The case involved a habeas corpus petition by Thomas Meloon challenging his conviction under a New Hampshire statute (NH RSA 632:1 I(c)) that made it a class A felony for a male to have sexual intercourse with a female under fifteen who was not his wife. The U.S. District Court held the statute unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it discriminated on the basis of sex. The court applied an equal protection analysis under the standard from Reed v. Reed, finding that the law created disparate treatment by exposing only males to criminal liability while females faced no such risk for equivalent conduct, and that this classification lacked a fair and substantial relation to the legislation's objective. The court ordered the writ granted and Meloon's release, though execution was stayed pending possible appeal.
The case involved a former employee suing his employer for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) after his discharge at age 43, along with related claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1988 alleging a conspiracy to violate civil rights; the plaintiff had filed administrative charges promptly but delayed filing a formal intent-to-sue letter until November 1975, over a year after his initial complaints. The court denied the motion to dismiss the ADEA claim, holding that the timely filing requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) is not strictly jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling, particularly where the Department of Labor failed to notify the plaintiff of the requirement and given the statute's remedial goals. It granted the motion to dismiss the § 1985(3) claim, reasoning that the complaint lacked allegations of racial discrimination, interference with interstate travel, or state action necessary to invoke Fourteenth Amendment protections under controlling precedent. The core analysis drew on statutory language, legislative history, and case law interpreting procedural requirements in employment discrimination statutes to favor access to relief absent clear contrary intent.
The case concerned a habeas corpus petition by an individual committed to the New Hampshire Hospital after a grand jury omitted an indictment for aggravated felonious sexual assault due to alleged insanity under NH RSA 651:8, followed by a superior court hearing under RSA 651:9 that addressed only dangerousness and resulted in life commitment. The petitioner argued that these procedures violated due process, equal protection, and the right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, while the state sought dismissal on grounds including failure to exhaust state remedies. The court examined the statutory scheme, noted the lack of requirements for medical testimony or observation before the grand jury and the limited scope of the committal hearing, and analyzed constitutional concerns such as the burden of proof on the committed person and differing release standards compared to civil commitments. It addressed exhaustion requirements and referenced precedents like Jackson v. Indiana in discussing equal protection issues.
In this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, prisoner Laaman challenged his transfer from the New Hampshire State Prison to the federal system, alleging that the transfer was motivated by his activities as a prolific writ writer and would violate his right of access to the courts, and that he was entitled to a due process hearing on the transfer. The court first dismissed the due process claim, holding that state law does not guarantee confinement in any particular institution and that a voluntary hearing does not trigger constitutional requirements. On the access claim, the court found that while the transfer was partly sought due to Laaman's writ-writing activities, prison officials had established a substantial legitimate need for removal based on evidence of contraband in his cell, his role in disruptive leadership, and information linking him to a prison fire. The court therefore denied injunctive relief and permitted the transfer, while noting that Laaman must be returned to New Hampshire as needed for his ongoing cases.
This case was a class-action civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by inmates at the New Hampshire State Prison challenging a broad range of living conditions and programs, including medical and mental health care, work and educational opportunities, visitation, mail, and the physical plant, initially arising from a prison lockup and search but expanding to a general attack on confinement conditions. The court dismissed several claims, such as challenges to the good-faith basis for the lockup itself, certain search and seizure issues that were severed, limited visitation as a First Amendment violation, and individual medical treatment claims that sounded only in tort. After trial and review of evidence on the homogeneous inmate population, inadequate facilities, idleness, and deficient services, the court found that the overall conditions violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The core reasoning was that the totality of circumstances demonstrated deliberate indifference to basic human needs and failed to provide minimally humane treatment consistent with constitutional standards.
The case involves Centronics Data Computer Corporation suing several foreign companies collectively referred to as Mannesmann for alleged violations of federal antitrust laws, interference with contractual relations, misappropriation of trade secrets, and defamation. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction in New Hampshire, improper venue under the antitrust statute, and insufficient service of process under the state's long-arm statutes. The court held that venue is proper in any district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) because all defendants are aliens, and also proper under § 1391(b) as the district where the claim arose due to alleged injury in New Hampshire. For jurisdiction, the court analyzed the New Hampshire long-arm statute (NH RSA 300:11(c)), noting it extends to constitutional limits and applying factors of reasonableness and fair play from prior precedent like Grappone, while referencing Restatement principles on effects within the state.