Robert Malcolm McRae jr

This case involved three former employees of Patton-Tully Transportation Company who alleged they were subjected to sexual harassment and a hostile work environment that forced their resignations, with one plaintiff also claiming racial harassment; they brought federal claims under Title VII along with pendent state claims for violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision. Defendant Patton-Tully moved to dismiss the negligent supervision claims on the ground that Tennessee law does not recognize them in this context and to dismiss the state claims of plaintiff Carolyn Kramer as time-barred. The court denied the motion as to the negligent supervision claims of two plaintiffs, reasoning that Tennessee recognizes such claims when supported by an underlying common-law tort such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, but granted dismissal of all state-law claims by Kramer because they were filed more than a year after her resignation in violation of the applicable statutes of limitations.

civil rightslabor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved foster parents who had taken in a bi-racial child and sued the Tennessee Department of Human Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that the Department's policies used race as a factor in adoption placements by preferring black or interracial families for bi-racial children. During the litigation the plaintiffs were approved as adoptive parents, and the court held a trial that included stipulated facts showing race could become the deciding factor in placements and that transracial placements with white families required extra approvals. The court ruled that these practices violated equal protection, enjoined the Department from using race to prefer one racial heritage over another, ordered new policies treating bi-racial children as having a combined heritage, and required a placement committee in Shelby County to reduce subjective racial preferences in decisions.

civil rightsfamily law

This case involves a federal antitrust lawsuit brought by Tacker, owner of a casket retail business in Tennessee, who alleged that casket distributors and funeral service providers conspired to refuse to deal with him after he began selling caskets directly to the public at lower prices, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, FTC regulations, Tennessee antitrust statutes, and common-law tort. The court denied motions to dismiss the Sherman Act claim against several casket companies, finding the complaint sufficiently alleged a conspiracy, but granted dismissal of that claim against individual board directors in their official capacities. It dismissed the FTC and Tennessee antitrust claims against all defendants for failure to state a cognizable claim. The court also denied a motion to dismiss the intentional tort claim against defendant Elmer Wilson, exercising supplemental jurisdiction because the claim arose from the same alleged conspiracy as the federal antitrust claim.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned a disabled passenger's state-law false imprisonment claims against Express Airlines and Northwest Airlines after the passenger was denied boarding on a reserved flight and later secured in an aisle chair for over 30 minutes while awaiting an alternative flight. The airlines moved for partial summary judgment, arguing preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act. The court granted the motions, ruling that the claims were preempted by 49 U.S.C. App. § 1305(a)(1) because they related to airline services, following the broad preemption standard established in Morales v. Trans World Airlines. The court noted that the incidents arose directly from the provision or denial of boarding and passenger accommodations, though separate federal claims under the Air Carrier Access Act remained viable.

federal powertorts & liability

In this case, defendant Edgar Hardin Gillock, a former state senator convicted in 1983 on multiple felony counts including conspiracy, mail fraud, and extortion, filed a motion nine years later seeking to expunge his entire criminal record after completing his prison sentence and parole, citing barriers to his professional growth and relying on the court's inherent equitable powers. The government opposed the motion, arguing lack of jurisdiction and that expungement was inappropriate. The court first determined it had jurisdiction over the motion as part of the original criminal case but then denied the request on the merits, holding that expungement was not justified given the seriousness of the offenses, the defendant's breach of public trust, and the absence of any statutory or constitutional basis for erasing a valid conviction record after the sentence was served.

criminal lawprocedure

Property owners near Memphis International Airport sued the Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority and the Federal Aviation Administration, alleging that airport noise had damaged their persons and property and seeking equitable relief under the citizen-suit provision of the Noise Control Act for the FAA's approval of an airport noise compatibility program. The court granted the federal defendants' motion to dismiss. It reasoned that the Act permits citizen suits only for the FAA's failure to perform non-discretionary duties under 49 U.S.C. App. § 1431, but the FAA's review and approval of noise compatibility programs under 14 C.F.R. § 150 requires the exercise of judgment on factors such as burdens on commerce and land-use compatibility, making those actions discretionary and outside the scope of the citizen-suit provision.

environmentfederal powerpropertyprocedure

This case arose from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filed by Hayes & Son Body Shop, Inc., in which the debtor challenged the United States Trustee's standing to object to the reasonableness of attorney fee applications and sought to strike the Trustee's pleadings. The court held that the Trustee has standing under 11 U.S.C. § 307 to raise and be heard on any issue in a bankruptcy case, including fee objections, based on the statute's plain language, its legislative history broadening the Trustee's role, and supporting precedent from the Sixth Circuit and local bankruptcy courts. The court denied the debtor's motion to strike, granted the Trustee's request for sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 because the debtor's arguments lacked legal support and ignored contrary authority, and ordered the debtor's counsel to pay the Trustee's reasonable fees of $692.50. In a follow-up order, the court rejected the debtor's request to alter or amend the sanctions ruling, finding that counsel's claimed lack of knowledge of relevant case law did not excuse the filing.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

The case was a medical malpractice action brought by plaintiff Billy Thompson against resident physicians (the UT Doctors) and other defendants for alleged negligent treatment at The Med hospital. The court granted the UT Doctors' motion for summary judgment on grounds of absolute immunity. The core reasoning was that the doctors were paid a salary by the University of Tennessee and thus qualified as state employees under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-301 et seq. and 8-42-101(a)(3), with no genuine factual dispute on this point and no applicable exceptions such as personal gain or non-state employment status.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

The case involved three former employees of Shulton suing the company, a security firm, and an individual for defamation after being accused of theft during an internal investigation into missing merchandise. Shulton removed the cases to federal court and moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA because they arose from a collective bargaining agreement. The court held that the state-law defamation claims were independent of the agreement and could be resolved without interpreting it, following the Supreme Court's decision in Lingle v. Norge. It therefore denied the summary judgment motions and remanded the cases to Tennessee state court.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case involved a former truck driver who sued his employer, supervisors, and company president under the federal RICO statute along with state claims for slander, interference with business relations, and breach of good faith, alleging he was fired for refusing to violate federal motor carrier safety regulations on driving hours and drug use. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that Section 405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 establishes a comprehensive administrative remedy before the Secretary of Labor as the exclusive process for such whistleblower discharge claims, supported by analogous interpretations of similar statutes like the Energy Reorganization Act.

labor & employmentcriminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a dispute between Plough, Inc. and Allergan, Inc., two manufacturers of sunscreen products, over Plough's promotional claims that its SHADE line provides superior UVA protection compared to Allergan's PHOTOPLEX products. Plough filed this declaratory judgment action under the Lanham Act seeking a declaration that its advertising did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and an order barring Allergan from further threats, after Allergan complained to the FDA and sent Plough a cease-and-desist letter. Allergan then sued Plough in California for Lanham Act violations and unfair competition and moved to dismiss, stay, or transfer this first-filed action. The court denied the motion in full, holding that the declaratory judgment would usefully clarify the parties' legal relations, that the first-filed rule favored retaining the case, and that Allergan had not shown the strong balance of inconvenience required for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case arose from a dispute between a credit union and securities firms over whether a margin agreement existed that authorized certain investments leading to losses, and whether the matter should proceed in court or through arbitration under a clause in that agreement. After denying the defendants' motions to stay the proceedings pending arbitration, the court considered their appeal of that denial and motions to stay the case while the appeal was pending. The court granted the stay, applying standards from Rule 62 and Hilton v. Braunskill, finding that the defendants would suffer irreparable harm from litigation expenses that would moot their appeal right, that plaintiff would not face substantial injury from delay, and that public policy supported conserving judicial resources until the appeal resolved the forum issue.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a black police officer, Leo Johnson, who sued the Memphis Police Department under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for race discrimination after being terminated for not complying with the department's clean-shaven policy due to his medical condition of folliculitis, which prevented shaving and was common among black males. The court found that the plaintiff was wrongfully terminated and awarded him back pay of $41,611.59, attorney's fees of $7,065, and expenses of $733.30. The reasoning centered on the policy's disparate impact on black officers and the department's failure to properly accommodate the plaintiff's condition as outlined in their prior agreement, despite medical evidence supporting the need for a beard.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involved an appeal by Metmor Financial, Inc., a mortgage holder, from a bankruptcy court's order reinstating the automatic stay in debtor Lois Bailey's Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, which had previously been lifted to allow foreclosure on her principal residence. The district court affirmed the reinstatement, finding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) given extenuating circumstances such as the debtor's illness, family deaths, and payment confusion with multiple mortgage holders. The court reasoned that the order requiring a lump sum payment and double payments to cure arrears did not improperly modify the confirmed Chapter 13 plan beyond the five-year limit and aligned with equitable principles allowing time to cure post-confirmation arrearages under bankruptcy law.

procedureproperty

In United States v. Smith, defendants Smith and Coleman filed motions challenging the validity of the federal Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, seeking to have their sentences imposed under prior law on constitutional and statutory grounds. The court denied the motions after reviewing the statutory framework establishing the Commission as an independent body within the judicial branch, its purposes to promote uniformity and fairness in sentencing, and specific claims regarding supervised release and fines. The court reasoned that the enabling statute authorized the Guidelines, that any inconsistencies could be addressed through case-specific sentencing or appeal rather than invalidation, and that the Guidelines were not unlawful on the grounds presented. The decision upheld the Guidelines' application in these cases.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a civil action by the United States against Velsicol Chemical Corporation, Terminix International, Monsanto, and others under CERCLA to recover over $1 million in response costs for investigating and cleaning up hazardous substance contamination at the Arlington Blending and Galloway Pit sites near Memphis, Tennessee. The complaint alleges that the defendants arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances by contracting with Arlington Blending to formulate and package pesticides containing chemicals such as aldrin and chlordane, generating wastes that were released at the sites. Terminix and Velsicol moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, arguing they merely supplied ingredients rather than arranging for disposal, while Monsanto moved for summary judgment on the ground that its products contained no hazardous substances. The court denied the motions to dismiss because the allegations sufficiently state a claim under CERCLA § 107(a)(3) for arranging disposal, and denied Monsanto's summary judgment motion without prejudice under Rule 56(f) because the plaintiff had not yet had an opportunity to conduct discovery.

environmentprocedure

The case involved the EEOC's claim that Firestone and its unions violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by denying severance awards to employees aged 55 or older (or with 25+ years of service) who were eligible for pensions when the Memphis plant closed in 1983, while paying them to younger workers with 5+ years of service. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that the suit was time-barred, the pension and insurance plan was a bona fide employee benefit plan exempt under ADEA section 623(f)(2), and the EEOC failed to establish a prima facie case because employees denied severance awards received more valuable immediate or deferred pension benefits instead, with the severance award functioning as a minimum pension distribution rather than separate compensation.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case was a class action challenging the policies and practices of the Tennessee Disability Determination Section (TDDS) and the Secretary of Health and Human Services in determining eligibility for Social Security disability benefits under Titles II and XVI, including issues with medical evidence collection and interim benefits after the 1984 Act. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part, ordering TDDS to obtain required medical assessments of claimants' work-related abilities from treating and consulting physicians as mandated by federal regulations, while denying other claims and motions to dismiss or decertify the class. It also ruled that interim benefits under the 1984 Act require individual elections by class members rather than a blanket filing by class counsel. The core reasoning was that TDDS's instructions to physicians to omit functional assessments violated 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513 and 416.913, leaving non-examining agency doctors' opinions as the sole evidence and making erroneous RFC determinations hard to challenge, and that the 1984 Act's text specifies individual rather than representative elections.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

This case involved a postal employee's challenge to his termination under an attendance control policy for unscheduled absences, including an appeal of a Merit Systems Protection Board decision approving the firing and claims of handicap discrimination under federal law. The court affirmed the MSPB ruling based on the administrative record and, after a bench trial on the discrimination claims, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b). The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to present evidence establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact on handicapped employees, disparate treatment because of his handicap, or a failure by the Postal Service to accommodate his condition, as the policy was applied uniformly, no motive tied to handicap was shown, and no transfer request was made despite available procedures. The court later amended its findings for clarification and denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case concerns a dispute over how to determine the voting domicile of Tennessee prisoners eligible to vote under state law, specifically whether inmates at the Tennessee State Penitentiary in Davidson County could establish domicile there instead of their prior free-world residence. Intervening inmates sought clarification of a 1980 consent order that presumed domicile at the last free-world residence unless a contrary intent was shown under Tennessee statutes. The court clarified the order by adopting a procedure requiring two sworn statements from the prisoner and a free-world affiant, with additional evidence tailored to three categories of inmates based on sentence length and release prospects, allowing domicile in the incarceration county only upon sufficient proof of intent and ties consistent with T.C.A. §§ 2-2-116 et seq. The decision rests on statutory provisions defining residence changes, temporary absences, and presumptions, while avoiding constitutional issues by focusing on nonconstitutional grounds for domicile determinations.

electionscriminal lawcivil rights