This case involved three former employees of Patton-Tully Transportation Company who alleged they were subjected to sexual harassment and a hostile work environment that forced their resignations, with one plaintiff also claiming racial harassment; they brought federal claims under Title VII along with pendent state claims for violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision. Defendant Patton-Tully moved to dismiss the negligent supervision claims on the ground that Tennessee law does not recognize them in this context and to dismiss the state claims of plaintiff Carolyn Kramer as time-barred. The court denied the motion as to the negligent supervision claims of two plaintiffs, reasoning that Tennessee recognizes such claims when supported by an underlying common-law tort such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, but granted dismissal of all state-law claims by Kramer because they were filed more than a year after her resignation in violation of the applicable statutes of limitations.
The case involved foster parents who had taken in a bi-racial child and sued the Tennessee Department of Human Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that the Department's policies used race as a factor in adoption placements by preferring black or interracial families for bi-racial children. During the litigation the plaintiffs were approved as adoptive parents, and the court held a trial that included stipulated facts showing race could become the deciding factor in placements and that transracial placements with white families required extra approvals. The court ruled that these practices violated equal protection, enjoined the Department from using race to prefer one racial heritage over another, ordered new policies treating bi-racial children as having a combined heritage, and required a placement committee in Shelby County to reduce subjective racial preferences in decisions.
This case involves a federal antitrust lawsuit brought by Tacker, owner of a casket retail business in Tennessee, who alleged that casket distributors and funeral service providers conspired to refuse to deal with him after he began selling caskets directly to the public at lower prices, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, FTC regulations, Tennessee antitrust statutes, and common-law tort. The court denied motions to dismiss the Sherman Act claim against several casket companies, finding the complaint sufficiently alleged a conspiracy, but granted dismissal of that claim against individual board directors in their official capacities. It dismissed the FTC and Tennessee antitrust claims against all defendants for failure to state a cognizable claim. The court also denied a motion to dismiss the intentional tort claim against defendant Elmer Wilson, exercising supplemental jurisdiction because the claim arose from the same alleged conspiracy as the federal antitrust claim.
The case concerned a disabled passenger's state-law false imprisonment claims against Express Airlines and Northwest Airlines after the passenger was denied boarding on a reserved flight and later secured in an aisle chair for over 30 minutes while awaiting an alternative flight. The airlines moved for partial summary judgment, arguing preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act. The court granted the motions, ruling that the claims were preempted by 49 U.S.C. App. § 1305(a)(1) because they related to airline services, following the broad preemption standard established in Morales v. Trans World Airlines. The court noted that the incidents arose directly from the provision or denial of boarding and passenger accommodations, though separate federal claims under the Air Carrier Access Act remained viable.
In this case, defendant Edgar Hardin Gillock, a former state senator convicted in 1983 on multiple felony counts including conspiracy, mail fraud, and extortion, filed a motion nine years later seeking to expunge his entire criminal record after completing his prison sentence and parole, citing barriers to his professional growth and relying on the court's inherent equitable powers. The government opposed the motion, arguing lack of jurisdiction and that expungement was inappropriate. The court first determined it had jurisdiction over the motion as part of the original criminal case but then denied the request on the merits, holding that expungement was not justified given the seriousness of the offenses, the defendant's breach of public trust, and the absence of any statutory or constitutional basis for erasing a valid conviction record after the sentence was served.
Property owners near Memphis International Airport sued the Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority and the Federal Aviation Administration, alleging that airport noise had damaged their persons and property and seeking equitable relief under the citizen-suit provision of the Noise Control Act for the FAA's approval of an airport noise compatibility program. The court granted the federal defendants' motion to dismiss. It reasoned that the Act permits citizen suits only for the FAA's failure to perform non-discretionary duties under 49 U.S.C. App. § 1431, but the FAA's review and approval of noise compatibility programs under 14 C.F.R. § 150 requires the exercise of judgment on factors such as burdens on commerce and land-use compatibility, making those actions discretionary and outside the scope of the citizen-suit provision.