In Staples v. Regions Bank, the plaintiffs sued Regions Bank and medical providers after the bank denied benefits under a debt protection rider attached to a promissory note following the death of one plaintiff's husband, alleging bad faith and unauthorized disclosure of medical records in violation of state and federal privacy laws. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court, granted the medical providers' motion to dismiss, and granted Regions' motion to compel arbitration while staying the case. It reasoned that federal question jurisdiction existed because the complaint affirmatively sought recovery under federal privacy laws, diversity jurisdiction existed due to fraudulent joinder of the in-state medical defendants, and the parties' contracts contained gateway arbitration provisions that delegated questions of the arbitration agreement's enforceability to the arbitrator.
This case involved a nursing home resident's estate suing the facility for negligence, medical malpractice, and deviations from the standard of care after the resident's death. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement signed by the resident's daughter upon admission, who claimed to act under power of attorney. The court applied the Federal Arbitration Act's two-step analysis, determining that a valid agreement to arbitrate existed under Mississippi contract law principles (including as a third-party beneficiary) and that the dispute fell within its broad scope, with no federal statute or policy rendering the claims nonarbitrable. The court granted the motion to compel arbitration, rejecting arguments regarding lack of authority, mutual assent, and unconscionability.
The case involves Derrick Latory Brown, who was convicted in Mississippi state court of selling cocaine based on a controlled buy arranged through a confidential informant and sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The federal court denied relief on the claim of insufficient evidence but granted it on the claim that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence several recorded phone conversations between the informant and an unidentified speaker. The court reasoned that the conversations constituted hearsay offered for the truth of the matter asserted, that the State could not establish the speaker's identity or connect the statements to Brown, and that their admission violated Brown's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and cross-examination as an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court therefore vacated the conviction and directed the state to initiate a new trial within 120 days or release Brown from all custody including probation.
This case concerns former Grenada police officer George Parker Mullen, who was suspended and then terminated after a positive urine drug test in 2007, despite a negative hair test and his claim that his drink had been spiked. Mullen sued the city and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for due process violations in the grievance process and under state law for defamation, invasion of privacy (false light), and wrongful termination, alleging misleading statements about the city's zero-tolerance policy and improper disclosure of test results. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the due process employment claim and wrongful termination because Mississippi law treats municipal police officers as at-will employees without a protected property interest in continued employment. It denied summary judgment on the false light claims against individual defendants Richardson and Runnels, finding triable issues over whether their statements about Mullen's drug use were sufficiently publicized. All official-capacity claims and some other aspects of the suit were dismissed.
The case involves claims by inmate Ronnie Lonoaea and his guardian against Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which operates the Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility, along with the State of Hawaii and individual CCA officials, arising from an assault by other inmates after cell doors in a segregation unit unexpectedly opened. The plaintiffs alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Mississippi law based on inadequate mental health treatment and failure to protect the inmate from known risks posed by hostile gang members. On defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing the State of Hawaii without prejudice on Eleventh Amendment grounds and dismissing claims against the individual defendants with prejudice. The court noted that the incident resulted from at most negligence, which does not support substantive due process claims, and addressed procedural matters such as the handling of motions in limine.
This case is a federal lawsuit brought by Chism Electric, Inc. against Angela Kaye Chism and her divorce attorney Malenda Meacham, asserting claims for abuse of process and civil conspiracy. The suit arose after the defendants added the company as a party to ongoing state-court divorce proceedings between Angela and Lloyd Chism, alleging the business was marital property subject to division. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The court reasoned that two state chancery judges had expressly authorized the amended complaints, that the claims were more properly characterized as malicious prosecution (which requires a favorable termination of the underlying action), and that the plaintiff should instead defend itself and seek relief in the pending state proceedings rather than pursue parallel federal litigation.