The Heritage Foundation and its executive director sued the Department of Justice under FOIA to obtain records that Attorney General Merrick Garland relied on when making public statements to Congress and the media asserting that U.S. Attorney David Weiss had full, independent authority over the Hunter Biden investigation. DOJ initially rejected the request as insufficiently specific, then interpreted it to cover preparation materials for the cited hearings and press conferences, searched the Office of Legislative Affairs, Office of Public Affairs, and Office of the Attorney General, and released 671 pages in whole or part while withholding 82 pages under FOIA Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted DOJ’s motion in part and denied it without prejudice in part, held the plaintiffs’ cross-motion in abeyance in part and denied it in part, after finding that DOJ had reasonably construed the request and conducted an adequate search but that further review was needed on certain withholdings.
The case involves Guled Hassan Duran, a Guantanamo Bay detainee since 2006, who filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the legal and factual basis for his continued detention without charge. The pending motions concerned the petitioner's requests for additional discovery of exculpatory evidence and circumstances surrounding statements by other detainees that the government relied upon in its Factual Return, along with a motion to compel a classified deposition of former CIA officer Glenn Carle; the government opposed and sought an exception from disclosure under the Case Management Order. The court denied the petitioner's discovery motion and motion to compel the deposition, while granting the government's motion for an exception from disclosure. It reasoned that habeas discovery is limited by the CMO and requires a showing that classified information is relevant and material (at least helpful to the petitioner's case), necessary for the court's meaningful review, and that no effective substitute exists, standards not met here after in camera review of ex parte submissions; the government had also withdrawn reliance on certain contested evidence.
The case involved plaintiff Franklin Osvaldo Rubio, a Hispanic/Latino male of Salvadoran origin employed as a systems administrator, who sued his former employer, Credence Management Solutions, LLC, alleging Title VII violations for race and national origin discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation; wrongful termination under the D.C. Human Rights Act; and common-law defamation based on statements about his performance and post-termination instructions not to contact him. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s allegations described general unfair treatment, stricter standards, and performance criticisms without plausible facts linking them to his protected characteristics or showing that any complaints constituted protected activity under Title VII. It further held that the defamation claims failed because the statements were either non-actionable opinions, not shown to be false, or lacked supporting factual allegations of falsity despite the plaintiff’s conclusory assertions.
In this case, 9878866 Canada Inc. sued Intake Breathing Technology, LLC for unfair competition and false advertising under the Lanham Act and D.C. law, while seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of Intake’s U.S. Patent No. 9,510,969 for a magnetic nasal strip device; Intake counterclaimed for patent infringement and moved for a preliminary injunction to halt sales of the competing product. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the preliminary injunction, barring the plaintiff from offering for sale, selling, importing, or using its accused nasal adhesive product during the litigation. The court found that Intake was likely to succeed on the merits of its infringement claim, would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest supported the injunction, after also determining that Intake had substantially complied with pre-motion conferral requirements.
The case involves Barry Ahuruonye, a former Grants Management Specialist at the Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service, who sued the Department and its Secretary under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. He alleged discrimination and retaliation tied to his 2012 termination, a subsequent settlement agreement, performance management, and his EEO activity. The district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. It dismissed the Title VII claims against the Department itself (as only the agency head is a proper defendant) and certain retaliation claims based on the processing of administrative complaints, finding those actions were not materially adverse. However, the court allowed one component of the retaliation claim to proceed, concluding that a supervisor’s questioning of the plaintiff about his EEO complaint during a performance meeting could plausibly deter protected activity under the standard set in Burlington Northern.
The case involves a lawsuit by Schyla Pondexter-Moore, a public housing resident at Highland Dwellings, against the District of Columbia Housing Authority and related defendants. She alleged that the installation of surveillance cameras and related equipment violated her Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches, her procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, her First Amendment rights, and District of Columbia common law on intrusion upon seclusion. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). It dismissed the First Amendment claim for lack of jurisdiction, the “mosaic theory” Fourth Amendment claim, the substantive due process claim, and portions of the procedural due process claim tied to freedom of movement, association, tenancy, and physical intrusions, while allowing the core Fourth Amendment claim, the common-law tort claim, and the remaining procedural due process components (based on property and privacy interests) to proceed. The court reasoned that certain claims failed to meet jurisdictional or pleading requirements under established constitutional and procedural standards, whereas others sufficiently alleged violations of protected interests to survive dismissal at this stage.
