Terrance Proctor, who was convicted as a juvenile of multiple counts of aggravated robbery and robbery, received a life sentence plus 200 years to be served consecutively. After Graham v. Florida invalidated life-without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, his life term was reduced to 40 years, resulting in a cumulative 240-year sentence; he then petitioned for habeas corpus relief claiming the sentence was an unconstitutional de facto life term and grossly disproportionate. The circuit court denied the petition, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the prior remedy complied with Graham, the judgment was not facially invalid, the trial court had jurisdiction, and the disproportionality claim did not establish a basis for habeas relief under state law.
In Beene v. State, petitioner Cecil D. Beene sought a belated appeal of his 2016 conviction for second-degree sexual assault, alleging that his trial counsel failed to file a notice of appeal despite his requests made through counsel and his mother. The Arkansas Supreme Court treated the motion as one for belated appeal and, after remanding for an evidentiary hearing, denied it. The trial court found that Beene had not expressed a desire to appeal within the required thirty-day period, crediting the attorney's testimony over Beene's, and the Supreme Court upheld this finding as not clearly erroneous, noting that the right to appeal may be waived by failing to timely inform counsel of the desire to appeal.
The case involved James E. Whitney appealing the denial of his motion to reconsider an order setting a $35 partial filing fee for his pro se tort complaint against the Washington County Sheriff and others. The Supreme Court of Arkansas dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion for reconsideration was filed 197 days after the original order, which exceeded the 90-day limit under Rule 60(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The court reasoned that the motion did not involve a clerical error correctable at any time and thus was untimely, making the circuit court's denial proper. The motion to file a nonconforming brief was deemed moot as a result.
The case involves James Edward Whitney appealing the circuit court's denial of his petition to proceed in forma pauperis on his pro se habeas corpus petition against Wendy Kelley, Director of the Arkansas Department of Correction. The Supreme Court of Arkansas remanded the matter to the circuit court for additional findings, rendering the appellant's motion to file a nonconforming brief moot. The core reasoning is that Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 72 requires the circuit court to make specific findings on both the petitioner's indigency and whether the facts allege a colorable cause of action, which the lower court's order failed to adequately provide by only addressing the lack of a cognizable habeas claim without proper indigency findings or explanations.
The case involved James E. Whitney appealing the circuit court's denial of his motion for reconsideration of an order imposing a $20 partial filing fee on his pro se civil tort complaint against four defendants. The Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as it was clear the circuit court had correctly denied the reconsideration motion. The court reasoned that the motion was filed 155 days after the October 2017 order, exceeding the 90-day limit under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) for modifying judgments to correct errors or prevent injustice, and it did not involve a clerical error correctable at any time. Consequently, Whitney's separate motion to file a nonconforming brief on appeal was rendered moot.
In Bunch v. State, petitioner Rodney Bunch sought permission from the Arkansas Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that prosecutors withheld evidence of his prior convictions in violation of Brady v. Maryland, leading to an illegal enhancement of his sentence as a habitual offender to life imprisonment for aggravated robbery. The court denied the petition, holding that Bunch failed to allege facts extrinsic to the record that were unknown at sentencing or that would have altered the outcome, and that coram nobis is not available to seek a reduction in sentence. The court also denied Bunch's motion for sanctions against the Attorney General's office, ruling that the motion was meritless and that Rule 11 sanctions do not apply to criminal proceedings. The decision rested on the narrow scope of coram nobis relief, which requires a strong presumption of judgment validity and is limited to specific grounds not met here.