Hugh Henry Bownes

The case involved a habeas corpus petition by Thomas Meloon challenging his conviction under a New Hampshire statute (NH RSA 632:1 I(c)) that made it a class A felony for a male to have sexual intercourse with a female under fifteen who was not his wife. The U.S. District Court held the statute unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it discriminated on the basis of sex. The court applied an equal protection analysis under the standard from Reed v. Reed, finding that the law created disparate treatment by exposing only males to criminal liability while females faced no such risk for equivalent conduct, and that this classification lacked a fair and substantial relation to the legislation's objective. The court ordered the writ granted and Meloon's release, though execution was stayed pending possible appeal.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved a former employee suing his employer for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) after his discharge at age 43, along with related claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1988 alleging a conspiracy to violate civil rights; the plaintiff had filed administrative charges promptly but delayed filing a formal intent-to-sue letter until November 1975, over a year after his initial complaints. The court denied the motion to dismiss the ADEA claim, holding that the timely filing requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) is not strictly jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling, particularly where the Department of Labor failed to notify the plaintiff of the requirement and given the statute's remedial goals. It granted the motion to dismiss the § 1985(3) claim, reasoning that the complaint lacked allegations of racial discrimination, interference with interstate travel, or state action necessary to invoke Fourteenth Amendment protections under controlling precedent. The core analysis drew on statutory language, legislative history, and case law interpreting procedural requirements in employment discrimination statutes to favor access to relief absent clear contrary intent.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned a habeas corpus petition by an individual committed to the New Hampshire Hospital after a grand jury omitted an indictment for aggravated felonious sexual assault due to alleged insanity under NH RSA 651:8, followed by a superior court hearing under RSA 651:9 that addressed only dangerousness and resulted in life commitment. The petitioner argued that these procedures violated due process, equal protection, and the right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, while the state sought dismissal on grounds including failure to exhaust state remedies. The court examined the statutory scheme, noted the lack of requirements for medical testimony or observation before the grand jury and the limited scope of the committal hearing, and analyzed constitutional concerns such as the burden of proof on the committed person and differing release standards compared to civil commitments. It addressed exhaustion requirements and referenced precedents like Jackson v. Indiana in discussing equal protection issues.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, prisoner Laaman challenged his transfer from the New Hampshire State Prison to the federal system, alleging that the transfer was motivated by his activities as a prolific writ writer and would violate his right of access to the courts, and that he was entitled to a due process hearing on the transfer. The court first dismissed the due process claim, holding that state law does not guarantee confinement in any particular institution and that a voluntary hearing does not trigger constitutional requirements. On the access claim, the court found that while the transfer was partly sought due to Laaman's writ-writing activities, prison officials had established a substantial legitimate need for removal based on evidence of contraband in his cell, his role in disruptive leadership, and information linking him to a prison fire. The court therefore denied injunctive relief and permitted the transfer, while noting that Laaman must be returned to New Hampshire as needed for his ongoing cases.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case was a class-action civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by inmates at the New Hampshire State Prison challenging a broad range of living conditions and programs, including medical and mental health care, work and educational opportunities, visitation, mail, and the physical plant, initially arising from a prison lockup and search but expanding to a general attack on confinement conditions. The court dismissed several claims, such as challenges to the good-faith basis for the lockup itself, certain search and seizure issues that were severed, limited visitation as a First Amendment violation, and individual medical treatment claims that sounded only in tort. After trial and review of evidence on the homogeneous inmate population, inadequate facilities, idleness, and deficient services, the court found that the overall conditions violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The core reasoning was that the totality of circumstances demonstrated deliberate indifference to basic human needs and failed to provide minimally humane treatment consistent with constitutional standards.

civil rightscriminal law

The case involves Centronics Data Computer Corporation suing several foreign companies collectively referred to as Mannesmann for alleged violations of federal antitrust laws, interference with contractual relations, misappropriation of trade secrets, and defamation. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction in New Hampshire, improper venue under the antitrust statute, and insufficient service of process under the state's long-arm statutes. The court held that venue is proper in any district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) because all defendants are aliens, and also proper under § 1391(b) as the district where the claim arose due to alleged injury in New Hampshire. For jurisdiction, the court analyzed the New Hampshire long-arm statute (NH RSA 300:11(c)), noting it extends to constitutional limits and applying factors of reasonableness and fair play from prior precedent like Grappone, while referencing Restatement principles on effects within the state.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved the Secretary of Labor suing the Manchester East Catholic Regional School Board under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for allegedly discharging and refusing to rehire an employee due to her age. The defendant moved to dismiss, claiming it was not covered by the ADEA as it was not a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce." The court denied the motion, reasoning that the ADEA's definition of "affecting commerce" draws from broader statutes like the NLRA, extending coverage to the full scope of the Commerce Clause and thus including the school board.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfederal power

This case involved two national banks challenging the Comptroller of the Currency's approval of Keene National Bank's request to relocate its long-standing agency in Walpole, New Hampshire, from one location to another and to expand its services there. The court examined whether the agency qualified as a "branch" under the McFadden Act's grandfather clause in 12 U.S.C. § 36(a), which allows branches in operation before 1927 to continue. After reviewing the agency's history of continuous operation since 1872, including receiving deposits and making loans, the court found it constituted a branch that met the grandfather requirements. The court upheld the Comptroller's decision, determining that the agency qualified for relocation approval and that no special procedural hurdles applied to the expanded services for such grandfathered branches.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved three consolidated interpleader actions removed to federal court, in which the United States and the State of New Hampshire disputed priority over funds held by operators who collected but failed to remit meals and rooms taxes. The court held that the federal tax liens under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6323 had priority over the state's claimed liens under NH RSA 78-A, granting summary judgment to the United States in two actions while reserving the insolvency question in the third. Federal law governs lien priority, applying the "first in time, first in right" rule, which requires competing liens to be choate—meaning the lienor, property, and amount must be established—before the federal lien attaches. The state's implied lien failed this test because the operator's commingled funds did not identify the lienor, segregate property, or fix the amount until the state took further action. The court also ruled that attorneys' fees could not be paid from funds insufficient to satisfy the prior federal tax liens.

taxesfederal power

The case involved a long-running Chrysler-Plymouth dealership seeking a preliminary injunction in federal court after Chrysler attempted to end the franchise relationship. The dealership had repeatedly failed to meet sales quotas and other contractual obligations in 1975 and 1976. The court denied the injunction, holding that Chrysler had shown due cause for termination under New Hampshire RSA 357-B:4 III(c) and had complied with the statute's sixty-day written notice requirements via its July 9, 1976 letter, even though the prior term-sales agreement did not automatically expire. Because the plaintiff lacked a probability of success on the merits, the traditional equitable factors did not support injunctive relief.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved St. Mary's Bank, the first credit union organized in the United States, seeking a refund of federal income taxes paid after the IRS revoked its exempt status. The taxpayer claimed exemption under Section 501(c)(14)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code as a credit union, while the government argued it operated more like a commercial bank. The court held that the bank qualified as a credit union during the tax years in question because it was chartered with a common bond among members, operated on cooperative principles without a profit motive, and focused on member loans and services rather than general commercial banking. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff for the amount of taxes paid plus interest.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case is a class action civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by inmates in protective custody at the New Hampshire State Prison, who allege that their segregated housing conditions—including limited showers, recreation, library access, and out-of-cell time in the Annex—constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Defendants maintain that the restrictions are required for the inmates' security needs due to threats from the general population. The court reconsidered its prior ruling in a similar case, examined the factual conditions based on testimony and inspection, and analyzed whether the deprivations were justified by security rather than other factors such as budget, while noting the statutory purposes of the prison system.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case was a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by a student at the New Hampshire Technical Institute who was suspended after marijuana was found in his dormitory room. The plaintiff alleged that the evidence resulted from unconstitutional searches of his room by school staff on May 22 and 23, 1976, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that his disciplinary and appeal hearings lacked impartiality and procedural safeguards required by due process. The court reviewed the facts surrounding the searches conducted by a resident assistant and head resident without warrants or formal consent, the use of a passkey, and the subsequent disciplinary process chaired by school officials, while analyzing whether the exclusionary rule applies in school disciplinary hearings and what standards govern campus searches.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved Mary Pat King, a female applicant, suing the Hampton Beach Meter Patrol (a state agency) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for sex discrimination in its hiring decisions for seasonal positions over three years. The court found that the agency had discriminated against King based on sex in 1975 by refusing to hire her despite her qualifications, but not in 1974 or 1976, where other factors such as work history and application accuracy were determinative. It awarded King back pay damages of $832.30 for the lost wages in 1975 and 1976 (reasoning that a 1975 hire would have led to automatic rehire in 1976) plus $1,500 in attorneys' fees, after confirming that all EEOC procedural prerequisites under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e had been satisfied and that the scope of the lawsuit aligned with the agency's investigation.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved the U.S. Department of Labor alleging that New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc. and New Hampshire Trotting and Breeding Association, Inc. willfully violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to pay employees time-and-a-half for hours worked over forty per week in 1973 and 1974. The defendants claimed exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3) as an amusement or recreational establishment, arguing they operated as two separate establishments or alternatively satisfied the receipts test, and also asserted good faith and a two-year statute of limitations. The court found the operations constituted a single establishment based on shared facilities, ownership overlaps, and functional integration at Rockingham Park, narrowly construed the exemption which did not apply, rejected the good faith defense under applicable precedent, and determined the violations were willful because the defendants knew the FLSA was in play, triggering the three-year limitations period. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff on liability, with further proceedings on damages.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned a challenge by two mothers and their children to a New Hampshire welfare policy that denied Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and medical assistance to otherwise eligible children solely because a stepparent lived in the home after the recipient parent remarried. The plaintiffs argued that the policy violated the Social Security Act and federal regulations, as well as constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that New Hampshire law does not impose a support obligation on stepparents of general applicability equivalent to that of natural parents, because stepparent liability arises only when children are deemed "in need" and is not enforced in the same manner as for natural children in criminal or divorce contexts. Accordingly, the policy contravened 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a), and the court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs while permanently enjoining enforcement of the denial policy.

family lawfederal power

The case involved the Mont Vernon Preservation Society, a nonprofit environmental group, seeking preliminary injunctive and declaratory relief against federal and state highway officials to halt a project reconstructing a 0.85-mile section of Route 13 in Mont Vernon, New Hampshire, primarily alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The court addressed whether the project constituted a "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," requiring an environmental impact statement. It denied the motion for preliminary relief, finding that the project's impacts, including road widening, tree removal, and minor changes to sidewalks and drainage, were not significant enough to trigger NEPA requirements, as the road was in poor condition needing safety improvements and the reconstruction would not substantially alter land use or the village's character. The court also ruled that the plaintiff's late attempt to amend the complaint to add a claim under 23 U.S.C. § 128 would not be considered for the preliminary motion, and excluded untimely affidavits from evidence.

environmentprocedure

This diversity case concerns a plaintiff's claims that the defendant's oral contraceptive C-Quens caused optic nerve hemorrhages resulting in her legal blindness; she asserted counts for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. The defendant moved for summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds under New Hampshire law. The court held that the state's discovery rule for malpractice applies to drug products-liability actions and, after reviewing the evidence, found that the plaintiff neither knew nor reasonably should have known of the causal connection before the limitations cutoff, so her tort claims were timely. It further ruled that the separate breach-of-warranty count was time-barred by the four-year UCC statute because the last purchase occurred more than four years before suit. Summary judgment was therefore denied on the tort counts and granted on the warranty count.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

This case involves Jehovah's Witnesses George and Maxine Maynard who covered the state motto "Live Free or Die" on their New Hampshire license plates due to religious and political objections, leading to multiple arrests and convictions under NHRSA 262:27-c for obscuring the motto. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, while the state argued for equitable restraint under Younger v. Harris and asserted interests in promoting the motto and vehicle identification. The three-judge court rejected the Younger doctrine's application because the plaintiffs sought relief only from future prosecutions rather than interfering with ongoing state proceedings. It determined that covering the motto constituted protected symbolic speech under the First Amendment, as the act conveyed a message likely to be understood, and applied the O'Brien test to find that the state's justifications did not sufficiently outweigh the interference with protected expression.

free speechreligious libertycivil rights

The case concerned a challenge by a pregnant woman denied general assistance benefits by the Town of Raymond, New Hampshire, under RSA 165:1, on the grounds that the town administered the program without any written or objective eligibility standards, violating her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. The court held that due process requires local officials to promulgate and apply written, ascertainable standards when deciding general assistance claims. It reasoned that applicants have a protected property interest in such benefits, that the lack of standards prevents meaningful notice and fair administration, and that procedural and substantive due process principles from cases like Goldberg v. Kelly and Board of Regents v. Roth therefore compel written criteria even for this locally administered welfare program.

civil rights