In Jones v. Bush, pro se plaintiff Laura Jones, a white Lead Mail Assistant in the White House mailroom, sued former President George W. Bush and other White House officials under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the First Amendment. She alleged racial discrimination, retaliation for raising security concerns about an unscreened package, and a racially hostile work environment. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The court reasoned that Jones failed to exhaust administrative remedies on some claims, did not show adverse employment actions, could not establish a First Amendment violation, failed to rebut the defendants' non-discriminatory reasons for employment decisions, and did not link alleged hostile conduct to her race.
In this criminal case, defendant Marlana Quigley pled guilty to production and distribution of child pornography and was sentenced to 15 years in prison plus $800,000 in restitution to the victim. She moved pro se to defer her restitution payments until release from prison, citing the loss of financial support from her grandmother and lack of prison income. The district court denied the motion, explaining that the timing and amount of restitution payments by inmates fall under the Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program and are executive, not judicial, decisions. The court added that Quigley had not exhausted administrative remedies and that the proper vehicle for such a challenge, if any, would be a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district of her confinement.
In United States v. Stewart, pro se defendant Willie Stewart challenged a special parole violation warrant issued by the U.S. Parole Commission in September 2012, claiming it was invalid because it came after he had completed his underlying sentence; he sought a writ of mandamus for a prompt hearing and a writ of habeas corpus to prevent any resulting confinement. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied the petition. The court reasoned that the three-year special parole term, which began in 2010 after mandatory release supervision ended, was still active when the warrant was issued for a new drug conviction, making it lawful. Additionally, due process did not require a revocation hearing before the warrant's execution, as the Commission could lodge it as a detainer and hold the hearing after an intervening sentence, which it did in November 2014.
This miscellaneous case arose when the U.S. Department of State moved under local rules for appointment of a single coordinating judge to oversee roughly three dozen pending FOIA actions seeking emails from former Secretary Hillary Clinton and her staff. The motion acknowledged that the cases did not qualify as “related” under Local Civil Rule 40.5(a)(3), many already had scheduling orders in place, and the randomly assigned judges had been coordinating informally. A majority of the plaintiffs opposed the request. The Executive Session of the District Court unanimously denied the motion, finding no need for formal coordination. The court therefore closed the miscellaneous docket.
In United States v. Smith, defendant Billy Ray Smith, who had been convicted in 1990 of distributing cocaine base and later had his supervised release revoked in 2014 after new drug convictions, filed two pro se motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate the revocation sentence, claiming actual innocence and lack of jurisdiction. The district court denied the motions, concluding that the claims were procedurally defaulted because Smith had not raised them on direct appeal and had not shown cause and actual prejudice to excuse the default. The court further found that Smith's jurisdictional challenge had no merit and that he offered no factual support for his actual innocence claim regarding the supervised release violation.
This case involves the United States bringing False Claims Act and common law claims against Second Chance Body Armor, Toyobo, and related defendants for allegedly supplying defective Zylon-containing bullet-resistant vests in connection with federally funded purchases by federal agencies via the GSA Multiple Award Schedule and by state, local, and tribal agencies reimbursed under the Bullet Proof Vest Grant Partnership Act. Toyobo and the government filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on various counts. The court denied summary judgment to both sides on claims for vests sold off the GSA schedule after a 2002 contract modification and on claims for vests reimbursed under the grant program, finding genuine disputes of material fact. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on claims for vests sold off the GSA schedule before the 2002 modification because the undisputed facts entitled them to judgment as a matter of law. The government’s motions were denied across the board due to the same factual disputes.
