Reggie B. Walton

The Heritage Foundation and its executive director sued the Department of Justice under FOIA to obtain records that Attorney General Merrick Garland relied on when making public statements to Congress and the media asserting that U.S. Attorney David Weiss had full, independent authority over the Hunter Biden investigation. DOJ initially rejected the request as insufficiently specific, then interpreted it to cover preparation materials for the cited hearings and press conferences, searched the Office of Legislative Affairs, Office of Public Affairs, and Office of the Attorney General, and released 671 pages in whole or part while withholding 82 pages under FOIA Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted DOJ’s motion in part and denied it without prejudice in part, held the plaintiffs’ cross-motion in abeyance in part and denied it in part, after finding that DOJ had reasonably construed the request and conducted an adequate search but that further review was needed on certain withholdings.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

The case involves Guled Hassan Duran, a Guantanamo Bay detainee since 2006, who filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the legal and factual basis for his continued detention without charge. The pending motions concerned the petitioner's requests for additional discovery of exculpatory evidence and circumstances surrounding statements by other detainees that the government relied upon in its Factual Return, along with a motion to compel a classified deposition of former CIA officer Glenn Carle; the government opposed and sought an exception from disclosure under the Case Management Order. The court denied the petitioner's discovery motion and motion to compel the deposition, while granting the government's motion for an exception from disclosure. It reasoned that habeas discovery is limited by the CMO and requires a showing that classified information is relevant and material (at least helpful to the petitioner's case), necessary for the court's meaningful review, and that no effective substitute exists, standards not met here after in camera review of ex parte submissions; the government had also withdrawn reliance on certain contested evidence.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Franklin Osvaldo Rubio, a Hispanic/Latino male of Salvadoran origin employed as a systems administrator, who sued his former employer, Credence Management Solutions, LLC, alleging Title VII violations for race and national origin discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation; wrongful termination under the D.C. Human Rights Act; and common-law defamation based on statements about his performance and post-termination instructions not to contact him. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s allegations described general unfair treatment, stricter standards, and performance criticisms without plausible facts linking them to his protected characteristics or showing that any complaints constituted protected activity under Title VII. It further held that the defamation claims failed because the statements were either non-actionable opinions, not shown to be false, or lacked supporting factual allegations of falsity despite the plaintiff’s conclusory assertions.

civil rightslabor & employmenttorts & liability

In this case, 9878866 Canada Inc. sued Intake Breathing Technology, LLC for unfair competition and false advertising under the Lanham Act and D.C. law, while seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of Intake’s U.S. Patent No. 9,510,969 for a magnetic nasal strip device; Intake counterclaimed for patent infringement and moved for a preliminary injunction to halt sales of the competing product. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the preliminary injunction, barring the plaintiff from offering for sale, selling, importing, or using its accused nasal adhesive product during the litigation. The court found that Intake was likely to succeed on the merits of its infringement claim, would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest supported the injunction, after also determining that Intake had substantially complied with pre-motion conferral requirements.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involves Barry Ahuruonye, a former Grants Management Specialist at the Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service, who sued the Department and its Secretary under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. He alleged discrimination and retaliation tied to his 2012 termination, a subsequent settlement agreement, performance management, and his EEO activity. The district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. It dismissed the Title VII claims against the Department itself (as only the agency head is a proper defendant) and certain retaliation claims based on the processing of administrative complaints, finding those actions were not materially adverse. However, the court allowed one component of the retaliation claim to proceed, concluding that a supervisor’s questioning of the plaintiff about his EEO complaint during a performance meeting could plausibly deter protected activity under the standard set in Burlington Northern.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involves a lawsuit by Schyla Pondexter-Moore, a public housing resident at Highland Dwellings, against the District of Columbia Housing Authority and related defendants. She alleged that the installation of surveillance cameras and related equipment violated her Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches, her procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, her First Amendment rights, and District of Columbia common law on intrusion upon seclusion. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). It dismissed the First Amendment claim for lack of jurisdiction, the “mosaic theory” Fourth Amendment claim, the substantive due process claim, and portions of the procedural due process claim tied to freedom of movement, association, tenancy, and physical intrusions, while allowing the core Fourth Amendment claim, the common-law tort claim, and the remaining procedural due process components (based on property and privacy interests) to proceed. The court reasoned that certain claims failed to meet jurisdictional or pleading requirements under established constitutional and procedural standards, whereas others sufficiently alleged violations of protected interests to survive dismissal at this stage.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a FOIA lawsuit by Protect the Public’s Trust against the National Labor Relations Board seeking disclosure of an ethics memorandum concerning Board members Gwynne Wilcox and David Prouty’s participation in matters potentially implicating conflicts with their former employers or clients, arising from disputes over the Board’s joint-employer standards and the 2018 Hy-Brand decision. The court granted the NLRB’s renewed motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion, holding that the agency properly withheld the memorandum. The court reasoned that the document was protected in full by FOIA Exemption 5 under the attorney work-product privilege because it was prepared in anticipation of litigation, the Board adequately showed foreseeable harm from disclosure, and no segregation of non-privileged material was required even assuming the memo constituted final agency opinion or working law.

labor & employmentprocedurebusiness & regulatoryfederal power

Ten Black female Metropolitan Police Department officers sued the District of Columbia, alleging race discrimination (including disparate treatment, disparate impact, hostile work environment, and retaliation), age and disability discrimination, whistleblower retaliation, and violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act under Title VII, the D.C. Human Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 via § 1983, the ADEA, the ADA, the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act, and related statutes. The District filed a partial motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint or, alternatively, for partial summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. It dismissed or granted judgment on many individual claims but allowed certain race discrimination claims under § 1981/1983 to proceed, finding the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged municipal liability based on MPD Equal Employment Opportunity office policies and practices that could support an equal protection or contractual violation.

civil rightslabor & employment

Karen Hylton sued the District of Columbia Office of Risk Management, Mayor Muriel Bowser, the U.S. Marshals Service, and her landlord WC Smith, alleging that her May 2025 eviction violated D.C. Code § 42-3505.01 because it occurred during rain, that Marshals used excessive force, and that she lost personal property as a result, seeking over $112 million in damages. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against the U.S. Marshals Service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity. It dismissed the claims against the District defendants under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, reasoning that the U.S. Marshals Service—not D.C. officials—executes evictions under D.C. Code § 13-302 and is a federal entity outside District control, so the plaintiff alleged no actionable conduct by those defendants. The court then remanded the remaining wrongful-eviction claim against WC Smith to D.C. Superior Court, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the purely state-law issue once all federal claims were resolved.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedureproperty

Emerson Bradley sued the U.S. Department of Education under the Privacy Act, alleging that the agency violated the statute by processing twelve fraudulent Federal Direct PLUS loan applications his father submitted in his name as endorser between 2012 and 2020, despite multiple red flags of identity theft, and by later reporting the resulting balances to credit agencies. The district court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the entire action. It held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10) because the identity theft was committed by his father before any agency involvement, and that the disclosure claim under § 552a(b) failed because the agency reasonably relied on signed Endorser Addendums authorizing credit reporting and therefore did not willfully or intentionally violate the Act. The court also dismissed remaining claims on grounds including sovereign immunity.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

Edward Lee Morgan, Sr., an African American EMT employed by the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department since 1987, sued the District, Mayor Muriel Bowser, FEMS, and FEMS Chief John Donnelly after his termination for failing to obtain NREMT recertification. He alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, as well as claims under the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act, Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act, and Human Rights Act, asserting procedural irregularities and discriminatory treatment in the recertification and termination process. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims against the individual defendants and FEMS, dismissed the constitutional claims, dismissed the CMPA claim, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining DCAPA claims. The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to exhaust required administrative remedies under the CMPA, that the constitutional claims were not viable in federal court under the circumstances, and that once the federal claims were dismissed, principles of comity counseled against retaining jurisdiction over the local-law claims.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

In Ewoudou v. Scott, a Cameroonian plaintiff who arrived in the U.S. on an F-1 visa sued the Director of USCIS and other federal officials under the Mandamus Act and Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that the agency’s multi-year delay in adjudicating his December 2021 asylum application (Form I-589) was unreasonable and seeking to compel a decision. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Applying the six TRAC factors, the court determined that the delay was not yet unreasonable because INA timelines are not mandatory, precedent supported longer asylum backlogs, the plaintiff alleged no agency bad faith, and his claimed harms (stress, career interference, and inability to sponsor family or travel) did not outweigh agency resource priorities.

immigrationfederal powerprocedure

In *Hinge v. Lyons*, an Indian national on an F-1 student visa sued the Acting Director of ICE under the Administrative Procedure Act after the agency terminated his SEVIS record without notice in April 2025, citing a dismissed reckless driving charge. The termination ended his lawful student status, preventing him from continuing his PhD studies. ICE moved to dismiss the case as moot after reinstating the record, claiming it had no plans to terminate it again based on the same information. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion, holding that the agency’s assurances were insufficient to eliminate the possibility of future termination without additional process, leaving the plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief unresolved.

immigrationprocedurefederal power

The case involved E. Montrez Nicholson, an African-American female Senior Procurement Analyst at the General Services Administration, who sued the agency under Title VII alleging that her supervisor created a race-based hostile work environment and retaliated against her after she engaged in protected activity. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing the hostile work environment claim while allowing the retaliation claim to proceed. It reasoned that the plaintiff had adequately alleged a pattern of antagonism, including negative performance reviews, denial of a detail, and division restructuring, that was plausibly linked to her protected activity and thus sufficient to survive dismissal at this stage.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

Olha Noha sued Washington Dulles International Airport, its police department, and the airport authority’s president and CEO, claiming she was unfairly banned from the airport for repeated after-hours trespassing and that the ban was humiliating, discriminatory, violated her civil rights, and was unlawful because local trespass laws did not apply; she sought $6 million in damages. The defendants moved to dismiss for improper venue under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). The court found that all events giving rise to the claims occurred in Dulles, Virginia, so venue lay in the Eastern District of Virginia rather than the District of Columbia, and that Noha had not opposed the motions, had not updated her address as required, and had ceased participating in the case after September 2025. Because she showed no intent to prosecute the action, the court dismissed the case without prejudice instead of transferring it.

civil rightsprocedurecriminal law

Olha Noha, proceeding pro se, sued Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, one of its police officers, and its manager, alleging that airport police questioned her about her immigration status and activities while she was at the airport in December 2024, issued a barring order against her, and later arrested her for trespass when she returned, for which she sought $3 million in damages. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and dismissed the case without prejudice. The court found venue improper in the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the defendants do not all reside in the same state and none of the events giving rise to the claims occurred there; instead, all relevant events took place at Reagan National and in Arlington County, Virginia. Although transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia is the usual remedy for improper venue, the court dismissed rather than transferred the case because Noha had not opposed the motion, failed to update her address after mail was returned undeliverable, and had taken no action in the case for months.

immigrationcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Barati Almas, a Black woman employed as an accounting manager at defendant Ad Hoc LLC, who alleged that after the company acquired her prior employer, she received lower pay, no retention bonus, and no promotion compared to two male program managers with substantially similar job duties and responsibilities, in violation of the Equal Pay Act and D.C. Human Rights Act. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a prima facie case by describing comparable roles involving similar skill, effort, and responsibility. The court reasoned that identical job titles or duties are not required at the pleading stage, and distinctions such as different departments or titles could be addressed with further evidence later, rather than warranting dismissal now.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involves three plaintiffs suing Uber Technologies, Inc., related companies, and an Uber driver for negligence and negligent hiring, training, and supervision after an automobile collision allegedly caused by the driver. The Uber defendants moved to compel arbitration under their Terms of Use and to dismiss the claims. The court granted the motion to compel arbitration as to plaintiffs Umstead and Fontaine because they had created Uber accounts and affirmatively clicked checkboxes agreeing to the updated Terms of Use (including the arbitration provision) in December 2021, but denied it as to plaintiff Nicoletti, who had no Uber account and thus no arbitration agreement. The court denied the motion to dismiss, stayed all proceedings involving Umstead and Fontaine pending arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, and allowed Nicoletti’s claims to proceed.

torts & liabilityprocedure

Whitney Ward, an African American woman employed as a Fire Investigator with the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services since 2006, sued the District under Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act. She alleged race- and gender-based discrimination, a gender-based hostile work environment, and retaliation, primarily based on inappropriate comments and conduct by a coworker, Scott Ford, that began with a 2013 remark and intensified after he became her supervisor in 2022. The court granted in part and denied in part the District’s motion to dismiss. It dismissed the retaliation claims, finding no sufficient causal connection because the alleged hostile conduct largely predated Ward’s protected activity and showed no escalation tied to her complaints, and because she failed to allege facts linking her protected activity to a later promotion and transfer decision. The discrimination and hostile work environment claims were allowed to proceed.

civil rightslabor & employment

Larry Klayman, an attorney proceeding pro se, sued the D.C. Office of Disciplinary Counsel and its members, the Board on Professional Responsibility and its members, and the law firm Lathrop GPM LLP along with one of its attorneys. He alleged that the defendants tortiously interfered with his business relationships by notifying other jurisdictions of his D.C. disciplinary proceedings and violated his equal protection rights through selective, politically motivated prosecution. This was not Klayman’s first lawsuit raising these claims; the D.C. Circuit had already ruled in a prior related case that the ODC defendants enjoy absolute immunity from damages claims for their disciplinary actions. The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss all claims, granted the ODC defendants’ request for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for repeatedly litigating the same rejected theories, and denied Klayman’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, concluding that absolute immunity barred the core claims and that further amendment would be futile.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability