Lyn Stuart

This case involved a DUI-related vehicle accident in which the defendant was charged with first-degree assault under Alabama law for causing serious bodily injury to a child passenger. The key issue was whether the element of 'serious and protracted disfigurement' could be proven sufficiently for the jury through testimony from the child's mother describing visible scars and a keloid, or whether medical testimony or the victim's own testimony was required as a matter of law. The Court of Criminal Appeals had ruled the mother's testimony alone was insufficient. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that lay witness testimony from someone with firsthand knowledge of the injuries and recovery can establish a prima facie case of serious bodily injury, as disfigurement is a condition observable without specialized expertise and thus presents a question for the jury.

criminal law

The case involved Wakilii Brown's convictions for three counts of capital murder arising from the killings of Dotty Jemison and Cherea Jemison during a robbery, for which a jury recommended and the trial court imposed the death penalty; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On certiorari, the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed claims regarding the procedures for admitting testimony from a child witness under Rule 603, Ala. R. Evid., alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and alleged errors in the trial court's jury instructions on reasonable doubt and the robbery element of capital murder. The court conducted plain-error review because Brown had not objected at trial, declined to adopt a per se rule requiring child-witness competency examinations outside the jury's presence or a separate reliability test beyond Rule 403, and held that the trial court's instructions adequately conveyed the required legal standards. The court therefore affirmed the convictions and death sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose when the City of Irondale sued CHSPSC and related entities over the relocation of a hospital from Birmingham to Irondale, alleging breach of contract, fraud, promissory estoppel, and intentional interference with business relations after the hospital was instead moved to another Birmingham site. During discovery, the city sought to depose CHSPSC's CEO Wayne Smith, whom the company argued lacked unique personal knowledge and should be protected from deposition. The trial court denied the company's motion for a protective order, and CHSPSC petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel protection. The court denied the petition, holding that Smith had been directly involved in the relocation decision and possessed relevant information not obtainable through less intrusive means, and that the trial court had not abused its discretion in managing discovery.

procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a default judgment entered against defendant John Folds approximately 90 days after service of a summons and complaint in a construction contract dispute brought by plaintiff Hilton Cooper Contracting, Inc. Folds moved under Rule 55(c) to set aside the default, addressing two of the three Kirtland factors by alleging a meritorious defense and lack of willful conduct, but making only a brief statement on lack of prejudice to the plaintiff. The trial court denied the motion, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. The dissent contended that the minimal showing on prejudice should not have been fatal under the circumstances.

procedure

The case involved whether indictments charging Mitchell and Michelle Roffler with theft of specific dollar amounts from layaway customers at their furniture store were legally sufficient, even though they did not specify the medium of exchange such as cash, checks, or credit cards. The trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the indictments, relying on prior precedent requiring such details for adequate notice. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that an indictment stating only the dollar amount stolen is sufficient under modern standards. The court reasoned that changes in the 21st century, including varied forms of payment, have rendered specification of the medium of exchange unnecessary for informing the defendants of the charges.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Fannie Mae filed an ejectment action in Alabama circuit court against Jeffery and Matilda Steele to remove them from their home after acquiring title through foreclosure on a defaulted mortgage. The Steeles did not file an answer, leading to a default judgment in Fannie Mae's favor; Jeffery's later motion to set aside the judgment was denied by operation of law under Rule 59.1. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the motion de novo and affirmed the default judgment. The court held that the ejectment statute, § 6-6-280, does not require a pre-suit demand for possession, overruling prior cases that had imposed such a requirement, and concluded that Jeffery had not presented a meritorious defense.

propertyprocedure

This case arose from a 2006 school bus accident in which students were injured after the bus went over a highway barrier. The plaintiffs, most of whom were minors at the time, initially sued the bus driver, owner, and another driver, then later amended their complaints in 2009 to add products-liability, breach-of-warranty, and negligence claims against the bus manufacturers Navistar and IC Bus. The trial court granted summary judgment to the manufacturers, holding the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, waiver, and laches. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Alabama law tolled the limitations period for the minor plaintiffs until they reached age 19, so the 2009 claims were timely, and that waiver and laches did not apply on these facts.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the Alabama State Bar's disciplinary proceedings against attorney Douglas H. Cooner, who was disbarred for alleged violations of professional conduct rules in his handling of an irrevocable trust and property transfers for his uncle by marriage, William B. Riley, including serving as trustee and failing to provide accountings. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the disbarment order, holding that Cooner did not violate Rule 1.8(c) of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct because the rule's prohibition on preparing certain instruments for non-relatives did not apply where the client was related by marriage. The court remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, declining to address other issues such as the denial of a motion for new trial at that stage.

family lawpropertyprocedure

In Phillips v. Seward, plaintiff Mary Nell Phillips sued truck driver James Travis Seward and his employer Heartland Express for negligence after her minivan was rear-ended by Seward's tractor-trailer while she waited in a yield-controlled right-turn lane to merge into traffic. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the trial court denied Phillips's post-trial motions. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on contributory negligence because the defendants presented no substantial evidence that Phillips acted unreasonably or negligently in attempting to merge. The court reasoned that Seward's own testimony showed he did not fault Phillips and that her brief forward movement followed by stopping was consistent with normal driving in heavy traffic. The case was remanded for a new trial.

torts & liability

In this case, Lee Lumber Company sued Jesse Hughes, doing business as RBM Transport Company, in Bibb Circuit Court for breach of two contracts involving the lease and purchase of trucks and trailers, seeking damages for unpaid amounts. Hughes, who resides in Pickens County, moved to transfer the action there under Alabama Code § 6-3-2(a)(2), which requires contract actions against individuals to be brought in the defendant's county of residence, but the trial court denied the motion after Lee Lumber argued venue was proper in Bibb County under the statute for unincorporated organizations. The Alabama Supreme Court granted Hughes's petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that a sole proprietorship has no separate legal existence from the individual owner and thus does not qualify as an unincorporated organization or association under § 6-3-6. The court reasoned that Hughes's undisputed testimony established the business as a one-person operation, making venue proper only in Pickens County. It therefore directed the trial court to transfer the case.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Kathryn Honea, a client who lost over $1 million in her investment accounts and sued Raymond James Financial Services and broker Bernard Michaud in Alabama circuit court, alleging violations of the Alabama Securities Act along with claims for breach of contract, fiduciary duty, negligence, wantonness, and fraud. The parties' client agreement required arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, and the arbitrators ruled entirely in favor of RJFS. The trial court vacated the award, relying on a contract clause allowing de novo judicial review when losses exceeded $100,000, but the Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel made the FAA's limited statutory grounds for vacatur exclusive and barred parties from contractually expanding judicial review.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the Madison County Department of Human Resources, as legal guardian of T.S., a severely disabled minor, appealing a trial court's approval of a confidential $787,500 settlement for T.S.'s personal-injury claims arising from burns suffered at a group home, along with associated attorney fees of $262,500. The settlement, reached after mediation in a case filed by T.S.'s mother through counsel, allocated funds after expenses, liens, and a loss-of-consortium award to purchase an annuity for T.S.'s care via a special-needs trust. The Supreme Court of Alabama remanded with directions, holding that the one-third contingency fee was excessive and unreasonable because the matter settled quickly before extensive discovery or significant attorney effort, and directed a reduced fee structure of 20% on the minor's net recovery plus a separate one-third fee on the mother's loss-of-consortium portion.

torts & liabilityprocedurefamily law

The case involved Alabama voters suing state officials in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the 1901 Alabama Constitution was ratified only through voter fraud in certain counties and seeking a declaration that it was void along with an injunction against its enforcement. The trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, prompting the defendants to petition for a writ of mandamus. The Alabama Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered dismissal of the action. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege a particularized injury distinct from that suffered by the general public, depriving the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

electionscivil rightsprocedure

First Commercial Bank sued Charles Stephens in Jefferson Circuit Court for defaulting on a $648,118 promissory note, seeking the principal plus interest, fees, and costs. The trial court granted summary judgment to the bank for $737,686 after reviewing an affidavit from a bank officer stating the default based on personal knowledge of the bank's records. Stephens appealed, arguing the affidavit was inadmissible hearsay and violated the best-evidence rule, and that he needed more discovery time. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the affidavit was competent evidence of default and damages because it rested on the affiant's personal knowledge rather than requiring the underlying records, and Stephens had not produced contrary evidence.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Angela Young Purser sued Solid Ground Development, LLC, claiming that the company unlawfully drained a lake on its adjacent property, which interfered with her use and enjoyment of a connected lake on her own land and caused it to go dry. The Shelby Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Solid Ground, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that Purser had no legal right, such as an easement, to require Solid Ground to maintain the lake on its property, and under the common-enemy doctrine for surface water diversion within municipal limits, Solid Ground could alter the water without liability to neighbors. Arguments about implied rights were not properly raised below and thus could not be considered on appeal.

propertytorts & liability

This case involved a law firm challenging Jefferson County's assessment of ad valorem taxes on its business personal property, arguing that the tax assessor's use of a mass-appraisal method did not accurately reflect the fair market value of the property. The trial court ruled in favor of the county, finding that the method was practical, applied uniformly, and that the firm had not proven the assessment inaccurate. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, and the Alabama Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, though it noted it did not endorse all statements in the lower court's opinion. A dissent expressed concern that the courts had substituted a procedural standard for the required fair market value standard in tax assessments.

taxespropertyprocedure

This case involved a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit filed by the estate of Venoria Womack in the Clayton Division of the Barbour Circuit Court against Lakeview Hospital and Dr. Mottershaw, among others, alleging failure to diagnose cancer. The defendants sought to transfer the case to the Eufaula Division pursuant to a 1969 local act dividing Barbour County into two divisions for court sessions and specifying transfer rules based on defendant residence. The trial court denied the transfer, holding that the Alabama Medical Liability Act's venue provision prioritizing the plaintiff's residence superseded the local act. The Alabama Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, ruling that the AMLA addresses only county-level venue and does not override the local act's division-specific rules, thus requiring transfer to the Eufaula Division where the defendants resided and some acts occurred.

procedurehealthcaretorts & liability

This case involved an election contest filed by Steven R. Sears against Ben McCrory, the elected mayor of Montevallo, claiming McCrory was ineligible due to incomplete or untimely campaign finance reports under the Fair Campaign Practices Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of McCrory, which the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that McCrory had filed the required financial-disclosure reports, albeit some outside the strict statutory period, and under precedent, such filings rendered him eligible for office, with any potential criminal penalties not affecting civil eligibility in this context.

electionsprocedure

This case involves Waymon George Peterson's Rule 32 petition challenging his conviction for assaulting a public-safety official. After the circuit court initially denied the petition, Peterson appealed, prompting the court to withdraw its denial and grant a new trial; the appeal was dismissed as moot. The circuit court then held an evidentiary hearing on the City's motion to reconsider and again denied the petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Peterson's new appeal, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider or alter its judgment after 30 days or after the appeal had been filed, rendering all subsequent orders void.

criminal lawprocedure

In Yeager v. Winstead, the case concerned whether a former wife was entitled to postjudgment interest at 12% on alimony in gross and attorney fees awarded in a 2001 divorce judgment after the ex-husband tendered checks for the principal amounts, which she did not negotiate due to concerns over her appeal rights. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' ruling that interest had accrued, holding that the tender complied with the judgment and stopped interest from running. The core reasoning was that the ex-husband placed no improper conditions on the payment, the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine did not apply because there was no cross-appeal challenging the award amount and the payment was voluntary, and thus the former wife was not deprived of use of the funds in a way that justified additional interest. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

family lawprocedure