In Brown v. CitiMortgage, Inc., plaintiffs alleged that Citi violated the Truth-in-Lending Act by failing to provide timely notice after a mortgage assignment and sought only statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). Citi moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g) requires proof of actual damages. The court denied the motion, holding that the statute expressly permits recovery of statutory damages (twice the finance charge, subject to a $400-$4,000 range) in addition to or instead of actual damages. The court reasoned that the plain text of § 1640(a), supported by Eleventh Circuit precedent, allows statutory damages irrespective of actual damages or the amount of any finance charge incurred.
The case involved a pro se plaintiff who sued Western Express and Southern Refrigeration alleging race and age discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA, stemming from his 2008 termination for alleged falsification of an employment application related to a drug test and the dissemination of negative employment references in 2010 that prevented him from being hired by other trucking companies. After a status hearing where the plaintiff indicated a desire to dismiss his claims, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal, finding both voluntary dismissal and failure to state a claim, including lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies for the discriminatory discharge claims. The district court adopted the recommendation in full as its opinion, resulting in dismissal of all claims against the defendants.
This case involves federal criminal charges against a defendant located in Louisiana for operating an internet bookmaking operation, including using interstate facilities to promote unlawful gambling under 18 U.S.C. § 1952, transmitting betting information via wire under 18 U.S.C. § 1084, and accepting proceeds from unlawful internet gambling under 31 U.S.C. § 5363. The charges stem from interactions with a confidential informant and undercover agent, where payments were sent via FedEx from Alabama to Louisiana and calls were made to an agent in Mobile, Alabama. The defendant moved to dismiss Counts Four and Five for lack of venue or, alternatively, to transfer the case. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that venue was proper in the Southern District of Alabama under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) because the offenses involved interstate transportation that was begun, continued, or completed in the district. The court granted the motion to transfer under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b).
In Doe v. City of Demopolis, a minor plaintiff sued the city under Alabama Code § 11-47-190 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after a city police officer sexually assaulted her multiple times in 2006, alleging the city had notice of the officer's propensity and failed to take remedial action such as training or reassignment. The court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on the claims against it. It reasoned that there was no evidence the city acted with deliberate indifference to the risk or that any such indifference was the moving force behind the assaults, as the officer knew his conduct was illegal and the initial contact occurred outside his assigned duties. The court also indicated it would decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claim against the officer individually.
The case concerns Defenders of Wildlife's challenge to federal agencies' continuation of offshore oil and gas lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill. Plaintiff alleged that the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management violated NEPA, the ESA, and the APA by relying on a 2007 environmental impact statement without preparing a supplement, accepting bids on new leases, and failing to reinitiate endangered species consultations based on new information from the spill. The court considered overlapping motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by the federal defendants and intervenors, evaluating whether the claims addressed final agency actions, provided adequate notice, and stated plausible violations. The opinion dismissed Claim Three for failure to state a claim and addressed related arguments on the remaining claims concerning past and ongoing lease activities.
The case involves plaintiff Erica Mahan suing defendant Retrieval-Masters Credit Bureau under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act for using a pseudonym in collection letters, falsely claiming prior written contacts about a debt, and failing to provide required disclosures about disputing the debt. The defendant moved to dismiss most claims under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing insufficient pleading and that the conduct did not violate the FDCPA. The court granted the motion only as to the request for declaratory relief, which the plaintiff conceded, but denied it as to the remaining FDCPA claims, finding the allegations plausible under Twombly/Iqbal standards and that using a false name and making misrepresentations about prior contacts could violate specific FDCPA provisions like § 1692e(14). The § 1692g claim was not challenged and thus proceeded. The ruling relied on accepting the complaint's facts as true and precedents interpreting the statute's prohibitions on deceptive practices.