The case involved a property owner who sued the City of Prichard, Alabama, after the city demolished her vacant house in 2006 pursuant to a nuisance abatement ordinance and later used the lot as a police department parking area. The plaintiff asserted claims for trespass, Fifth Amendment taking, due process violation, fraud, negligence, wantonness, and failure to provide honest government. The court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on all claims except the trespass claim based on the parking lot use, finding that the city had followed statutory notice procedures under Alabama Code § 11-53B-1 and Ordinance 1912, that the plaintiff had received actual notice of the hazard and demolition orders, and that due process requirements were satisfied since she had an opportunity to object. The court denied the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment and allowed the parking-related trespass claim to proceed because the city's use of the property after demolition lacked authorization.
This case arose from a dispute between the South Dallas Water Authority and a contractor (W.D. Wainwright & Sons) over the breach of a construction contract for water main improvements, along with a performance bond issued by The Guarantee Company of North America USA. After the Authority sued the contractor and surety in Alabama state court, the surety removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and granted the Authority's motion to remand the case to the Circuit Court of Dallas County, Alabama, because the removing defendant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 at the time of removal. The court also denied the Authority's request to tax costs and expenses against the defendant. The core reasoning focused on the timing and sufficiency of the defendant's jurisdictional showing under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 and related precedents.
The case involved J & M Associates suing AIG and various agents for breach of contract, negligence, wantonness, fraud, fraudulent concealment, and civil conspiracy after J & M enrolled in a VEBA welfare benefit plan using AIG life insurance policies, which resulted in large tax liabilities and penalties. The district court addressed AIG's amended motion for summary judgment, focusing on whether claims were timely and whether J & M could show reasonable reliance on plan documents or agent statements. The court applied a two-year statute of limitations to the fraud and wantonness claims and found that the plan documents clearly disclosed the relevant risks and rights, precluding reasonable reliance. It also noted that J & M had consulted its own advisors and rejected analogies to cases involving less clear documents. As a result, the court granted summary judgment to AIG on the remaining claims against it.
business & regulatorytaxestorts & liabilityprocedure
In this case, a deaf and mentally disabled plaintiff sued Dollar General Corporation and its store manager after an incident in which the manager called police while the plaintiff was in the store restroom, leading to officers using pepper spray, a taser, and force that caused injury during his arrest on charges including resisting arrest. The plaintiff alleged negligence and wantonness by the defendants for failing to unlock the door, communicate his disabilities to police, or otherwise handle the situation appropriately, along with a separate claim for failure to train or supervise employees. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, dismissing with prejudice the claim against the manager for negligent or wanton failure to train managers and employees, while denying the motion to dismiss as to the other claims. The court reasoned that the remaining negligence claims were adequately pled under Alabama law and that issues like foreseeability of the police actions were not appropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss without further factual development.
This case arose from disputes between two sisters renting a mobile home and Kenneth Walker, a city councilman who purchased the property in 2008, involving incidents such as Walker allegedly grabbing one plaintiff, destroying her plants, and disputes over rent and eviction proceedings. The plaintiffs brought twelve claims, including § 1983 civil rights violations for unlawful seizure and false arrest, state-law claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, and specific tort claims for conversion and assault against Walker. The court denied summary judgment on Dianna Alston’s conversion and assault claims against Walker due to genuine issues of material fact regarding those incidents but granted summary judgment on all remaining claims, finding insufficient evidence to support constitutional violations, municipal liability, or other state-law elements. The decision rested on review of affidavits, prior testimony, and the absence of disputed facts or legal support for the other counts.
This case arose from an injury sustained by Emil Harris, a pipefitter, who fell from a ledge in a cargo hold of the vessel M/V Vinland SAGA while it was undergoing repairs at Harrison Brothers' shipyard. J. Gregory Carwie, as conservator, sued the vessel owner Knudsen for negligence in state court; Knudsen responded in federal court with a complaint seeking exoneration or limitation of liability under admiralty law, while also asserting counterclaims against Harrison Brothers for indemnity or contribution. Harrison Brothers and Carwie filed cross-motions for summary judgment centered on whether Harrison Brothers was immune from tort liability under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) as the employer or borrowing employer, and whether Knudsen had breached duties regarding vessel hazards. The court granted Harrison Brothers’ motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds, denied Carwie’s motion, and granted Knudsen’s motion in part while denying it in part, reasoning that the LHWCA barred the tort claims against the repair yard and that factual disputes remained regarding the vessel owner’s active control over the area and related duties.