Ivan L. R. Lemelle

The case involved the EEOC suing on behalf of Lisa Harrison's estate, alleging that her employer, Resources for Human Development, Inc., violated the ADA by terminating her from her position at a residential treatment facility due to severe obesity, which the employer allegedly regarded as a disability. Harrison, who weighed over 500 pounds at the time of her 2007 termination, had performed her duties without issue for nearly eight years. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that obesity does not qualify as a disability under the ADA and that Harrison was not a qualified individual. The court denied both motions, finding genuine disputes of material fact on whether severe obesity constitutes an impairment that substantially limits major life activities, whether the employer regarded Harrison as disabled, and whether she could perform essential job functions with or without accommodation. The decision relied on ADA definitions, EEOC guidelines treating severe obesity as a potential impairment, and the need to construe facts in favor of the non-moving party.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involves a personal injury claim under general maritime law and Texas law by plaintiff Henry Lee Dennis, who allegedly slipped and fell on oil while working as a fire watcher on an offshore platform owned by Energy XXI that was being dismantled. Plaintiff sued the platform owner and various contractors, after which Energy XXI filed third-party claims against American Fire seeking defense, indemnity, and insurance coverage under a Master Service Agreement. The court denied Energy XXI's motion for summary judgment on its own liability without prejudice due to incomplete discovery, granted in part and denied in part the motions regarding the enforceability of the indemnity and insurance provisions, and held that the insurance clause requiring Energy XXI to be named as an additional insured was valid and separate from any indemnity obligations limited by the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act. The reasoning applied the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to invoke Texas substantive law, including Chapter 95 requirements for owner control and actual knowledge of hazards, along with case law distinguishing insurance provisions from unenforceable indemnity agreements.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatorylabor & employment

This case arose from the death of worker Andre Magee Jr., who fell while employed as a rigger on a partially constructed barge at a shipyard in Mississippi. Plaintiffs, acting on behalf of Magee's minor children and father, sued the shipbuilder and barge owner under general maritime law and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act section 905(b), claiming vessel negligence, with diversity jurisdiction pled in the alternative. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that an incomplete barge under construction was not a vessel for purposes of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. It also granted partial summary judgment dismissing the father's mental anguish claim under Mississippi law because he did not contemporaneously witness the accident.

proceduretorts & liabilitylabor & employment

In Stabler v. United States, the plaintiff challenged the government's sale of property subject to a federal tax lien, asserting a wrongful levy claim under 26 U.S.C. § 7426 and a refund claim under 26 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) after the property was sold to satisfy tax liabilities. The district court granted the United States' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that a wrongful levy action does not apply because the sale occurred through a judicial lien foreclosure proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 7403 rather than an administrative levy under 26 U.S.C. § 6331, and that § 7426 provides the exclusive remedy for third-party claims, precluding a separate refund action. The court further noted that the plaintiff's interests should have been litigated in the prior foreclosure action in the Southern District of Alabama.

taxesfederal powerprocedure

This case involves claims by the EEOC on behalf of employee Kerry Woods against Boh Bros. Construction Co. for same-sex sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Woods alleged that his supervisor subjected him to derogatory name-calling such as 'faggot' and 'princess,' simulated sex acts, and other conduct because he did not conform to masculine stereotypes, and that he suffered adverse actions after reporting the behavior. The district court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on both claims, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the harassment occurred because of sex, was severe or pervasive, and whether the employer's response amounted to retaliation. The court also denied without prejudice the defendant's attempt to raise the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense at the summary judgment stage.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned a mortgage foreclosure dispute between Colonial Mortgage and Loan Corporation and debtor Marshall Ellzey following the completion of Ellzey's Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. Colonial filed a proof of claim for $9,634.02 but later sought additional amounts through state court foreclosure proceedings after the debtor's discharge, leading the bankruptcy court to rule that the proof of claim amount controlled and to dismiss claims against the debtor. This court affirmed that decision and denied Colonial's motion for rehearing, which argued that the confirmed Chapter 13 plan should dictate the debt amount based on a recent Supreme Court ruling. The court reasoned that a proof of claim provides prima facie evidence of the claim's validity and amount unless properly objected to, that the Supreme Court precedent did not apply because Colonial's proof of claim did not align with the plan, and that Colonial, as a participating creditor, could not challenge the amount after failing to amend its claim.

propertyprocedure

This case involved four white female employees at the Tangipahoa Parish Animal Control Office who sued the parish government and their black male supervisor, alleging race and sex discrimination and a hostile work environment under Title VII and Louisiana law, a procedural due process violation based on stigmatizing public statements after termination, and First Amendment retaliation for refusing to support the parish president's re-election campaign. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that some plaintiffs resigned voluntarily rather than being terminated, that terminations were based on performance issues rather than political retaliation, and that the employer had an adequate anti-harassment policy to support an affirmative defense. The court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the reasons for the plaintiffs' departures and the adequacy of the grievance procedures in the personnel manual, which did not sufficiently address harassment claims or allow bypass of supervisors as required for the Ellerth/Faragher defense.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfree speechelections

The case involved a homeowner who purchased a Katrina-damaged property and received an assigned Road Home grant that he claimed was undercalculated; after his appeal was denied, he sued the executive director of the Louisiana Recovery Authority in his official capacity, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act, the Housing and Community Development Act, and the Stafford Act, and seeking a declaration of rights violations plus an injunction to compel payment of an additional $22,022.60. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. It held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the claims because, despite the plaintiff's framing, the suit sought retroactive monetary relief from the state treasury rather than purely prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law, making the state the real party in interest. The court rejected arguments that the official acted outside his authority or that the relief could be characterized as prospective, noting that any judgment would require the state agency to disburse funds.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

This case is a redhibitory action under Louisiana law in which Washed Up on the Beach, LLC alleged hidden defects in a yacht and its three Mercury outboard motors that prevented the vessel from being used for its intended purpose, seeking rescission of the sale or a reduction in price after settling with the other defendants. Defendant Mercury moved for summary judgment, arguing among other things that the engines were mere component parts, that prior settlements extinguished any claim against it, and that it could not be held liable for the vessel as a whole. The court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the plaintiff's status as buyer, the extent of the defects and their effect on the vessel's usability, and the relationship between the boat and motors under redhibition doctrine, as well as unresolved questions about solidary liability versus comparative fault following the 1996 Civil Code revisions.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a challenge by Friends of St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Church to FEMA's decision to provide disaster relief funds for relocating Holy Cross School to the site of Cabrini Church in New Orleans, which was eligible for the National Register of Historic Places, after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Plaintiffs argued that FEMA failed to properly comply with the Section 106 review process under the National Historic Preservation Act and related regulations when approving the undertaking that would result in the church's demolition. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted FEMA's cross-motion, dismissing the claims. It held that FEMA substantially complied with NHPA Sections 106 and 110 through consultation, public meetings, and execution of a memorandum of agreement, and that any procedural missteps were harmless because they would not have altered the agency's "no adverse effect" determination or final outcome under the Administrative Procedure Act's deferential standard of review.

environmentprocedure

This diversity case involves plaintiffs BL Exploration and Biloxi Marsh Lands suing Hoover Oilfield Supply and Polyflow for damages after a natural gas flow line made of Thermoflex pipe, installed under defendants' supervision on land in St. Bernard Parish, ruptured during testing at 756 psi and damaged the marsh, wetlands, and water bottoms. Plaintiffs, who participated in a joint operating agreement for oil and gas development and bore costs for the line, alleged negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and redhibitory defects based on defendants' warranties that the pipe could handle 1200 psi and their role in fabrication and installation. The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), holding that the complaint must be liberally construed, all well-pleaded facts accepted as true, and plaintiffs had minimally stated plausible claims under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315 and 2316 plus redhibition rules, as factual questions like duty, breach, reasonable inspection, and seller's opportunity to repair could not be resolved at this stage.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over whether an insurance policy covered damage to a building's walls and floors allegedly caused by adhesive residue from protective barriers used during mold remediation after Hurricane Katrina. Trade-Winds Environmental Restoration performed the remediation work under contract with Stewart Development, and its insurer C&I sought summary judgment on coverage for the counter-claim by Stewart and Travelers. The court granted C&I's motion, holding that the damage was excluded under the policy's work product exclusions j(5) and j(6) because the barrier placement was part of Trade-Winds' operations and work on the property. The court reasoned that under New York law, the damage did not result from an "occurrence" as it stemmed from purposeful actions rather than an accident, and the exclusions applied to the specific parts of the property involved in the work.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a traveling evangelist who sued Southeastern Louisiana University officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the university's speech policy—which required a seven-day advance application and limited expressive activity to two hours per seven-day period—violated his First Amendment rights by restricting spontaneous speech and follow-up dialogue on campus. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages after university police stopped his demonstration and required compliance with the policy. The court had previously denied a preliminary injunction, and in this order it denied the plaintiff's motion to stay proceedings pending appeal while addressing motions for judgment on the pleadings. It denied dismissal of claims against the officials in their official capacities but granted dismissal of claims against them in their personal capacities, reasoning that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions in enforcing the policy were objectively reasonable and did not knowingly violate clearly established law.

free speechcivil rightsprocedure

In United States v. Jefferson, defendants Betty Jefferson and Mose Jefferson sought to dismiss lis pendens notices and forfeiture claims on multiple New Orleans properties tied to a superseding indictment charging RICO conspiracy, mail fraud, program fraud, money laundering, and related offenses. The district court denied the motions without prejudice, holding that the properties were subject to forfeiture under statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 1963 and that the notices of lis pendens were properly recorded to preserve the government's interest. The court reasoned that lis pendens is not a seizure requiring an evidentiary hearing and that the defendants had not yet shown concrete hardship, such as inability to sell or encumber the properties, sufficient to justify removal, though they could renew the motions with additional evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

Troy Taylor was convicted in Louisiana state court of second degree kidnapping and attempted second degree murder and sentenced to concurrent prison terms. He filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 asserting five claims: ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, double jeopardy, insufficient evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and denial of the right to present a defense. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, which reviewed the state court record under AEDPA standards, and dismissed the petition with prejudice after finding the state courts' decisions were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned homeowners who sued the United States after their property at 2311 Tricou Street in New Orleans was demolished in July 2007 by a contractor hired by the Army Corps of Engineers under post-Hurricane Katrina debris removal agreements. Plaintiffs claimed the demolition was wrongful due to inadequate notice and because their home was not an imminent threat, asserting both tort claims and constitutional due-process and takings violations. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the constitutional claims but denied it on the remaining issues. It held that due-process and takings claims are not justiciable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, while questions of immunity under Louisiana disaster statutes and whether the Corps acted as a representative of the City required further proceedings.

civil rightspropertyfederal powertorts & liability

In Banks v. New Orleans City, property owners sued the City of New Orleans, ECC, and the United States after their Ninth Ward home was demolished in 2007 as part of post-Katrina debris removal efforts, despite city inspections showing no major structural damage beyond flood issues and the owners having begun repairs. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment to cap recovery at the home's pre-demolition fair market value minus depreciation and to exclude mental anguish damages, arguing that Louisiana tort law aims only to restore plaintiffs to their prior position and that the demolition resulted from negligence rather than intent. The court denied both motions, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the appropriate measure of damages in light of the owners' long-term family attachment to the property and whether the demolition qualified as intentional conduct sufficient to support emotional distress claims under Louisiana law. These determinations, the court held, turn on subjective facts and weighing of evidence that must be resolved by a jury rather than on summary judgment.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act after slipping and falling on steps of a FEMA trailer without handrails while working for a FEMA contractor in Louisiana. The plaintiff had previously received a workers' compensation settlement from his employer. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The decision rested on findings that FEMA was not liable for the independent contractor's actions and that the discretionary function exception under the Stafford Act and FTCA applied, as trailer selection involved policy judgments without mandatory regulations dictating specific safety features.

torts & liabilityfederal powerprocedure

In this case arising from a 2008 collision on the Mississippi River between the M/V TINTOMARA and a barge that spilled oil, various parties filed limitation complaints and claims seeking damages under both the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) and general maritime law. The court addressed motions to dismiss the general maritime claims as preempted by OPA. It granted the motions, dismissing without prejudice all claims for damages covered under 33 U.S.C. § 2702. The court reasoned that OPA's mandatory language establishes it as the exclusive remedy for such covered damages, requiring claimants to first present claims to the responsible party through OPA's administrative procedures rather than pursuing parallel claims under general maritime law.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal powertorts & liability

This case concerned whether a commercial property insurance policy issued by United Fire covered losses from theft of copper wiring at a vacant New Orleans store that had been damaged by Hurricane Katrina. The court denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment and granted the policyholder's motion in part, finding that the insurer had waived the policy's 60-day vacancy exclusion. The core reasoning was that the insurer renewed the policy and accepted premiums with full knowledge of the vacancy pursuant to the Louisiana Commissioner's Emergency Rule 23, thereby waiving reliance on the exclusion under established Louisiana waiver precedents. Genuine issues of material fact remained on the amount of recovery and any penalties, so those portions of the motions were denied.

business & regulatoryproperty