Otis D. Wright 2

The case involved a dispute between ProMex, LLC and Yolanda Eustaquio, owners of the CREMA CUADRIDERMA trademark for an anti-itch skin cream, and Claudia Hernandez and Products Zapotol Corp., who produce a similar cream under the QUADRYDERN N.F. mark. Following a prior settlement agreement limiting the defendants' sales to Southern California, the plaintiffs sued for breach of contract and trademark violations after the defendants sold products outside that region, including to Fresno, California, and other states. The court determined that the defendants breached the agreement by making sales beyond the defined Southern California counties and awarded the plaintiffs nominal damages of one dollar, as evidence of actual damages based on the defendants' profits was deemed too speculative without proof of corresponding losses to the plaintiffs. The court declined to grant a nationwide injunction, enforcing the terms of the existing agreement instead.

business & regulatory

In Haugen v. Marshall, the petitioner, serving a 25-years-to-life sentence for a 1980 first-degree felony murder conviction, challenged the California Governor's reversal of the Board of Parole Hearings' October 2006 suitability finding for parole. The U.S. District Court granted the petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, ordering that the petitioner's parole period be credited for time spent in unlawful confinement. The court adopted the magistrate judge's findings after de novo review, determining that the Governor's reliance on the commitment offense and discrepancies in the petitioner's acceptance of responsibility was unsupported by evidence and violated due process by failing to show an unreasonable public safety risk.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves David Eng, a Deputy District Attorney employed by Los Angeles County since 1984, who brought claims against District Attorney Steve Cooley, other DAO officials including Curtis Hazell, Steve Sowders, and Curt Livesay, and the County itself. The claims arise from alleged retaliation connected to Eng's participation in the Belmont Task Force investigation of the LAUSD project, his recommendations against filing charges, his handling of a sexual harassment complaint, and subsequent denials of promotions and other employment actions. The court granted Hazell's motion for summary judgment on the first and third causes of action, granted the County's motion on the remaining claims in the third amended complaint, and denied the motion by Cooley, Sowders, and Livesay as to those remaining claims. The rulings were based on the absence of evidence linking certain defendants to adverse actions, statute of limitations issues, and the application of doctrines like continuing violations, while finding triable issues against some individual defendants.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In Moody v. Dexter, petitioner Jimmy Nathan Moody, convicted in 1990 of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and related firearm offenses in California state court, sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after exhausting multiple state post-conviction petitions filed between 1996 and 2008. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, dismissing the July 2008 federal petition as untimely. The core reasoning was that AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations from the finality of direct review (here, 1993), state habeas filings after significant unexplained delays did not toll the period, and neither newly discovered evidence nor due diligence exceptions applied to restart the clock.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a trademark dispute where Credit One Corporation, an auto finance company using the "Credit One" mark since the late 1990s, sued Credit One Financial and its national bank subsidiary, which hold federal registrations for "Credit One," "Credit One Bank," and "Credit One Financial" marks used in credit card services. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction alleging Lanham Act false designation and common law trademark infringement due to claimed consumer confusion from misdirected calls and payments. The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits because the defendants' registrations provide prima facie validity and evidence did not establish likely confusion. The court further found no showing of irreparable harm, that the balance of equities favored the defendants who had invested heavily in their marks, and that an injunction would not serve the public interest.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by a California state prisoner who was convicted after a jury trial of attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, unlawful taking of a vehicle, and street terrorism, with findings that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and with premeditation and use of a deadly weapon, resulting in a sentence of 15 years to life plus a determinate term. The petitioner had unsuccessfully appealed his convictions through the state courts and filed a prior state habeas petition before bringing this federal action. The district court, after conducting a de novo review of the petition, records, and the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and noting that no objections were filed, adopted the recommendation in full and dismissed the action with prejudice. The core reasoning was that the claims lacked merit under the standards governing federal review of state convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In Oliva v. Hedgpeth, a state prisoner filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging his first-degree murder conviction and firearm enhancements, which were based primarily on eyewitness identifications from two witnesses who observed a shooting involving a person on a bicycle. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and conditionally granted the petition. The court reasoned that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient under due process standards because the identifications were unreliable and did not support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the state was ordered to retry the petitioner within ninety days or discharge him from the adverse consequences of the judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

In Samica Enterprises, LLC v. Mail Boxes Etc. USA, Inc., franchisees who invested in The UPS Store sued Mail Boxes Etc. and UPS entities, alleging they were misled into buying economically unviable franchises through inadequate disclosures and breaches of contract terms like the "best efforts" provision for securing discounts. The court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on the Phase I plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, fraud by omission, negligent misrepresentation, violations of the California Franchise Investment Law, unfair business practices statutes, and related requests for declaratory relief and rescission. The ruling found no genuine issues of material fact, as the franchise agreements and offering circulars disclosed the relevant terms and incentives, and plaintiffs provided insufficient evidence to show breaches or actionable omissions. The decision rested on the contracts' language allowing UPS discretion over discounts and the absence of specific proof supporting the fraud or statutory violation allegations.

business & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over liability for cargo destroyed in a train derailment during an international shipment from Singapore to Alabama. The shipper contracted with an ocean carrier under a bill of lading that included a covenant not to sue subcontractors and a $500 per package liability limit under COGSA; after the insurer paid the claim and became subrogated to the shipper's rights, it sued the railroad subcontractor for the full loss amount. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, enforcing the covenant not to sue. The core reasoning was that subrogation passes only those rights the insured possessed, which were limited by the contractual terms in the bill of lading.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a class action labor dispute where employees sued their employer Brinderson for wage and hour violations under California law and sued Brinderson's oil refinery clients under Labor Code section 2810 for allegedly entering contracts that did not provide sufficient funds to comply with labor laws. The court granted the refinery defendants' motion to dismiss the section 2810 claim, finding that the plaintiffs' allegations were speculative and failed to plead facts showing the refineries knew or should have known the contracts lacked adequate funding, as required by the statute and the Twombly pleading standard. The court dismissed that claim without leave to amend and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims against Brinderson, resulting in dismissal of the entire action.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involves a claim by Vicki Benson for short-term disability benefits under an ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan insured by Continental Casualty Company after her multiple sclerosis diagnosis led to cessation of work. Following denial of benefits and a court remand to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to respond to an independent medical review report, the parties returned to court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court decided to grant the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees but reduced the compensable hours, cutting 0.1 hours from one attorney and 8.3 hours from another. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff was entitled to fees as the prevailing party, including for work on the administrative appeal after remand, but certain billed time was excessive or unreasonable under applicable standards.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involves Tokyo Keiso Co.'s claim that SMC Corp. infringed U.S. Patent No. 5,458,004, which covers a volume flow meter using acoustic signals through a plastic measuring line made of PFA to reduce signal interference from the tubing. SMC moved for summary judgment of invalidity on obviousness grounds, citing prior art such as the 1991 Urmson Patent (describing polymeric measuring lines that attenuate sound) and the 1986 Lynnworth Article (noting easier measurement in plastic pipes due to lower sound speed). The court granted SMC's motion, applying the Graham factors and finding that the claimed invention would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art, with secondary considerations like commercial success failing to rebut the prima facie case of obviousness. Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment of infringement was denied as moot.

business & regulatory

The case concerns Bappi Lahiri's claim that defendants infringed his copyright in the Indian song "Thoda Resham Logta Hai" by sampling it in the hip-hop track "Addictive." Lahiri composed the song for the 1981 film Jyoti under an agreement with producer Pramod Films, which later assigned rights to Saregama; both Lahiri and Saregama obtained U.S. copyright registrations and sued the defendants. The court granted defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment, ruling that Lahiri does not own the copyright. Under Section 17(b) of India's Copyright Act, the producer is the first owner of copyright in a cinematograph film (including its soundtrack) made for valuable consideration at the producer's instance, absent an agreement otherwise, and no such contrary agreement was shown here.

property

This case involved plaintiffs who purchased land in California containing a 1943 U.S. Army Air Force airplane crash site with munitions and sought to recover approximately $3.2 million in cleanup costs from the United States under CERCLA section 107, asserting innocent landowner status under sections 107(b)(3)(a) and 101(35). The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The decision turned on the finding that plaintiffs failed to qualify as innocent landowners because they actively moved contaminated soil from the 3,000-square-foot crash site to fill sites spanning over 16 acres during grading for development, constituting a "release" under the statute. The court reasoned that this active spreading meant the United States was not the sole cause of the release, consistent with precedents distinguishing active from passive conduct and CERCLA's strict liability approach that does not require knowledge of contamination.

environmentproperty