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Judge, District Court, N.D. Mississippi · Born 1956 · Charleston, SC
Staples v. Regions Bank
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2011-11-10
In Staples v. Regions Bank, the plaintiffs sued Regions Bank and medical providers after the bank denied benefits under a debt protection rider attached to a promissory note following the death of one plaintiff's husband, alleging bad faith and unauthorized disclosure of medical records in violation of state and federal privacy laws. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court, granted the medical providers' motion to dismiss, and granted Regions' motion to compel arbitration while staying the case. It reasoned that federal question jurisdiction existed because the complaint affirmatively sought recovery under federal privacy laws, diversity jurisdiction existed due to fraudulent joinder of the in-state medical defendants, and the parties' contracts contained gateway arbitration provisions that delegated questions of the arbitration agreement's enforceability to the arbitrator.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Cook Ex Rel. Wrongful Death Beneficiaries v. GGNSC Ripley, LLC
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2011-04-14 · cited 7×
This case involved a nursing home resident's estate suing the facility for negligence, medical malpractice, and deviations from the standard of care after the resident's death. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement signed by the resident's daughter upon admission, who claimed to act under power of attorney. The court applied the Federal Arbitration Act's two-step analysis, determining that a valid agreement to arbitrate existed under Mississippi contract law principles (including as a third-party beneficiary) and that the dispute fell within its broad scope, with no federal statute or policy rendering the claims nonarbitrable. The court granted the motion to compel arbitration, rejecting arguments regarding lack of authority, mutual assent, and unconscionability.
proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare
Brown v. Epps
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2010-12-21 · cited 1×
The case involves Derrick Latory Brown, who was convicted in Mississippi state court of selling cocaine based on a controlled buy arranged through a confidential informant and sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The federal court denied relief on the claim of insufficient evidence but granted it on the claim that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence several recorded phone conversations between the informant and an unidentified speaker. The court reasoned that the conversations constituted hearsay offered for the truth of the matter asserted, that the State could not establish the speaker's identity or connect the statements to Brown, and that their admission violated Brown's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and cross-examination as an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court therefore vacated the conviction and directed the state to initiate a new trial within 120 days or release Brown from all custody including probation.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Mullen v. CITY OF GRENADA, MISS.
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2010-03-31 · cited 3×
This case concerns former Grenada police officer George Parker Mullen, who was suspended and then terminated after a positive urine drug test in 2007, despite a negative hair test and his claim that his drink had been spiked. Mullen sued the city and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for due process violations in the grievance process and under state law for defamation, invasion of privacy (false light), and wrongful termination, alleging misleading statements about the city's zero-tolerance policy and improper disclosure of test results. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the due process employment claim and wrongful termination because Mississippi law treats municipal police officers as at-will employees without a protected property interest in continued employment. It denied summary judgment on the false light claims against individual defendants Richardson and Runnels, finding triable issues over whether their statements about Mullen's drug use were sufficiently publicized. All official-capacity claims and some other aspects of the suit were dismissed.
civil rightslabor & employmentproceduretorts & liability
Lonoaea v. Corrections Corp. of America
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2009-10-15 · cited 3×
The case involves claims by inmate Ronnie Lonoaea and his guardian against Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which operates the Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility, along with the State of Hawaii and individual CCA officials, arising from an assault by other inmates after cell doors in a segregation unit unexpectedly opened. The plaintiffs alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Mississippi law based on inadequate mental health treatment and failure to protect the inmate from known risks posed by hostile gang members. On defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing the State of Hawaii without prejudice on Eleventh Amendment grounds and dismissing claims against the individual defendants with prejudice. The court noted that the incident resulted from at most negligence, which does not support substantive due process claims, and addressed procedural matters such as the handling of motions in limine.
civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability
Chism Electric, Inc. v. Meacham
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2009-10-09
This case is a federal lawsuit brought by Chism Electric, Inc. against Angela Kaye Chism and her divorce attorney Malenda Meacham, asserting claims for abuse of process and civil conspiracy. The suit arose after the defendants added the company as a party to ongoing state-court divorce proceedings between Angela and Lloyd Chism, alleging the business was marital property subject to division. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The court reasoned that two state chancery judges had expressly authorized the amended complaints, that the claims were more properly characterized as malicious prosecution (which requires a favorable termination of the underlying action), and that the plaintiff should instead defend itself and seek relief in the pending state proceedings rather than pursue parallel federal litigation.
family lawproceduretorts & liability
Hood v. Central United Life Insurance
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2009-09-30 · cited 2×
This case involved a dispute between Bobbie Hood and Central United Life Insurance Company over the calculation of per-day benefits under a 1986 cancer treatment policy after her husband's colon cancer diagnosis and treatment, with Hood alleging breach due to the insurer's use of hospital room-and-board charges to define days. The court granted Hood's motion for reconsideration of its prior summary judgment ruling, applying a four-year statute of limitations drawn from the required provisions in Miss. Code Ann. § 83-9-5 rather than the general three-year period, and finding the policy's undefined term day to be ambiguous. On the merits, the court denied summary judgment on the contract claim while granting it on the bad faith claim, as the insurer had a legitimate basis for its payment calculations consistent with standard practices.
business & regulatoryhealthcareprocedure
Johnson v. Lewis
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2009-07-20 · cited 7×
The case concerns plaintiffs' motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer trial of their civil action from Oxford (Western Division) to Greenville (Greenville Division) in the Northern District of Mississippi, where the suit was originally filed; defendants opposed the transfer. The court explains the district's long-standing practice, established by standing orders after Congress repealed the divisional venue statute (28 U.S.C. § 1393) in 1988, of assigning and trying cases at judges' duty stations rather than the filing division to prevent forum shopping, judge shopping, and the creation of judicial fiefdoms. It discusses administrative challenges of multi-judge scheduling across divisions, cites a Fifth Circuit mandamus ruling in a similar matter (Beck v. Koppers), and notes that intra-district transfers are disfavored absent case-specific factors showing convenience and justice require a change.
procedure
Hybrid Kinetic Automotive Holdings, Inc. v. Hybrid Kinetic Automotive Corp.
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2009-06-23
The case centers on a dispute over control of a proposed $6.5 billion hybrid car factory project in Mississippi involving Chinese investors, where plaintiffs Hybrid Kinetic Automotive Holdings, Inc. and related parties allege that defendants, including Charles Wang and Hybrid Kinetic Automotive Corp., improperly took actions to pursue the project after a breakdown in relations with Benjamin Yeung. The court, acting on its own motion to address delays in discovery and inform third-party stakeholders such as the State of Mississippi and Chinese investors, sets forth preliminary conclusions that the central issue is whether Wang was Yeung's employee or a joint venturer under a handshake agreement. The court reasons that an employment relationship would favor plaintiffs' claims while a joint venture might allow broader equitable remedies, and it indicates an inclination to rescind certain contracts with third parties like Meta and Lion if defendants acted improperly, all subject to further evidence and briefing.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Johnson v. Merchant
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2009-06-22 · cited 4×
In Johnson v. Merchant, plaintiff Christopher Johnson sued defendants Michael Merchant and the City of Greenville in the Greenville Division of the Northern District of Mississippi, but the case was assigned for trial in Oxford under the district's customary practice of having judges try cases at their duty stations. Defendants moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer the trial to Greenville, which plaintiff initially opposed. The court examined its standing orders on divisional venue, the 1988 repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1393, Fifth Circuit precedent in Beck v. Koppers, and policy considerations including avoiding forum shopping and promoting efficient case management across divisions. It outlined factors for deciding intra-district transfers, emphasizing flexibility while prioritizing the convenience of litigants and the administration of justice.
procedure
Vuncannon v. United States
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2009-06-22
This case involves an intervention by Shelby County Health Care Corporation (the Med) against Tippah County seeking reimbursement for over $640,000 in medical expenses incurred by Timmy Vuncannon while he was in county custody after an injury in a work release program. The Med's claims are based on Mississippi Code § 47-1-59, which addresses county responsibility for prisoner hospitalization. The court denied Tippah County's motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment regarding the Med's claims, allowing them to proceed, but granted the county's motion to dismiss Vuncannon's own reimbursement claims against it. The decision rests on the potential applicability of state law to the hospital's claims and the lack of standing or merit for the plaintiff's direct claims, with the court noting that Mississippi state courts may be better suited for some issues.
criminal lawhealthcareprocedurecivil rights
Plunkett v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2009-04-13
This case was a declaratory judgment action filed by Eric Plunkett and others against State Farm seeking liability insurance benefits after a 2006 fatal car accident in Mississippi, based on claims that the at-fault driver Tyler Gray was an insured under a policy issued to his stepfather Dillard Pruitt. The court granted State Farm's cross-motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' motion, ruling that Tyler was not an insured under the policy. The core reasoning was that the policy defined "relative" (and thus insured) as a person related by blood, marriage, or adoption who resides primarily with the named insured, and undisputed facts showed Tyler's primary residence was with his natural father after high school graduation; the court distinguished the Mississippi Supreme Court's Grange decision on both the policy language requiring "primarily" and the specific facts regarding residence, while concluding that Mississippi law allows private parties to set the scope of liability coverage by contract.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
Williamson Pounders Architects, P.C. v. Tunica County
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2008-10-29 · cited 16×
This case involves a contract dispute where Williamson Pounders Architects sought additional fees from Tunica County for expanded design work on a riverfront park project after scope changes increased the budget. The court denied the plaintiff's motion to alter its prior judgment, which had disallowed recovery for work performed before October 2003 due to lack of required contractual notice. The reasoning centered on the contract's plain language requiring specific written notice for changes beyond the initial scope discussion, and Mississippi public policy mandating that county contract modifications be recorded in official minutes, which prevented application of Tennessee law allowing implied contract recovery.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Champluvier v. Couch
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2008-05-20 · cited 2×
Deborah Champluvier sued prosecutor Allen B. Couch, Jr. under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after her embezzlement conviction was reversed by the Mississippi Supreme Court, alleging that Couch improperly applied the state's embezzlement statute—which did not cover LLCs—to her as a member of a limited liability company during grand jury proceedings, trial, and appeal, thereby violating her rights to due process, equal protection, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, along with state-law malicious prosecution. The court construed the pro se complaint broadly but found that Champluvier failed to state a claim because absolute prosecutorial immunity protects a prosecutor from civil liability for actions taken within the scope of advocating the state's case, even when the legal theory applied is later deemed incorrect. The court therefore dismissed the case with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim and because the defendant was immune from monetary relief.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure
Baughman v. LEE COUNTY, MS
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2008-05-20 · cited 1×
This case involves twenty-seven plaintiffs who filed a joint 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against Lee County, Mississippi, alleging that each was unnecessarily strip-searched at the Lee County Jail in violation of their constitutional rights. The defendant moved to sever the claims into separate actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs' claims did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, as the strip searches occurred at different times between 2005 and 2007 and would require individualized evidence regarding the circumstances and damages, particularly emotional distress. The court reasoned that while there might be some common legal issues, the need for separate fact witnesses and proof for each plaintiff's claim outweighed the benefits of joinder, following the approach in a similar multi-plaintiff case.
civil rightsprocedure
United States v. Moultrie
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2008-05-13 · cited 2×
In United States v. Moultrie, the defendant, facing federal criminal charges including theft, bribery, and mail fraud related to a state government project, moved to admit results from two privately administered polygraph examinations to support his defense. The court conducted a Daubert hearing to assess the admissibility of polygraph evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. After reviewing expert testimony and scientific studies, the court denied the motion, concluding that polygraph science lacks sufficient evidentiary reliability to qualify as admissible expert testimony. The court also found that the specific examinations were not trustworthy due to the government's lack of involvement in their administration, raising concerns under Rule 403 about potential prejudice.
criminal lawprocedure
Rule v. Region VI Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2008-02-19
The case involved former house parent employees of a nonprofit mental health services provider who sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act alleging they were not paid for designated sleep time during shifts exceeding 24 hours. The court applied the two-year statute of limitations after finding no evidence of a willful violation and examined the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 785.22, which permits exclusion of up to eight hours of sleep time when adequate facilities are provided and there is an agreement between employer and employee. Testimony established that the plaintiffs were informed at hiring that sleep time would be uncompensated unless they documented interruptions via night duty reports, that they understood the arrangement, and that they never submitted such reports or evidence of actual time worked beyond rough estimates. The court therefore entered judgment for the defendant employer on the claims of the Beacon Harbor plaintiffs.
labor & employment
Borrego Springs Bank, N.A. v. Skuna River Lumber, LLC
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2008-01-30 · cited 2×
This case is a bankruptcy appeal by secured creditor Borrego Springs Bank from a Northern District of Mississippi bankruptcy court order directing it to pay the fees and expenses of Equity Partners, Inc. (EPI) for marketing and auctioning the assets of Chapter 11 debtor Skuna River Lumber. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's equitable estoppel ruling but otherwise affirmed, holding that Borrego must compensate EPI under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) because EPI's services were reasonable, necessary, and conferred a benefit on the estate and secured creditors by attracting bidders and establishing market value for the property. The court rejected Borrego's argument that its credit bid exempted it from the surcharge, noting that public policy favors compensating such professionals to facilitate asset sales whether bids are cash or credit-based, and remanded for further proceedings to effect payment.
business & regulatoryprocedureproperty
Bruno v. RIH ACQUISITIONS MS I, LLC
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2008-01-14 · cited 2×
In this case, plaintiff Michael Bruno, a former casino executive, sued his employer after being discharged, alleging retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act for opposing age-based hiring discrimination against a job candidate and under state law for reporting environmental violations. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing no genuine issues of fact supported the claims. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, finding that Bruno had engaged in protected activity under the ADEA by directly opposing a manager's age-based comments during hiring discussions, that he suffered an adverse action, and that fact issues existed on causation due to the timing and other evidence; it noted the state environmental claim was not challenged on summary judgment.
labor & employmentcivil rightsenvironment
Brewer v. American Power Source, Inc.
District Court, N.D. Mississippi · 2007-10-03 · cited 1×
This case was a federal lawsuit brought by former employees against American Power Source, Inc. under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, alleging that the company conducted a mass layoff of 102 workers at its Mississippi plant in February 2005 without providing the required 60 days' advance notice. The defendant moved for summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds and for lack of evidence supporting the claims. The court granted the motion, holding that the most analogous Mississippi limitations period was the one-year period for unwritten employment contracts under Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-29, which barred the suit filed more than a year after the layoff, and that plaintiffs had failed to present evidence creating genuine issues of material fact.
labor & employmentprocedure