This case involved a DUI-related vehicle accident in which the defendant was charged with first-degree assault under Alabama law for causing serious bodily injury to a child passenger. The key issue was whether the element of 'serious and protracted disfigurement' could be proven sufficiently for the jury through testimony from the child's mother describing visible scars and a keloid, or whether medical testimony or the victim's own testimony was required as a matter of law. The Court of Criminal Appeals had ruled the mother's testimony alone was insufficient. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that lay witness testimony from someone with firsthand knowledge of the injuries and recovery can establish a prima facie case of serious bodily injury, as disfigurement is a condition observable without specialized expertise and thus presents a question for the jury.
The case involved Wakilii Brown's convictions for three counts of capital murder arising from the killings of Dotty Jemison and Cherea Jemison during a robbery, for which a jury recommended and the trial court imposed the death penalty; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On certiorari, the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed claims regarding the procedures for admitting testimony from a child witness under Rule 603, Ala. R. Evid., alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and alleged errors in the trial court's jury instructions on reasonable doubt and the robbery element of capital murder. The court conducted plain-error review because Brown had not objected at trial, declined to adopt a per se rule requiring child-witness competency examinations outside the jury's presence or a separate reliability test beyond Rule 403, and held that the trial court's instructions adequately conveyed the required legal standards. The court therefore affirmed the convictions and death sentence.
The case arose when the City of Irondale sued CHSPSC and related entities over the relocation of a hospital from Birmingham to Irondale, alleging breach of contract, fraud, promissory estoppel, and intentional interference with business relations after the hospital was instead moved to another Birmingham site. During discovery, the city sought to depose CHSPSC's CEO Wayne Smith, whom the company argued lacked unique personal knowledge and should be protected from deposition. The trial court denied the company's motion for a protective order, and CHSPSC petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel protection. The court denied the petition, holding that Smith had been directly involved in the relocation decision and possessed relevant information not obtainable through less intrusive means, and that the trial court had not abused its discretion in managing discovery.
This case involved a default judgment entered against defendant John Folds approximately 90 days after service of a summons and complaint in a construction contract dispute brought by plaintiff Hilton Cooper Contracting, Inc. Folds moved under Rule 55(c) to set aside the default, addressing two of the three Kirtland factors by alleging a meritorious defense and lack of willful conduct, but making only a brief statement on lack of prejudice to the plaintiff. The trial court denied the motion, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. The dissent contended that the minimal showing on prejudice should not have been fatal under the circumstances.
The case involved whether indictments charging Mitchell and Michelle Roffler with theft of specific dollar amounts from layaway customers at their furniture store were legally sufficient, even though they did not specify the medium of exchange such as cash, checks, or credit cards. The trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the indictments, relying on prior precedent requiring such details for adequate notice. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that an indictment stating only the dollar amount stolen is sufficient under modern standards. The court reasoned that changes in the 21st century, including varied forms of payment, have rendered specification of the medium of exchange unnecessary for informing the defendants of the charges.
In this case, Fannie Mae filed an ejectment action in Alabama circuit court against Jeffery and Matilda Steele to remove them from their home after acquiring title through foreclosure on a defaulted mortgage. The Steeles did not file an answer, leading to a default judgment in Fannie Mae's favor; Jeffery's later motion to set aside the judgment was denied by operation of law under Rule 59.1. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the motion de novo and affirmed the default judgment. The court held that the ejectment statute, § 6-6-280, does not require a pre-suit demand for possession, overruling prior cases that had imposed such a requirement, and concluded that Jeffery had not presented a meritorious defense.