In this case, pro se plaintiffs Thomas Gregory Sanderlin and Laura Denise Bradshaw sought a temporary restraining order to halt the foreclosure sale of their North Carolina property, alleging that the defendant law firm and others lacked standing as real parties in interest under state mortgage law. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted the plaintiffs' request to proceed in forma pauperis but denied the TRO and dismissed the complaint sua sponte. The court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the claims arose under state law regarding the validity of notes and deeds of trust, without implicating federal statutes or presenting a substantial federal question, and complete diversity of citizenship was absent since the plaintiffs and one defendant were all North Carolina citizens. Plaintiffs were directed to pursue any remedies in state court under North Carolina foreclosure statutes.
This case involved a plaintiff with mobility disabilities who sued a shopping center under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for alleged accessibility barriers in its parking lot, entrances, and restrooms. The plaintiff, who acts as an ADA "tester," claimed to visit the area periodically but provided no specific plans to return to the shopping center. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff lacked standing under Article III because he failed to demonstrate a concrete and imminent injury-in-fact. The reasoning centered on the lack of particularized harm, as the plaintiff's intent to return was speculative and not sufficiently imminent.
This case involves a dispute between Celanese Acetate, LLC, a Delaware company supplying materials for cigarette filters, and Lexcor, Ltd., a Hong Kong company that served as its sales representative in China, regarding whether Lexcor was entitled to further commission payments after the termination of their agreements. Celanese sought a declaratory judgment in the Western District of North Carolina, and Lexcor moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, contending that the forum-selection clause in the original 1999 Agreement did not apply to the subsequent month-to-month arrangement and that minimum contacts were lacking. The court denied the motion to dismiss, finding the forum-selection clause valid and enforceable. It reasoned that the clause continued to govern the parties' ongoing relationship after the formal agreements expired because they operated month-to-month under the prior terms without clearly indicating otherwise, thereby waiving objections to personal jurisdiction.
This case involves an insurance company's federal declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that its business liability policy does not cover a wrongful death claim arising from a 2007 Kawasaki vehicle accident, where the underlying state court suit alleged the insured was not engaged in business activities at the time. The defendant moved to dismiss on grounds of federalism, comity, and efficiency, arguing the issues should be resolved in the parallel North Carolina state proceeding, or alternatively to join USAA, the insurer under the defendant's homeowners policy. The court denied the motion to dismiss and retained jurisdiction after applying the Fourth Circuit's Nautilus factors, finding that the coverage dispute involved only routine application of settled state contract law rather than novel or complex questions, with no risk of entanglement or procedural fencing. It granted the joinder motion because USAA has a direct interest in the coverage determination and the two policies potentially apply to the same incident.
In United States v. Coxton, victims (family members of a deceased individual connected to the underlying drug and gun charges) sought a court order granting them access to specific sections of the defendant's sealed presentence report, including background facts, restitution details, sentencing guidelines calculations, and upward departure analysis, prior to sentencing. They argued that the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, implicitly entitled them to this information to exercise their rights to be heard at sentencing and to obtain full restitution. The district court denied the motion, holding that presentence reports are confidential documents subject to a strong presumption against disclosure to third parties under 18 U.S.C. § 3552(d), Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, and Fourth Circuit precedent such as In re Brock. The court found that the CVRA does not override this presumption or require disclosure, as the victims' statutory rights could be satisfied without access to the report, and both the government and defendant opposed release.
This case is a Lanham Act trademark infringement action brought by NASCAR against unidentified defendants alleged to be producing and selling counterfeit merchandise. The court previously granted an ex parte temporary restraining order, seizure order, and preliminary injunction authorizing the seizure of counterfeit goods near NASCAR events. In this order, the court addresses the procedures for disposing of the seized goods, requiring that a Lanham Act violation be established and that notice of potential forfeiture be given to all interested parties, including unknown defendants, via publication on the NASCAR website and compliance with the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions to satisfy due process. The court sets deadlines for claimants to file claims and answers to contest forfeiture before any destruction of the goods under 15 U.S.C. § 1118.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Affiliations
District Court, W.D. North Carolina — appointed by George W. Bush
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