Frank DeArmon Whitney

In this case, pro se plaintiffs Thomas Gregory Sanderlin and Laura Denise Bradshaw sought a temporary restraining order to halt the foreclosure sale of their North Carolina property, alleging that the defendant law firm and others lacked standing as real parties in interest under state mortgage law. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted the plaintiffs' request to proceed in forma pauperis but denied the TRO and dismissed the complaint sua sponte. The court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the claims arose under state law regarding the validity of notes and deeds of trust, without implicating federal statutes or presenting a substantial federal question, and complete diversity of citizenship was absent since the plaintiffs and one defendant were all North Carolina citizens. Plaintiffs were directed to pursue any remedies in state court under North Carolina foreclosure statutes.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a plaintiff with mobility disabilities who sued a shopping center under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for alleged accessibility barriers in its parking lot, entrances, and restrooms. The plaintiff, who acts as an ADA "tester," claimed to visit the area periodically but provided no specific plans to return to the shopping center. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff lacked standing under Article III because he failed to demonstrate a concrete and imminent injury-in-fact. The reasoning centered on the lack of particularized harm, as the plaintiff's intent to return was speculative and not sufficiently imminent.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involves a dispute between Celanese Acetate, LLC, a Delaware company supplying materials for cigarette filters, and Lexcor, Ltd., a Hong Kong company that served as its sales representative in China, regarding whether Lexcor was entitled to further commission payments after the termination of their agreements. Celanese sought a declaratory judgment in the Western District of North Carolina, and Lexcor moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, contending that the forum-selection clause in the original 1999 Agreement did not apply to the subsequent month-to-month arrangement and that minimum contacts were lacking. The court denied the motion to dismiss, finding the forum-selection clause valid and enforceable. It reasoned that the clause continued to govern the parties' ongoing relationship after the formal agreements expired because they operated month-to-month under the prior terms without clearly indicating otherwise, thereby waiving objections to personal jurisdiction.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves an insurance company's federal declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that its business liability policy does not cover a wrongful death claim arising from a 2007 Kawasaki vehicle accident, where the underlying state court suit alleged the insured was not engaged in business activities at the time. The defendant moved to dismiss on grounds of federalism, comity, and efficiency, arguing the issues should be resolved in the parallel North Carolina state proceeding, or alternatively to join USAA, the insurer under the defendant's homeowners policy. The court denied the motion to dismiss and retained jurisdiction after applying the Fourth Circuit's Nautilus factors, finding that the coverage dispute involved only routine application of settled state contract law rather than novel or complex questions, with no risk of entanglement or procedural fencing. It granted the joinder motion because USAA has a direct interest in the coverage determination and the two policies potentially apply to the same incident.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In United States v. Coxton, victims (family members of a deceased individual connected to the underlying drug and gun charges) sought a court order granting them access to specific sections of the defendant's sealed presentence report, including background facts, restitution details, sentencing guidelines calculations, and upward departure analysis, prior to sentencing. They argued that the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, implicitly entitled them to this information to exercise their rights to be heard at sentencing and to obtain full restitution. The district court denied the motion, holding that presentence reports are confidential documents subject to a strong presumption against disclosure to third parties under 18 U.S.C. § 3552(d), Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, and Fourth Circuit precedent such as In re Brock. The court found that the CVRA does not override this presumption or require disclosure, as the victims' statutory rights could be satisfied without access to the report, and both the government and defendant opposed release.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case is a Lanham Act trademark infringement action brought by NASCAR against unidentified defendants alleged to be producing and selling counterfeit merchandise. The court previously granted an ex parte temporary restraining order, seizure order, and preliminary injunction authorizing the seizure of counterfeit goods near NASCAR events. In this order, the court addresses the procedures for disposing of the seized goods, requiring that a Lanham Act violation be established and that notice of potential forfeiture be given to all interested parties, including unknown defendants, via publication on the NASCAR website and compliance with the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions to satisfy due process. The court sets deadlines for claimants to file claims and answers to contest forfeiture before any destruction of the goods under 15 U.S.C. § 1118.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a North Carolina distributor suing a German manufacturer for breach of an exclusive supply agreement for bicycle performance devices, along with related claims of unfair trade practices, fraud, conversion, open account, and account stated, after the defendant terminated the contract and allegedly failed to repair defective products or honor exclusivity. The defendant removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3), citing a forum-selection clause designating Mörfelden-Walldorf, Germany, as the exclusive venue along with German law. The court granted the motion in part by dismissing the contract, unfair trade practices, fraud, and conversion claims, finding the clause mandatory and enforceable under federal and German law precedents, but denied it in part by remanding the open account and account stated claims to North Carolina state court as they fell outside the clause's scope.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether defendants timely removed an employment lawsuit from North Carolina state court to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Plaintiff Riggs had filed an Application and Order to Extend Time to File Complaint in state court that described claims for wrongful termination, retaliation, and violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and he argued that the removal clock started when defendants were served with those documents rather than the later-filed complaint. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that the thirty-day removal period is triggered by formal service of the summons and complaint, consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. The Applications and Orders did not qualify as the initial pleading that starts the removal deadline, and defendants' notice of removal was therefore timely.

procedurelabor & employment

This case involves a law firm's motion to quash a grand jury subpoena seeking testimony and documents from an attorney about a client. The court denied the motion in full. It ruled that service on a shareholder-member of the firm was effective because he qualified as a general agent under federal criminal procedure. The court further held that North Carolina Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 authorizes disclosure of confidential information when required by law, including a grand jury subpoena, and that federal prosecutors need not first demonstrate compliance with Rule 3.8(e) before the subpoena can be enforced; any privilege claims must instead be promptly raised for in-camera review under federal common law standards.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a defendant's motion for bond pending sentencing after pleading guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court denied the motion, ruling that the offense qualifies as a crime of violence under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), which triggers mandatory detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) for a defendant found guilty and awaiting sentencing. Acceptance of the guilty plea by a magistrate judge was deemed sufficient to satisfy the "found guilty" requirement, and the defendant did not meet the statutory exceptions for release. The court also noted the defendant's extensive history of failing to appear and violating court orders as an independent basis for detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).

criminal lawgunsprocedure