Richard W. Roberts

In Jones v. Bush, pro se plaintiff Laura Jones, a white Lead Mail Assistant in the White House mailroom, sued former President George W. Bush and other White House officials under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the First Amendment. She alleged racial discrimination, retaliation for raising security concerns about an unscreened package, and a racially hostile work environment. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The court reasoned that Jones failed to exhaust administrative remedies on some claims, did not show adverse employment actions, could not establish a First Amendment violation, failed to rebut the defendants' non-discriminatory reasons for employment decisions, and did not link alleged hostile conduct to her race.

civil rightslabor & employment

In this criminal case, defendant Marlana Quigley pled guilty to production and distribution of child pornography and was sentenced to 15 years in prison plus $800,000 in restitution to the victim. She moved pro se to defer her restitution payments until release from prison, citing the loss of financial support from her grandmother and lack of prison income. The district court denied the motion, explaining that the timing and amount of restitution payments by inmates fall under the Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program and are executive, not judicial, decisions. The court added that Quigley had not exhausted administrative remedies and that the proper vehicle for such a challenge, if any, would be a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district of her confinement.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Stewart, pro se defendant Willie Stewart challenged a special parole violation warrant issued by the U.S. Parole Commission in September 2012, claiming it was invalid because it came after he had completed his underlying sentence; he sought a writ of mandamus for a prompt hearing and a writ of habeas corpus to prevent any resulting confinement. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied the petition. The court reasoned that the three-year special parole term, which began in 2010 after mandatory release supervision ended, was still active when the warrant was issued for a new drug conviction, making it lawful. Additionally, due process did not require a revocation hearing before the warrant's execution, as the Commission could lodge it as a detainer and hold the hearing after an intervening sentence, which it did in November 2014.

criminal lawprocedure

This miscellaneous case arose when the U.S. Department of State moved under local rules for appointment of a single coordinating judge to oversee roughly three dozen pending FOIA actions seeking emails from former Secretary Hillary Clinton and her staff. The motion acknowledged that the cases did not qualify as “related” under Local Civil Rule 40.5(a)(3), many already had scheduling orders in place, and the randomly assigned judges had been coordinating informally. A majority of the plaintiffs opposed the request. The Executive Session of the District Court unanimously denied the motion, finding no need for formal coordination. The court therefore closed the miscellaneous docket.

procedurefederal power

In United States v. Smith, defendant Billy Ray Smith, who had been convicted in 1990 of distributing cocaine base and later had his supervised release revoked in 2014 after new drug convictions, filed two pro se motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate the revocation sentence, claiming actual innocence and lack of jurisdiction. The district court denied the motions, concluding that the claims were procedurally defaulted because Smith had not raised them on direct appeal and had not shown cause and actual prejudice to excuse the default. The court further found that Smith's jurisdictional challenge had no merit and that he offered no factual support for his actual innocence claim regarding the supervised release violation.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves the United States bringing False Claims Act and common law claims against Second Chance Body Armor, Toyobo, and related defendants for allegedly supplying defective Zylon-containing bullet-resistant vests in connection with federally funded purchases by federal agencies via the GSA Multiple Award Schedule and by state, local, and tribal agencies reimbursed under the Bullet Proof Vest Grant Partnership Act. Toyobo and the government filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on various counts. The court denied summary judgment to both sides on claims for vests sold off the GSA schedule after a 2002 contract modification and on claims for vests reimbursed under the grant program, finding genuine disputes of material fact. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on claims for vests sold off the GSA schedule before the 2002 modification because the undisputed facts entitled them to judgment as a matter of law. The government’s motions were denied across the board due to the same factual disputes.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

In United States v. Trabelsi, the defendant, extradited from Belgium on terrorism and weapons conspiracy charges, sought correspondence between the U.S. and Belgian governments regarding his extradition to support a motion to dismiss the indictment for alleged treaty violations. The district court had previously ordered production of certain documents, and the government moved for reconsideration, asserting various privileges and requesting in camera ex parte review plus a sealing order. The court denied reconsideration in part, finding that general privilege claims were insufficient and that most specific claims failed, but granted it in part because some materials could qualify as opinion work product and because public disclosure risked harming U.S. foreign relations with Belgium and other nations. It ordered the government to submit all responsive documents for in camera review and, if any are later produced to the defendant, directed that they be filed under seal with related proceedings also sealed. The ruling applied the "as justice requires" standard for interlocutory reconsideration while balancing discovery needs against privilege and foreign-policy concerns.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Cobble, the defendant was tried on charges including conspiracy to distribute drugs and conspiracy to launder monetary instruments. A jury acquitted him of the drug charge but convicted him of money laundering conspiracy after evidence showed he allowed a relative to use his name and bank account for purchasing a vehicle with funds from questionable sources. Cobble moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and prejudice from an emotional outburst by a government witness during cross-examination. The court denied the motion, holding that a rational jury could find the elements of the laundering conspiracy proven beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and that the witness's outburst did not warrant a new trial in the interest of justice.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Woodruff, defendants Sidney Woodruff, Sr. and Calvin Stoddard were convicted by a jury of conspiring to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. They moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, arguing that the verdict form was erroneous because it failed to require the jury to find the drug quantity attributable to each defendant individually or reasonably foreseeable to them. The district court denied the motion, holding that Supreme Court precedent in Apprendi and Alleyne, along with existing D.C. Circuit case law, does not require an individualized jury finding of drug quantity to trigger statutory penalties in a conspiracy case when the jury has unanimously found the quantity attributable to the conspiracy as a whole.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a petition by the Probation Office alleging that defendant Harold Hill had violated conditions of his supervised release following a prior criminal conviction. A magistrate judge recommended that Hill undergo electronic monitoring for 30 days, with a curfew imposed at the probation officer's discretion to accommodate his work schedule. No objections were filed by any party to the recommendation. The district court adopted the report and recommendation in full, ordering the 30-day monitoring period and waiving associated costs, on the grounds that the recommendation was fair and just.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, defendant Desmond Thurston, convicted by a jury of two counts of distributing crack cocaine, filed an unopposed motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) to reduce his 194-month sentence after Amendment 782 lowered the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. The court denied the motion, explaining that the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) had already been fully considered at the original sentencing, which included a downward departure from the then-applicable range of 262 to 327 months to 168 to 210 months based on mitigating factors like sentencing disparities and the defendant's background. The court further noted that Thurston's current sentence already falls within the new guidelines range and that he presented no additional facts or arguments supporting a further reduction.

criminal lawprocedure

Plaintiff Earnest Wilson sued the United States under FOIA and the Privacy Act to challenge the government's response to his request for a firearms trace report used in his 2001 federal conviction for possessing a firearm shipped in interstate commerce. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The court found that the ATF had fulfilled its FOIA obligations and that the Privacy Act claim failed because that statute cannot be used to collaterally attack a conviction, amend an interstate nexus determination, or revise records reflecting prior judicial or agency judgments.

gunscriminal lawfederal powerprocedure

In this case, plaintiffs Benoit Brookens and Mary Todd sued the United States, the District of Columbia, and various officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and common law, alleging violations connected to Brookens's arrest and prosecution for criminal contempt arising from an order barring him from practicing law in the District. An earlier October 2013 order dismissed all claims except those against certain individual police officers. The plaintiffs then moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) to reconsider that dismissal, arguing that the court had misapplied equal-protection principles under the Fourteenth Amendment, erred regarding waiver of service and personal jurisdiction defenses by federal defendants, and failed to draw appropriate inferences from precedents such as Bolling v. Sharpe. The district court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiffs had not identified any patent misunderstanding, controlling law overlooked, or other extraordinary circumstances that would make reconsideration necessary to prevent manifest injustice, and that they had not shown any harm from the prior ruling.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedurefederal power

In this case, defendant Joseph Jones, convicted by a jury of two counts of distributing crack cocaine, moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to reduce his 180-month sentence, arguing that Amendment 750 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines had retroactively lowered the applicable crack cocaine sentencing ranges. The government opposed the motion, contending that Jones was ineligible because his sentence was based on his career offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, a range unaffected by the amendment. The court denied the motion, holding that Jones's sentence was not based on a guidelines range subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission, and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, already fully considered at the original sentencing which included a downward departure, did not support any further reduction.

criminal law

In United States v. Evans, defendant Sean Evans moved to expunge the record of his 1994 conviction for carrying a pistol without a license, arguing that it hindered his employment opportunities after 20 years. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion. The court reasoned that expungement is an equitable remedy available only in extreme circumstances, such as flagrant constitutional violations, and that difficulties in obtaining employment do not qualify as such circumstances when the conviction was valid and unchallenged on legal grounds.

criminal law

In Al-Nashiri v. Obama, a Guantánamo detainee filed an amended habeas corpus petition challenging the government's plan to try him by military commission under the Military Commissions Act of 2009 for alleged involvement in attacks including the USS Cole bombing, arguing that the offenses did not occur in the context of recognized hostilities and thus exceeded congressional and constitutional limits on military authority. The petitioner sought a preliminary injunction to halt the military commission proceedings until the habeas petition was resolved on the merits. The respondents moved to stay the habeas case during the military trial. The district court granted the stay and denied the injunction, holding that principles of comity and judicial economy warranted abstaining from exercising equitable jurisdiction while the military commission trial was pending, given the procedural protections available in that forum including counsel, discovery, evidence rules, and appellate review in the D.C. Circuit.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involves an insurance company filing an interpleader action in federal district court to determine the proper distribution of proceeds from a $289,972 payment bond obtained for a District of Columbia construction subcontract between Apex Service, Inc. and Niyyah Electrical Contractors. Multiple parties, including sub-subcontractors, suppliers, and a former employee, asserted claims against the bond exceeding its value after the subcontract was terminated amid disputes over performance and payments. The magistrate judge recommended discharging the insurance company from further liability, awarding it $12,000 in attorneys' fees and costs, denying the other claims, and disbursing the remaining $277,972 to Apex. With no objections filed, the district court adopted the recommendations in full, approved a stipulation between the parties, and issued a final order accordingly.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The plaintiffs, Haitian immigrants employed at the District of Columbia Public Schools Division of Transportation, sued the District under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act, Title VII, and related local laws. They alleged that their supervisor required illegal kickbacks for overtime assignments and retaliated against them, including through warnings, suspensions, and terminations, after they reported the scheme to officials. The District moved for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to immunity because the DOT was under a court-ordered receivership at the relevant time and that it should receive the same protection as the receiver. The court denied the motion, holding that the District failed to demonstrate that the DOT was actually under receivership during the period in question or that the challenged actions were integral to carrying out the receivership order.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved defendant Jasmine Bell, who was convicted after a guilty plea of conspiracy to engage in racketeering and sentenced to 146 months in prison. Bell filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate or correct his sentence, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that his attorney failed to file a notice of appeal despite Bell's instructions to do so. The government opposed the motion, asserting that no such request had been made. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion, holding that Bell had not met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he timely asked his attorney to file the appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

Pro se plaintiff Salame M. Amr, after being terminated from Virginia State University and losing prior federal lawsuits in Richmond, brought claims in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Commonwealth of Virginia, the presiding federal judge, and an engineering education society. He alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, along with common law torts including negligence, fraud, conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, claiming the defendants conspired to harm his reputation and obstruct his litigation. The court dismissed the complaint against all defendants on the ground that the District of Columbia was an improper venue. It further dismissed claims against the Commonwealth and the judge for lack of personal jurisdiction and against the Commonwealth for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and granted the judge's motion to set aside the entry of default.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability