Jeffrey R. Howard

The case involved D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund (now Fortress Value Recovery Fund I LLC) suing Vikas Mehrotra in Massachusetts state court for state-law fraud claims arising from an alleged scheme that defrauded Zwirn of roughly $7.5 million; Mehrotra removed the action to federal district court on diversity grounds and obtained dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds. On appeal, the First Circuit focused on whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The court held that the parties’ pleadings and affidavit were insufficient to establish complete diversity because Zwirn is a limited liability company whose citizenship is determined by the citizenship of all its members, and merely stating that no member was a Rhode Island citizen (Mehrotra’s state) did not affirmatively identify those members or trace citizenship through any layers of unincorporated entities. Relying on Supreme Court precedent such as Cameron v. Hodges and Seventh Circuit authority in Meyerson, the panel ordered Zwirn to file, under seal, a detailed jurisdictional statement listing every member’s identity and citizenship as of the date of removal, with Mehrotra given an opportunity to contest the filing.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Matos-Santana v. Holder, a Dominican Republic native and lawful permanent resident sought judicial review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' denial of his 2010 motion to reopen removal proceedings that had ended in a final order of removal in 2004. The petitioner had been ordered removed after his convictions for second-degree robbery and third-degree auto stripping, both classified as crimes involving moral turpitude, and he argued that the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky entitled him to reopen the case on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his auto-stripping plea. The First Circuit denied the petition, concluding that the motion was filed more than six years after the removal order became final and was therefore time-barred under the applicable statute and regulations. The court further held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen the proceedings, noting that the petitioner had made no effort to vacate his state conviction.

immigrationcriminal lawprocedure

In this case, Mr. S. moved to quash a grand jury subpoena served on his real estate attorney's law office for documents from a 2007 property purchase, including deeds, settlement statements, payment records, and related materials. He claimed protection under the attorney-client privilege because the attorney handled the transaction and under the Fifth Amendment, citing Fisher v. United States for the argument that documents transferred to counsel for legal advice could not be compelled. The district court denied the motion after in camera review. The First Circuit affirmed, ruling that the documents were standard transactional records prepared by the attorney rather than materials reflecting legal advice or confidentiality, so neither privilege applied and the hybrid Fisher claim failed.

criminal lawprocedure

In this age discrimination case under the ADEA, plaintiff Genaro Bonefont, a 71-year-old stevedore with 57 years at International Shipping Corp., sued after being fired for allegedly attempting to assault his supervisor during a heated argument. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, and the First Circuit affirmed. The court held that Bonefont failed to show evidence of discriminatory animus by the decision-maker, the HR director, who stated she terminated him based on a security report indicating he raised his hands to strike the supervisor. Even if the assault did not occur or the decision was unwise, the employer’s stated reason was not shown to be pretext for age bias, as coworker comments alone did not demonstrate that the decision was motivated by age rather than the reported conduct.

labor & employment

The case involved an appeal by Juan Garcia-Hernandez from his federal drug-trafficking convictions and sentence in New Hampshire, arising from a large-scale cocaine distribution operation uncovered through an informant and undercover work. Agents executed a search warrant at his home on April 12, 2009, using an armored vehicle, battering ram, and noise-flash devices without prior announcement, seizing cash, drugs, and paraphernalia, plus additional cocaine from his car; he moved to suppress the evidence for a knock-and-announce violation and challenged a three-level aggravating-role sentencing enhancement. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment, holding that Hudson v. Michigan (2006) categorically bars exclusion of evidence as a remedy for knock-and-announce violations and that USSG §3B1.1(b) authorizes the enhancement whenever the overall criminal activity involves five or more participants, regardless of how many individuals the defendant personally supervised. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court precedent controls the suppression issue and that the guideline text focuses on the scope of the enterprise rather than the precise number of direct supervisees.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a petition for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act after the petitioner succeeded in a habeas corpus challenge to his detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The petitioner, a lawful permanent resident with a prior state conviction, had been taken into custody without bond under the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) based on the Board of Immigration Appeals' interpretation that any post-IIRIRA release from criminal custody triggered the provision. The court had previously ruled that the statute was unambiguous and did not apply in these circumstances, granting relief. In denying fees, the court held that the government's position was substantially justified because the question of whether the statute was ambiguous under Chevron was a novel issue of first impression among the courts of appeals.

immigrationprocedure

In this case, three former career employees of the Puerto Rico Tourism Company and their spouses sued Commonwealth officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that their 2001 terminations violated the First Amendment by targeting their political affiliation and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by lacking adequate pre-termination procedures; they also asserted derivative claims under Puerto Rico law. A jury awarded compensatory damages, and the district court granted additional relief including reinstatement. On appeal, the First Circuit held that the First Amendment judgment must be vacated and remanded for a new trial because of erroneous jury instructions, while the due process judgment must be reversed because the plaintiffs lacked a protected property interest in their career positions, which had been obtained in violation of Puerto Rico's merit-based personnel laws. The court also vacated the derivative claims and struck the reinstatement order without prejudice, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

civil rightsfree speechlabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a Guatemalan national who entered the United States without inspection in 1994 and later sought asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protection based on her observations of violence in Guatemala, harm inflicted on her husband by relatives, and fears of being targeted as a wealthy returnee or due to gang violence. An immigration judge found her testimony credible but denied all relief, concluding there was no past persecution on a protected ground and no objectively reasonable fear of future persecution; the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit denied the petition for review under the substantial evidence standard, holding that the agency's findings were supported by the record and that the petitioner had not shown error of law or facts compelling a different outcome.

immigration

The case involved Medical Mutual Insurance Company of Maine seeking reimbursement under a directors and officers (D&O) liability policy from Indian Harbor Insurance Company for settlement costs and losses arising from an employment discrimination claim filed by a former CEO. The administrative and civil complaints named only the company as the respondent or defendant, though they alleged wrongful conduct by its directors and officers. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer, and the First Circuit affirmed, holding that the policy language limited coverage to claims made against the directors and officers themselves. The court reasoned that D&O policies are designed to protect individuals from personal liability through corporate indemnification, not to provide broad coverage for claims brought solely against the corporation.

business & regulatory

This case arose from a contract dispute between R&G Mortgage and Freddie Mac over the termination of R&G's mortgage servicing rights, which led to a sealed lawsuit settled by the parties. Doral Bank, which had been lined up as an interim servicer, moved to intervene after the settlement to challenge the sealing order and access the case records. The district court denied the motion as untimely and declined to hold a hearing on the sealing order. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed, holding that Doral had notice of the litigation well before settlement yet waited to act, that its intervention request was motivated by private interests rather than public access concerns, and that it had not shown prejudice because it could have obtained needed documents through a confidentiality agreement.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case is part of a multi-district class action in which nationwide consumers alleged that Johnson & Johnson and affiliated companies inflated published average wholesale prices for physician-administered drugs reimbursed by Medicare Part B, while offering secret discounts to doctors, thereby increasing consumers' co-payments. The district court entered a pre-trial judgment against the Class 1 plaintiffs (those making co-payments based on AWP), following a bench trial on related classes. On appeal, the First Circuit found the record unclear as to the precise scope of the judgment (including whether it covered claims under state laws other than Massachusetts Chapter 93A) and whether the plaintiffs had been given an opportunity to present evidence on material factual issues such as reasonable spread expectations. The court therefore vacated the judgment and remanded for further explanation and any appropriate proceedings under Rule 56, while preserving appeal rights.

healthcarebusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In United States v. Troy, the defendant was convicted by a jury of assaulting a federal Customs and Border Protection officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) after an incident at a border inspection facility in Maine where Troy attempted to enter a supervisor's office, ignored commands, and pushed an officer who had followed him. Troy appealed the district court's denial of his motion for acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence that the officer was engaged in official duties at the time of the altercation. The First Circuit affirmed the conviction, reasoning that a rational factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer's actions in investigating Troy's attempt to access a restricted area, determining his right to enter the United States, and maintaining security at the passenger processing area were within the scope of her official duties rather than personal conduct.

criminal lawimmigration

This case involved claims by insurers and other payers that AstraZeneca violated Massachusetts' consumer protection law (Chapter 93A) by causing the publication of inflated average wholesale prices (AWPs) for its drug Zoladex from 1997 to 2003. The district court, after a bench trial, found liability because the published AWPs did not reflect actual acquisition costs after discounts and rebates, creating an undisclosed 'spread' that led to overpayments by Medicare, insurers, and patients while benefiting physicians. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court's factual findings were supported by the evidence, its legal conclusions were correct, and the conduct constituted unfair and deceptive practices under Chapter 93A by exploiting the AWP benchmark for reimbursement. The court rejected AstraZeneca's challenges to the findings on injury, causation, and damages as lacking merit or sufficient development.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

The case involved a dispute between Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary (MEEI) and QLT Phototherapeutics over benefits conferred by MEEI during the development of Visudyne, a pharmaceutical treatment for age-related macular degeneration. MEEI claimed unjust enrichment, misappropriation of trade secrets, and violations of Massachusetts Chapter 93A unfair trade practices law after contract negotiations broke down. A jury found QLT unjustly enriched and in violation of Chapter 93A, awarding MEEI a 3.01% running royalty on global net sales as damages. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the liability and damages determinations, finding sufficient evidence and no error in the unjust enrichment and Chapter 93A rulings. The court vacated and remanded only the attorneys' fee award due to an incomplete record preventing meaningful review.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityhealthcare

In United States v. Graham, the defendant, a probationer subject to a search condition for prior drug offenses, was arrested pursuant to a warrant at an apartment where police reasonably believed he resided; officers then searched the bedroom and found a sawed-off shotgun, leading to federal charges for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Graham moved to suppress the evidence, claiming violations of the Fourth Amendment because police lacked a search warrant for the apartment entry or the bedroom search. The district court denied the motion, Graham entered a conditional guilty plea, and the First Circuit affirmed. The court held that the entry was valid under Payton v. New York based on the arrest warrant and reasonable belief of residence, while the bedroom search was justified as a probation search supported by reasonable suspicion of violations, given the probation condition that reduced Graham's privacy expectations and permitted warrantless searches.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, defendant James Hebshie was convicted after a jury trial on charges of arson under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), two counts of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and using fire to commit a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1), arising from a fire that damaged a commercial building housing his lottery and news store business, followed by an insurance claim. He appealed his convictions on the mail fraud and fire-related counts, as well as his sentence, arguing issues including the sufficiency of evidence, admissibility of certain evidence, and whether the arson statute imposed a mandatory minimum prison term. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment in full, holding that the evidence supported the convictions, no reversible error occurred at trial, and the statute's language required a five-year mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for the arson violation.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose from an insurance dispute in which Robinson sought coverage from Hartford for property damage caused by lead dust from a neighboring unit, which Hartford denied on the ground that it constituted pollution under the policy. Robinson obtained a declaratory judgment in state court that the loss was covered, after which Hartford paid the claim; Robinson then filed a second action alleging that Hartford's denial constituted an unfair trade practice under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A and seeking damages. The district court dismissed the second suit as barred by res judicata, but the First Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that, under Massachusetts law as informed by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 33, a final declaratory judgment that did not include coercive claims does not preclude a subsequent damages action arising from the same facts.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved an appeal by Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf challenging a district court's refusal to hold attorney Geoffrey Harper in contempt for disclosing documents from a grand jury proceeding to a reporter. The documents, which included a motion to stay and a stay order related to an arbitration discovery request, were subject to a sealing rule but were provided without explicit notice of the seal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, reasoning that Harper lacked culpable knowledge of the seal, as he was not a member of the local bar and the documents did not clearly compromise grand jury secrecy, and that no prejudice resulted from the disclosure. The court emphasized the discretionary nature of invoking inherent contempt powers when authority has not been offended.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves Drini Bebri, an Albanian national, petitioning for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' order affirming the denial of his asylum application by an immigration judge. Bebri claimed persecution due to his political activities with the Democratic Party of Albania, but the immigration judge found his testimony not credible due to multiple inconsistencies regarding the circumstances of an alleged beating and other aspects of his story. The court reviewed the record and determined that the adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, leading to the denial of the petition for judicial review.

immigration

The case involved a contract dispute between orthopedic surgeon Dr. Murali Jasty and Wright Medical Technology, Inc. over consulting services for developing an artificial knee system, including annual payments through 1999, royalties, and IPO-related compensation. Jasty sued for breach of contract after Wright stopped payments, while Wright counterclaimed and Jasty added claims under state consumer protection laws. The district court granted summary judgment to Jasty on the breach claim and to Wright on the consumer protection claims. The First Circuit affirmed across all issues, holding that the contract language entitled Jasty to payments based on his design contributions without requiring ongoing services after 1999, that Tennessee law governed prejudgment interest, and that other procedural rulings were proper.

business & regulatoryhealthcare