Williams argued that the State violated Brady v. Maryland by withholding witness statements, suborned perjury, breached a plea agreement, and that his plea was involuntary due to ineffective counsel and concealed evidence. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the petition failed to establish grounds for the writ, which is limited to specific categories like insanity, coerced pleas, withheld material evidence, or third-party confessions, and that Williams's claims were more properly raised as ineffective assistance under Rule 37 rather than reframed as Brady violations. The court further reasoned that no Brady violation occurred because the evidence was referenced in public records available before the plea, and claims of actual innocence or general coercion did not qualify for coram nobis relief.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the State of Arkansas appealing the Crittenden County Circuit Court's use of three nonmodel jury instructions at David Lasley's resentencing hearing for a capital murder committed when he was seventeen. Following U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana, the circuit court had vacated Lasley's original life-without-parole sentence and allowed the jury to consider factors related to his juvenile status before imposing a new sentence of forty years. The State sought only a declaration that the instructions were error, without requesting reversal or remand. The Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that it was not a proper state appeal under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Criminal 3 because the matter did not involve the interpretation of criminal rules with widespread ramifications or otherwise require review to ensure the correct and uniform administration of the law.

criminal lawprocedure

In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenged a circuit court order permitting the defendant, charged with raping a physically helpless victim, to introduce testimony about the victim's conduct with a third party the night before the alleged offense under the rape-shield statute. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court manifestly abused its discretion by deeming the evidence relevant. The court reasoned that the prior events involved only non-sexual lap dancing without any indication of conduct for sexual gratification, rendering it outside the scope of the rape-shield statute and irrelevant to the charge of rape of a physically helpless person where consent is not a defense. The decision emphasized that the statute's purpose is to shield victims from unnecessary intrusion into their prior sexual history.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether the Arkansas Department of Correction was required to release pharmaceutical package inserts and labels for its supply of midazolam, a drug used in the state's lethal injection protocol, in response to an Arkansas Freedom of Information Act request by attorney Steven Shults. The ADC argued that the documents were exempt from disclosure under the Method of Execution Act because they could identify manufacturers, sellers, or suppliers of execution drugs. The circuit court ordered production of the records, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The majority reasoned that the MEA's confidentiality protections for those who sell or supply drugs do not extend to manufacturers, requiring disclosure of the inserts and labels, but that lot, batch, and control numbers must be redacted to shield the identities of protected sellers and suppliers in the distribution chain.

criminal lawprocedure

In Taylor v. State, the appellant filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on grounds that the State failed to follow the negotiated plea agreement and that he had not agreed to serve 70 percent of his sentence before parole eligibility. The circuit court denied the petition, leading to this appeal. The Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Taylor failed to allege grounds for habeas relief because such a writ requires a showing that the judgment is facially invalid or that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The court explained that claims involving plea agreements or parole eligibility must instead be raised under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 or other appropriate proceedings, rendering the appeal without merit and the related motions moot.

criminal lawprocedure

In Matar v. State, petitioner Ali Martin Matar sought a belated appeal from the Benton County Circuit Court's August 17, 2016, order denying his petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1, after filing his notice of appeal on October 14, 2016, outside the required thirty-day window. The Arkansas Supreme Court treated the pro se motion for belated appeal and rule on clerk as a motion for belated appeal under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Criminal 2(e). The court denied the motion, holding that Matar failed to establish good cause for the delay despite possible noncompliance by the trial court with the mandatory mailing requirement under Rule 37.3(d), because he admitted receiving the order on September 9, 2016—before the appeal deadline expired—yet waited over a month to file. The decision emphasized that the burden is on the petitioner to show good cause when a notice of appeal is untimely.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an interlocutory appeal by the State of Arkansas from a circuit court order dismissing four counts of misdemeanor negligent homicide against Benjamin Ward Ledwell on statute-of-limitations grounds. The accident occurred on May 19, 2015; an arrest warrant based on a criminal information and probable-cause affidavit was issued on May 16, 2016, and the information was filed on June 6, 2016. The circuit court held that the one-year limitations period under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-1-109(b)(3)(A) had expired because the charging documents were not filed within one year. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed and remanded, ruling that under the plain language of section 5-1-109(f) a misdemeanor prosecution commences when an arrest warrant is issued based on a criminal information or other charging instrument, with no requirement that the instrument itself be filed of record within the limitations period. The court found this interpretation consistent with the statute’s commentary and prior precedent.

criminal lawprocedure