The case involved a dispute between ProMex, LLC and Yolanda Eustaquio, owners of the CREMA CUADRIDERMA trademark for an anti-itch skin cream, and Claudia Hernandez and Products Zapotol Corp., who produce a similar cream under the QUADRYDERN N.F. mark. Following a prior settlement agreement limiting the defendants' sales to Southern California, the plaintiffs sued for breach of contract and trademark violations after the defendants sold products outside that region, including to Fresno, California, and other states. The court determined that the defendants breached the agreement by making sales beyond the defined Southern California counties and awarded the plaintiffs nominal damages of one dollar, as evidence of actual damages based on the defendants' profits was deemed too speculative without proof of corresponding losses to the plaintiffs. The court declined to grant a nationwide injunction, enforcing the terms of the existing agreement instead.
In Haugen v. Marshall, the petitioner, serving a 25-years-to-life sentence for a 1980 first-degree felony murder conviction, challenged the California Governor's reversal of the Board of Parole Hearings' October 2006 suitability finding for parole. The U.S. District Court granted the petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, ordering that the petitioner's parole period be credited for time spent in unlawful confinement. The court adopted the magistrate judge's findings after de novo review, determining that the Governor's reliance on the commitment offense and discrepancies in the petitioner's acceptance of responsibility was unsupported by evidence and violated due process by failing to show an unreasonable public safety risk.
This case involves David Eng, a Deputy District Attorney employed by Los Angeles County since 1984, who brought claims against District Attorney Steve Cooley, other DAO officials including Curtis Hazell, Steve Sowders, and Curt Livesay, and the County itself. The claims arise from alleged retaliation connected to Eng's participation in the Belmont Task Force investigation of the LAUSD project, his recommendations against filing charges, his handling of a sexual harassment complaint, and subsequent denials of promotions and other employment actions. The court granted Hazell's motion for summary judgment on the first and third causes of action, granted the County's motion on the remaining claims in the third amended complaint, and denied the motion by Cooley, Sowders, and Livesay as to those remaining claims. The rulings were based on the absence of evidence linking certain defendants to adverse actions, statute of limitations issues, and the application of doctrines like continuing violations, while finding triable issues against some individual defendants.
In Moody v. Dexter, petitioner Jimmy Nathan Moody, convicted in 1990 of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and related firearm offenses in California state court, sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after exhausting multiple state post-conviction petitions filed between 1996 and 2008. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, dismissing the July 2008 federal petition as untimely. The core reasoning was that AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations from the finality of direct review (here, 1993), state habeas filings after significant unexplained delays did not toll the period, and neither newly discovered evidence nor due diligence exceptions applied to restart the clock.
This case involves a trademark dispute where Credit One Corporation, an auto finance company using the "Credit One" mark since the late 1990s, sued Credit One Financial and its national bank subsidiary, which hold federal registrations for "Credit One," "Credit One Bank," and "Credit One Financial" marks used in credit card services. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction alleging Lanham Act false designation and common law trademark infringement due to claimed consumer confusion from misdirected calls and payments. The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits because the defendants' registrations provide prima facie validity and evidence did not establish likely confusion. The court further found no showing of irreparable harm, that the balance of equities favored the defendants who had invested heavily in their marks, and that an injunction would not serve the public interest.
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by a California state prisoner who was convicted after a jury trial of attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, unlawful taking of a vehicle, and street terrorism, with findings that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and with premeditation and use of a deadly weapon, resulting in a sentence of 15 years to life plus a determinate term. The petitioner had unsuccessfully appealed his convictions through the state courts and filed a prior state habeas petition before bringing this federal action. The district court, after conducting a de novo review of the petition, records, and the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and noting that no objections were filed, adopted the recommendation in full and dismissed the action with prejudice. The core reasoning was that the claims lacked merit under the standards governing federal review of state convictions.