Sandra Segal Ikuta

In Vegas Diamond Properties, LLC v. FDIC, two Nevada property owners sued La Jolla Bank (later placed in FDIC receivership) after obtaining loans allegedly used in a fraudulent scheme tied to an unrelated development project; they sought a temporary restraining order in state court to block a trustee's sale of their properties, and the FDIC moved to dissolve it after removal to federal court. The district court granted the FDIC's motion under FIRREA's anti-injunction provision, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j), and the owners appealed. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot because the properties were sold during the proceedings, holding that no live controversy remained and that the case did not meet narrow exceptions such as issues "capable of repetition yet evading review," since the plaintiffs could still pursue damages claims through the administrative process.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedurefederal power

The case involved the IRS issuing a summons to Wells Fargo Bank for records related to Viewtech, Inc.'s bank account as part of efforts to collect approximately $3 million in unpaid federal income taxes assessed against Jung Kwak. Viewtech and Kwak filed a motion to quash the summons, arguing that 26 U.S.C. § 7609 required the IRS to provide them notice, which would have allowed them to challenge it in court. The district court dismissed the motion for lack of standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Applying the framework from Ip v. United States, the court held that exceptions under § 7609(c)(2)(D) applied because of Kwak's substantial ownership interest in Viewtech, his role as an officer and employee, and the significant financial intertwining between them, including transfers of funds, meaning neither was entitled to notice. As a result, Viewtech and Kwak lacked standing to quash the summons.

taxesfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned Fulton Leroy Washington, who was convicted in 1996 of federal drug offenses involving PCP manufacturing and sentenced to life imprisonment based on judicial fact-finding at sentencing. After an unsuccessful direct appeal and two prior motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Washington filed a new motion styled as a Rule 60(b)(4) challenge claiming defects in his original habeas proceedings, including Confrontation Clause violations and actual innocence. The Ninth Circuit held that the motion was in substance a successive § 2255 petition that did not satisfy the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h) for new evidence or new constitutional rules, and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. The court vacated the district court's denial and remanded with instructions to dismiss the motion.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs Cecil Ingram, a disabled tenant in a wheelchair, and the Fair Housing Council suing landlord Armine Oroudjian and manager Antony Abelyan under the Fair Housing Act and California law, alleging discrimination after an eviction attempt via unlawful detainer proceedings that Ingram ultimately won in state court. The parties settled the federal claims for modest payments, after which plaintiffs moved for attorney fees of over $88,000; the district court awarded about $30,000 after reducing hours for certain work and lowering requested rates. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering settlement negotiations to assess success, disallowing fees for unnecessary briefing on Younger abstention, and determining reasonable hourly rates based on market evidence and its own familiarity with local fees.

civil rightsprocedure

Federal prisoner Gerson Nunez filed a pro se Bivens action alleging that a random strip search conducted by prison staff violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that related grievances implicated his First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that Nunez had not exhausted administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and, alternatively, that the Fourth Amendment claim lacked merit. The Ninth Circuit held that exhaustion was excused for the Fourth Amendment claim because prison officials failed to provide a requested program statement needed to prepare a proper grievance, but concluded that the claim failed on the merits because the search was reasonable under the circumstances. The court assumed without deciding that Nunez had alleged a First Amendment claim but held that he had not exhausted administrative remedies for it and affirmed dismissal on that basis.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, Claude Cassirer sued Spain and the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation to recover a Camille Pissarro painting allegedly confiscated from his grandmother by Nazi agents in 1939 and later acquired by the Foundation for display in Spain. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal regarding challenges to personal jurisdiction, standing, and justiciability due to lack of appellate jurisdiction. However, it exercised jurisdiction over the sovereign immunity issue under the collateral order doctrine and held that the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies even when the defendant foreign state did not itself expropriate the property, and that the defendants' commercial activities in the United States satisfied the statute's requirements. The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether an exhaustion requirement should be imposed.

propertyprocedurefederal power

This case involved K&N Engineering's lawsuit against Sarah Bulat and Steve Wandel for selling unauthorized decals bearing K&N's registered trademark logo on eBay, alleging trademark infringement, counterfeiting, and dilution under federal law. K&N elected to seek statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) rather than actual damages, and the district court awarded both $20,000 in statutory damages and $100,000 in attorney's fees. The Ninth Circuit reversed the attorney's fees award, holding that an election of statutory damages under § 1117(c) precludes fees under § 1117(b). The court reasoned from the statute's plain language that § 1117(b)'s mandatory fee provision applies only when a plaintiff seeks actual damages and profits under § 1117(a), and § 1117(c) makes no separate provision for fees.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In United States v. Zalapa, the defendant was indicted and pleaded guilty to three counts, including two under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) for possessing a single unregistered machine gun (one count for an unregistered machine gun and one for a firearm with a short barrel), after being found with the weapon and ammunition while on probation for a prior felony. The district court entered convictions and concurrent sentences on all counts without objection from the defendant. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the two firearm convictions were multiplicitous because Congress intended each firearm to be the unit of prosecution under the statute, violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that failure to object in the district court did not waive the right to raise this challenge on appeal. The court found plain error affecting substantial rights and the fairness of proceedings due to potential collateral consequences, reversed the judgment, and remanded with instructions to vacate one of the multiplicitous convictions, sentences, and assessments.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

This case concerned the interpretation of § 402(e) of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, which mandates 100 percent federal Medicaid reimbursement for services 'received through an Indian Health Service facility.' Arizona's Medicaid agency argued that this covered services provided by non-IHS providers under referral agreements with IHS, while the federal HCFA maintained it applied only to services directly offered, provided, and billed by IHS facilities themselves. The district court granted summary judgment to Arizona, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the statutory text, legislative history, and agency practice supported HCFA's narrower reading limiting full reimbursement to direct IHS services.

healthcarefederal power

In Stoner v. Santa Clara County Office of Education, a pro se relator brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against a county office of education, a school district, and individual employees, alleging they submitted false certifications of compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act to obtain federal funding. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against the governmental entities, reasoning that states and state agencies are not 'persons' subject to liability under the FCA, and held that a pro se relator cannot represent the United States in such an action. The court reversed the dismissal of claims against the individual defendants in their personal capacities and remanded to allow the plaintiff time to obtain counsel or pro hac vice admission, after which the action could proceed or be dismissed without prejudice to the government.

procedurefederal power

This case involved a securities class action settlement for alleged false representations by VERITAS Software Corporation about a transaction with AOL, which led to a $35 million proposed settlement covering multiple classes of securities. Appellant, a class member, objected to the adequacy of the notice sent to class members under the PSLRA and to the plan of allocation, including treatment of in-and-out traders and options traders, while also seeking attorneys' fees. The court held that the notice was inadequate because it misleadingly presented the estimated average recovery per share without clarifying assumptions about claim filing rates, in violation of PSLRA requirements, and therefore vacated the settlement approval in part and remanded the case. The denial of attorneys' fees was affirmed on the ground that the application was untimely.

business & regulatoryprocedure